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This dissertation explores a phenomenon of corporate advocacy giving: 
philanthropic giving by corporations to 501c3 advocacy nonprofits (e.g., activist groups, 
think tanks) via their affiliated foundations. Corporate philanthropy is often 
conceptualized as the voluntary redistribution of corporate wealth, channeled through 
service nonprofits. However, another important function of nonprofits is advocacy, which 
leads to the question of whether corporate giving is channeled toward advocacy 
nonprofits and what role it plays in the repertoire of firms’ nonmarket strategies. Given 
the lack of prior knowledge on this phenomenon, throughout three chapters of my 
dissertation, I develop an initial yet systematic understanding on this underexplored 
phenomenon of corporate advocacy giving. Based on a novel database on corporate 
advocacy giving from 2003 to 2015, I find that it is not only an empirically significant 
phenomenon, but also plays a distinctive role in the repertoire of firm nonmarket 
strategies. Especially, my findings suggest that it can be understood as an underexplored 
channel of corporate activism pursued to advance firm employees' issue-related 
ideological preferences, which can often be homogeneous and extreme. In doing so, I 
present a more nuanced and less optimistic take on the role of corporate philanthropic 
giving in society, thus raising the need for effective monitoring on the practice.        
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Philanthropy has long been a tool used by society to address its needs with the 
help of private actors. It is particularly important in American society, where the role of 
government is traditionally limited, and a substantial portion of public goods provision is 
left to the hands of constituents in the private sphere. As elite power holders in society, 
firms are often expected to do their share, thus carrying expectations not only to enhance 
the wealth of their shareholders, but also to share some of their wealth with diverse 
members of society. Corporate philanthropy is a primary avenue by which firms execute 
such voluntary redistribution of their wealth, channeled through service nonprofits (e.g., 
soup kitchens, homeless shelters) that deliver various social goods and services (e.g., 
food, shelter) to those in need. 
However, potential recipients for corporate philanthropy include not just service 
nonprofits, but also advocacy nonprofits that specialize in framing public discourse by 
influencing society’s conceptions about which issues matter and how they should be dealt 
with, especially for the most salient and contentious social issues of our time (e.g., global 
warming, LGBTQ rights, gun control). For example, The Recycling Partnership, a 
nonprofit specialized in advocacy on global warming, raised $10 Mil from firms from 
2013 to 2017, which accounted for 85% of its entire revenue. While prior work has paid 
scant attention to this phenomenon of corporate advocacy giving, largely equating it with 
giving that goes to service nonprofits, the fundamentally different function of advocacy 
nonprofits points to a distinct motivation behind firms’ decision to fund them. Their 
unique function presents the possibility that firms could use advocacy giving to actively 
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shape what the public care about, in an effort to align public interests with firm members’ 
internal interests, while the prior literature assumes that firms give to the areas that the 
public care about. Notably, this is a qualitatively different and more nuanced take on the 
role of corporate giving in society, raising important questions about the appropriate 
limits on powerful business actors’ participation in civic discourse, and the use of tax-
exempt philanthropic giving to those ends. 
Despite the theoretical and practical importance of this phenomenon, little 
scholarly attention has been given to this matter. Thus, throughout three chapters of my 
dissertation, I seek to develop an initial yet systematic understanding on this 
underexplored phenomenon. To this end, I built a novel database on corporate advocacy 
giving from 2003 to 2015 by collecting detailed information on not only corporate givers, 
but also their 48,325 recipient nonprofit organizations. This enables me to track which 
issues and geographic areas a specific corporate grant goes to, and also which function of 
nonprofit organizations it supports, allowing me to break down giving to advocacy vs. 
service nonprofits at an individual grant level. The resulting database includes over one 
billion dollars of advocacy grants from 441 corporations. The dissertation is organized as 
the following three chapters. 
First chapter of dissertation: What is corporate advocacy giving? 
The first chapter of my dissertation focuses on filling this gap by documenting 
key stylized facts to provide a baseline for further inquiry into this understudied 
phenomenon. Specifically, this essay centers on the following two questions. First, is 
corporate advocacy giving an empirically significant phenomenon? Second, how is it 
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distinct from alternative nonmarket strategies, such as traditional service giving and 
lobbying? To this end, I built a novel database on corporate advocacy giving from 2003 
to 2015 by collecting detailed information on not only corporate givers, but also their 
48,325 recipient nonprofit organizations. This enables me to track which issues and 
geographic areas a specific corporate grant goes to, and also which function of nonprofit 
organizations it supports, allowing me to break down giving to advocacy vs. service 
nonprofits at an individual grant level. The resulting database includes over one billion 
dollars of advocacy grants from 441 corporations. 
According to my data, the majority of corporate givers (72%) give to advocacy 
nonprofits, directing about 7% of their entire giving to these organizations. From the side 
of advocacy nonprofits, corporate giving accounts for over 40% of these recipients’ 
external organizational contributions. Also, when giving to advocacy nonprofits, firms 
support causes different from those in service giving, and their advocacy giving is not 
only more focused and differentiated than service giving, but also more closely connected 
to employees’ preferences. These patterns suggest that, while service giving is largely 
reactive to external societal demands as understood in the literature, advocacy giving is 
more closely linked to firms’ own internal preferences. Moreover, I find that a substantial 
number of advocacy givers do not engage in lobbying at all, and even among firms that 
engage in both, the correlation between the two is modest. Also, compared to firms that 
lobby exclusively, advocacy givers are more employee-focused, suggesting that advocacy 
giving may target broader ranges of issues that are not necessarily directly related to 
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firms’ core business operation yet may elicit strong emotions and reactions among their 
internal stakeholders. 
Overall, the first chapter of my dissertation shows that corporate advocacy giving 
is not only an empirically significant phenomenon, but also a distinct form of corporate 
giving that is pursued in ways systematically different from traditional corporate service 
giving, thus calling for more scholarly attention on this understudied phenomenon. 
Notably, the systematic pattern of differences between advocacy giving and alternative 
forms of nonmarket strategies provides initial evidence for the possibility that corporate 
advocacy giving may be understood as a channel of employee activism, whereby a firm’s 
employees may use philanthropic resources to shape the nature of public discourse 
around issues that they care about to their private preferences. 
Second chapter of dissertation: Why do firms engage in advocacy giving? 
In the second chapter of my dissertation, I further explore this possibility by 
investigating the role of firms’ organizational members’ ideological interests on their 
decision to engage in advocacy giving. While the first chapter highlights firms’ internal 
interests as the potential driver of advocacy giving, what remains unclear is the nature of 
such interests. One possibility of interest is that those interests represent highly 
ideological preferences held by CEOs and other employees of the firm (i.e., strong 
liberals or conservatives), who are motivated to use its philanthropic resources to 
influence civic discourse around advocacy issues of their concern. While nonmarket 
scholars have long focused on external drivers of corporate social and philanthropic 
activities, scholars have recently started to highlight intrinsic and normative motivations 
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of a firm’s internal organizational members as an underexplored driver of those activities. 
According to these studies, firms often develop a strong ideological leaning among their 
membership via a sorting mechanism (i.e., individuals are attracted to and stay with the 
firms whose employees exhibit similar preferences to themselves) and such ideological 
clustering of like-minded individuals shape the pattern of corporate social actions. 
While these existing studies have demonstrated the role of such organizational 
ideological preferences in the context of traditional service issues (e.g., providing food 
and shelter to people in need), there are reasons to expect that its role will not only be 
more pronounced around advocacy issues, but also play out in a different manner. Most 
existing studies focus on the relationship between the direction of the firm’s ideological 
leaning among their workforce and the level of its social engagement, by showing that 
liberal firms are willing to invest more in CSR than conservative firms. Unlike traditional 
service issues, which focus on provisioning necessary social goods and services to those 
in need and thus appeal disproportionately to liberals who care more about 
egalitarianism, advocacy issues are unique in that they tend to attract attention from 
people of both ideological leanings. Therefore, it remains unclear which ideological 
characteristics within the organization would shape firms’ engagement around advocacy 
issues of contentious nature, and in what ways. 
This paper addresses this gap by uncovering multiple ideological attributes of the 
organization as important antecedents that jointly affect firms’ willingness to engage in 
corporate activism, thus departing from the existing focus on the direction of ideological 
leaning. First, I examine the role of the intensity of employees’ ideological preferences, 
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which refers to the importance of ideology to average organizational members’ self-
concept. After all, not all employees are ideologically motivated, and this variation 
matters, as only those with higher ideological intensity are willing to put a high price tag 
on the firm’s action. Indeed, While controlling for the effect of the average ideological 
position of the firm’s workforce, I find that firms with a higher ideological intensity, 
proxied as firms with a higher number of employees that make campaign political 
contributions, do give more to advocacy issues. I also consider additional ideological 
attributes of the organization as moderators, finding that the positive effect of ideological 
intensity holds only for those whose members think not only similarly to each other but 
also hold extreme preferences.  
Overall, the main finding of the second chapter—ideological preferences of firms’ 
organizational members as the main driver of corporate advocacy giving—is highly 
consistent with the main idea behind my dissertation: firms’ internal stakeholders may 
use giving to shape what society wants for their own internal preferences, rather than 
using such giving as a public tool to fulfill the needs of society.  
Third chapter of dissertation: What happens afterwards? 
In the second chapter, I answered the question of why firms engage in advocacy 
giving, demonstrating the effect of a focal firm’s ideology on its own social actions. 
However, we are yet to study its broader spillover effects: specifically, how ideological 
firms’ initial advocacy actions affect the actions of other firms in the population. 
Traditional accounts of how firms influence others’ philanthropic actions have 
focused on homogeneity and isomorphism, showing that firms tend to give more when 
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others give more. This finding suggests that initial giving by ideological firms may 
encourage their ideological allies to give, thus inviting widespread support for the issue. 
In this way, initiating ideological firms may act as “issue entrepreneurs” that put an issue 
into play by raising its salience in their field. Yet, what remains underexplored is the 
possibility that initiating firms’ actions may invite competition and countermobilization 
from their ideological rivals, who may join in the debate with a different or even 
opposing issue position. In the second chapter of my dissertation, I focus on this tension, 
positing that competitive response from ideological opponents may dominate the 
response from ideological allies. This is not only because the perceived costs for inaction 
are likely to be higher for organizational members of ideological opponents, but also 
because ideological opponents can strategically differentiate themselves with such 
counter-response in the eyes of their employees.  
My analyses show that while ideological firms’ giving encourages their 
ideological allies’ giving in the issue area of their choice, it also invites their ideological 
opponents’ giving, with the response from the opponents often dominating the response 
from the allies. Such selective counter-response from ideological opponents is stronger in 
swing states, and among firms with radical preferences, consistent with my theory that 
this response reflects the dynamics of within-issue competition between firms that lie at 
the opposite ends of the ideological spectrum. These findings suggest that ideological 
firms’ initial action to promote the cause may backfire by inviting a disproportionately 
stronger response from their ideological opponents compared to their allies, thus 




CHAPTER 1: CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY  




In the nonmarket literature, corporate social responsibility (CSR) and 
philanthropic giving are often viewed as strategic tools used to fulfill the demands of 
external stakeholders. Specifically, firms can fulfill the demands of the public and other 
external stakeholders, who want to see firms give to social areas of need, by channeling 
donations to service nonprofits that provide social goods and services (e.g., food, shelter) 
(Porter and Kramer, 2002; Bénabou and Tirole, 2010; Kaul and Luo, 2018). Scholars 
have shown that this voluntary social commitment and resulting goodwill from a variety 
of external stakeholders can translate into various strategic benefits: higher willingness to 
pay by customers (Elfenbein and McManus, 2010; Lev, Petrovits, and Radhakrishnan, 
2010), more lenient assessment by investors and regulators (Mackey, Mackey, and 
Barney, 2007; Wang and Qian, 2011), and effective impression management and 
reputation repair in the face of activist attacks (McDonnell and King, 2013; Ingram, Yue, 
and Rao, 2010; Godfrey, 2005; Luo, Kaul, and Seo, 2018). Importantly, what these 
explanations have in common is that they see firms undertaking philanthropy in response 
to exogenous stakeholder pressures and social needs, such that firms can address 
demands of stakeholders by funding service nonprofits operating in the issues that are 
dear to those stakeholders. 
However, the population of potential recipients for corporate philanthropy 
includes not just service nonprofits, but also advocacy nonprofits such as activist groups 
and think tanks (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Jenkins and Halcli, 1999; Kimberlin, 2010). 
For example, The Recycling Partnership, a 501(c)3 advocacy nonprofit specialized on 
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matters of environmental degradation and global warming, raised $10 million from firms 
from 2013 to 2017, which accounted for approximately 85% of its entire revenue 
(O’Neil, 2018). While the extant literature has paid scant attention to this phenomenon of 
corporate advocacy giving, largely equating it with service giving, the fundamentally 
different organizational function of advocacy nonprofits points to a distinct motivation 
that may drive firms’ decision to fund them. Unlike service nonprofits, advocacy 
nonprofits specialize in framing public discourse, influencing society’s conceptions about 
what issues matter and how they should be dealt with, and thus, they are often viewed as 
the moving force behind major cultural changes (King and Soule, 2007; Hiatt, Sine, and 
Tolbert, 2009). This suggests not only that stakeholders’ preferences and demands are 
endogenous, but also, more importantly, that firms may use their giving to advocacy 
nonprofits as a means of shaping the process of institutional change to their 
organizational members’ internal preferences and interests (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008).  
Firms’ use of nonmarket strategies for their internal interests and benefits is well 
acknowledged in the broader nonmarket literature, especially in the arena of public 
politics that study how firms engage in lobbying and campaign contributions to influence 
key public stakeholders such as policymakers and regulators (Hillman, Zardkoohi, and 
Bierman, 1999; De Figueiredo and Tiller, 2001; De Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006; 
Bonardi and Keum, 2005; Jia, 2014; Choi, Jia, and Lu, 2015; Richter and Werner, 2017). 
Extending this knowledge, scholars have recently shown that firms can also use CSR 
(Werner, 2015; McDonnell and King, 2018) and corporate philanthropy in particular 
(Bertrand et al., 2018; 2020) as a means to influence policy issues of direct strategic 
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relevance for their operation (e.g., taxation, subsidy). Yet, what remains relatively 
underexplored is the possibility that firms may use their philanthropic donation as a 
channel of corporate activism to influence society around on the issues that have little 
direct relevance to the way firms run their businesses and are rather a part of bigger 
sociopolitical debate. Indeed, this possibility is consistent with the growing body of 
research showing that firms and executives are increasingly weighing in on the issue that 
is peripheral to their core business operation, essentially acting like activist themselves by 
mobilizing the public (Walker and Rea, 2014; Chatterji and Toffel, 2019; Hambrick and 
Wowak, 2020). Despite such novel theoretical possibility, our scholarly interest in this 
phenomenon of corporate advocacy giving has been limited. 
Given the lack of our prior knowledge on this phenomenon of corporate advocacy 
giving, including even the basic facts such as how many firms give to advocacy 
nonprofits, how much, where, and who they are, this paper takes an exploratory, fact-
based approach that documents key stylized facts to provide a baseline for further inquiry 
into this understudied phenomenon (Helfat, 2007; Oxley et al., 2010; Bettis et al., 2014; 
James and Shaver, 2016; Moeen and Agarwal, 2017). I begin this paper by asking if 
corporate advocacy giving is an empirically significant phenomenon in the first place. 
Upon establishing the empirical significance of corporate advocacy giving, I then move 
on to exploring its strategic role in the repertoire of corporate nonmarket strategies, by 
asking if and how advocacy giving is distinctive from alternative forms of nonmarket 
strategies. To this end, I compare corporate advocacy giving to its two empirical and 
theoretical counterparts whose roles are relatively well understood in the nonmarket 
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literature: corporate service giving (Porter and Kramer, 2002; Bénabou and Tirole, 2010; 
Kaul and Luo, 2018) and lobbying (De Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006; Jia, 2014; 
Richter and Werner, 2017). The comparison to service giving helps to inform if and to 
what extent advocacy giving, unlike the traditional reactive form of service giving 
attending to unmet needs and demands of society, can be understood as a internally 
driven strategy based on the firm members’ private demands and preferences, which may 
significantly diverge from what’s objectively needed in society. The comparison against 
lobbying activities helps to evaluate the scope and nature of issues that firms are trying to 
influence via their advocacy giving and, in particular, if they target broader sociopolitical 
issues that extend beyond the traditional focus of lobbying activities centered around 
economic issues. Taken together, the systematic patterns of dissimilarity would present 
us with initial evidence that informs if corporate advocacy giving is a distinctive form of 
nonmarket strategy that deserves more scholarly attention, and specifically if it can be 
understood as a novel form of corporate activism driven by the firm’s internal 
organizational members’ private preferences. 
Based on about 0.4 million grant-level records of Fortune 1000 companies’ 
philanthropic donations through corporate foundations from 2003 to 2010, I find that 
about 72% of corporate givers give to advocacy, not just to service, and they spend $534 
Mil in total on advocacy giving, accounting for about 7% of their entire donation 
spending. Also, corporate money that goes to advocacy nonprofits accounts for over 40% 
of these recipients’ entire organizational funding, pointing to the potential significant 
influence firms may exercise on those advocacy groups. I also find the systematic 
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differences that exist between corporate advocacy giving and the two alternative forms of 
nonmarket strategies: corporate service giving and lobbying. When giving to advocacy 
nonprofits, firms support causes that are often different from those that they support 
through service giving, and advocacy giving tends to be both more focused and 
differentiated than service giving. These patterns suggest that, while service giving is 
largely reactive to external stakeholder demands, advocacy giving is more closely linked 
to firms’ own internal needs, being pursued by firms in a more differentiated and focused 
manner, especially by those that have strong incentives to care about employees’ 
demands. The final analysis that compares advocacy giving to lobbying activities shows 
that, while many advocacy givers engage in lobbying, a substantial number of advocacy 
givers do not engage in lobbying at all, and even within the population of firms that 
engage in both activities, the correlation between the two is fairly modest. Importantly, 
advocacy givers, compared to exclusive lobbying firms, are more employee-focused, 
suggesting that advocacy giving may be understood as a channel of employee activism, 
whereby employees use their firm’s philanthropic resources as a vehicle for activism to 
influence social discourse around issues that they personally care about, and do not 
necessarily have direct economic relevance to the firm’s core business operations. 
This study contributes to the literature on nonmarket strategy in multiple ways. To 
the best of my knowledge, it is one of the first studies that systematically examines the 
phenomenon of corporate advocacy giving with large-scale data (Bertrand et al., 2018; 
2020). In doing so, this research demonstrates the phenomenon’s empirical significance 
while also showing that it is pursued in ways systematically different from other 
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nonmarket strategies such as corporate service giving or lobbying, thus highlighting the 
unique role it may play in the broad repertoire of nonmarket strategies and providing a 
solid ground for future research on this phenomenon. Second, this study contributes to 
the corporate philanthropy literature by extending its scholarly conceptions of what 
corporate giving is. By the existing CSR accounts, corporate philanthropy is typically 
conceptualized as a form of delegated philanthropy, whereby firms give back to society 
in expectation of rewards from external stakeholders by funding of service nonprofits 
(e.g., soup kitchens, homeless shelters) that deliver social goods and services to people in 
need. While this view of corporate giving as a means of voluntary redistribution of 
corporate wealth and stakeholder management tool applies well to the traditional form of 
service giving, it does not hold in the case of corporate advocacy giving. My findings 
suggest that firms give to advocacy not because others expect them to give, but because 
firms’ organizational members have their own private, internal preferences to give to 
certain advocacy causes, which may deviate from what’s best for society. In doing so, I 
extend our view on why firms give and how firms can benefit from such giving, thus 
joining a growing body of research that examines firms’ proactive use of CSR and 
specifically tax-exempt corporate philanthropy for their own private benefits and its 
welfare implications (Werner, 2015; McDonnell and King, 2018; Barnett, 2019; Lyon et 
al., 2018; Kaul and Luo, 2018; Oelberger, 2018; Gehringer; 2021). Third, this paper joins 
an emerging body of literature that study how firms’ influence to shape the social and 
institutional environment is not limited to the limited scope of political and economic 
issues that have direct relevance to the firms’ business operations. While scholars have 
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shown that firms often engage in efforts to organize movements of their own by engaging 
the public (Walker, 2009; 2014, Walker and Rea, 2014), our knowledge on such 
proactive role that firms play outside the political arena of traditional lobbying activities 
is still relatively limited. This paper shows that corporate philanthropy can serve as 
another unexplored channel of corporate activism, with employees using their firm’s 
philanthropic resources to fund advocacy groups specialized in issues that they personally 
care about and thus to potentially shape the nature of broader sociopolitical debates to 
their private preferences. 
1.2. Data 
To establish corporate advocacy giving as an empirically significant phenomenon 
and compare it to the alternative forms of nonmarket strategies, the first and foremost 
task is to build a reliable database on it. To this end, I draw on multiple datasets of 
different natures.  
The first dataset comes from the Foundation Center, a nonprofit organization that 
compiles information on U.S. philanthropic foundations and their grants. Its Foundation 
Directory Online (FDO) database provides the single most comprehensive coverage on 
U.S. based philanthropic foundations and their grants (Luo et al., 2018), compiling the 
information on over 3 million grants made by 28,851 foundations during my study period 
of 2003 to 2010. Its grant data are originally drawn from the IRS Form 990s (Return of 
Organization Exempt from Income tax), which philanthropic foundations are mandated to 
file annually. My sampling frame is the public firms in Fortune 1000, based on which I 
map the list of corporate foundations and direct giving programs in the FDO dataset that 
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are affiliated to these Fortune 1000. This leaves me with 426 companies and       detailed 
information on about 0.3 Mil records of their grants totaling $9 Bil, including the 
recipient nonprofit’s name, location, and unique organizational identifier (EIN). 
The availability of EIN information allows a clean matching of the FDO database 
to the second main database of my study: Exempt Organizations Business Master File 
Extract (EO BMF). This is a master file on U.S. tax-exempt nonprofits that provides 
various information on their organizational characteristics. The most important 
information from this file is, to this study’s interest, a nonprofit’s primary organizational 
purpose, which I use to identify which of the grants correspond to advocacy giving. 
Following the previous studies (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Minkoff and Agnone, 2010; 
Coke et al., 2009), I operationalize a given grant as advocacy giving if it goes to a 
nonprofit whose primary purpose is advocacy as defined by the National Taxonomy of 
Exempt Entities Core Codes (NTEE-CC; a standard classification system in the nonprofit 
sector similar to SIC in the for-profit sector)1. The details of the categorization scheme 
are reported in Appendix Table 1.1. This approach of identifying advocacy nonprofits has 
a huge advantage in terms of its comprehensiveness, especially compared to the popular 
alternative of media report-based sampling of advocacy organizations that is known to be 
biased towards oversampling organizations of certain size and location (Earl et al., 2004). 
The coverage of BMF file is based on the IRS forms required for any exempt 
 
1 This mostly includes R (Civil Rights, Social Action, Advocacy) in NTEE major code, or 01 (alliances & 
advocacy) and 05 (public policy analysis) in NTEE subcode. 
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organizations with gross receipts of over $50,0002 and is thus extensive, providing the 
necessary information on over 1 Mil nonprofits during my study period. However, an 
important limitation with this approach should be noted. As the NTEE-CC categorization 
system categorizes nonprofits only by their primary mission, I cannot track advocacy 
giving that goes to nonprofits whose core mission is not advocacy but still engages in it 
as a secondary function. While the extant understanding is that most nonprofit advocacy 
is performed by core advocacy groups (Kimberlin, 2010), it does warrant that my 
observation about the prevalence of corporate advocacy giving, especially its relative 
prevalence compared to service giving, should be interpreted strictly as a conservative, 
lower-bound estimate. 
In addition to the donation data, this paper’s inquiry also requires the dataset on 
firms’ lobbying activities, which serve as the second empirical counterpart to the 
phenomenon of corporate advocacy giving. The data come from the firm-level lobbying 
database at lobbyview.org (Kim, 2018), which is originally generated from lobbying 
reports filed between 1999 and 2017 and recorded at the Senate Office of Public Records. 
I also draw on a variety of other sources that include Compustat and KLD Research & 
Analytics, etc., which provide additional firm-level financial and operational information. 
1.3. Empirical Prevalence of Corporate Advocacy Giving 
In the first section, I focus on examining the empirical significance of corporate 
advocacy giving in my sample. I begin this section by calling attention to the fact that a 
 
2 While the threshold was lowered to $25,000 as of 2009, I keep the $50,000 cutoff throughout the entire 
period to ensure the consistency in the sample of 501(c) nonprofit recipients. 
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substantial number of corporate givers give to advocacy nonprofits. In the entire sample 
of Fortune 1000 companies with affiliated foundations or direct giving programs, I find 
that 72% of them give at least once to advocacy nonprofits during the study period3. At 
the firm-year level, the proportion of firms that give to advocacy in each year is on 
average 54%. Clearly, corporate advocacy giving is an inherent part of philanthropic 
practices for the majority of corporate givers.  
The absolute dollar figure of advocacy grant that firms made during the sample 
period (2003 - 2010) is $534 Mil. In the years when they give, they give about 7% of 
their total giving to advocacy nonprofits; this portion is not small, especially given the 
significantly smaller presence of advocacy nonprofits in the entire recipient population 
(2% by income and 1% by asset size)4. I also find a significant variance in the relative 
magnitude of advocacy giving to service giving across firms. Figure 1.1 maps the 
distribution of the share of advocacy grant in total grant at the firm–year level. On the 
one hand, it is clear that a lot of companies dedicate only a very small portion of their 
giving to advocacy, with about half of them giving under 4%. On the other hand, the 
figure also illustrates that the ratio of advocacy giving does range widely from 0.1% to 
100% (standard deviation is 10%). In other words, there exist companies whose 
 
3 In the entire sample of Fortune 1000 firms, 38% of the firms are identified to have made at least one 
donation during the study period. 
4 The relative magnitude of corporate advocacy giving is substantial compared to lobbying as well (the 
second counterpart), with the amount of advocacy giving representing around 8% of firms’ federal 
lobbying expenditures for those in my sample in 2010. If we apply a 6% advocacy-giving ratio to the 
reported amount of entire philanthropic giving made by corporations in 2010 (Giving USA, 2010), the 
implied dollar value of advocacy giving is $1.07 Bil, which amounts to about 26% of total lobbying 
spending in that year. 
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advocacy-giving ratio is far over the average value of 7%, with some of them dedicating 
their entire philanthropic expenditure to advocacy organizations. 
***Insert Figure 1.1 about here*** 
Taken together, these figures imply that advocacy giving may indeed be an 
important component of corporate philanthropic practices, with the majority of firms 
allocating at least some portion of their giving to advocacy, and with some of them 
spending a lot more than others. Yet, a more important question is what corporate 
advocacy giving means from the side of nonprofit recipients—that is, if it is big enough 
to represent significant influence on recipient advocacy organizations. This question is 
especially important in light of the key potential motivation behind advocacy giving, such 
that firms may use philanthropic giving as a tool to influence advocacy organizations’ 
goals and activities. Thus, what matters is the relative significance of corporate 
contributions compared to recipient nonprofits’ alternative sources of funding. To this 
end, I look into how many advocacy nonprofits are the recipients of corporate 
philanthropy in the first place. I find that among 20,046 advocacy nonprofits that are 
identified on BMF file, 2,413 organizations receive funding from Fortune 1000 
companies at least once during the sample period. This corresponds to about 12% of the 
entire advocacy nonprofit population, showing that a substantial portion of this 
population is subject to the influence from corporations at least to some extent. 
Importantly, a lot of these nonprofit recipients of corporate advocacy giving depend quite 
heavily on corporate money. Within the sample of corporate advocacy giving recipients, 
the average value of dependence on corporate funding at the recipient organization level 
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is 41%; that is, corporate giving accounts for a major portion of the total organizational 
funding these advocacy nonprofits collect in each year, which includes funding from the 
various sources captured in the FDO data—independent/family foundations, community 
foundations, government organizations, etc5.  
A closer look at the distribution, which is illustrated in Figure 1.2, shows an 
interesting pattern of heterogeneity in the level of dependence on corporate funding 
across these advocacy recipients. The standard deviation in this distribution is very 
high—39%, which is consistent with the bimodal distribution shown in Figure 1.2 with 
two peaks on the opposite ends of the spectrum; thus, advocacy recipients tend to show 
either a low level of dependence on corporate funding or a very high level of dependence. 
Interestingly, the peak in the right end of the dependence—i.e., 100% dependence on 
corporate grant—is the highest, a result which suggests corporate preference for 
recipients for which they can be the exclusive source of funding. 
***Insert Figure 1.2 about here*** 
In summary, the descriptive analyses that investigate the significance of corporate 
advocacy giving from the sides of both corporate givers and advocacy recipients produce 
several initial insights. For one, corporate advocacy giving is an action taken by the 
majority of firms that give, suggesting that it is indeed an important component of firms’ 
 
5 To be clear, it does not include other income sources of nonprofits such as individual giving or program 
revenue generated through nonprofits’ own operational activities. However, previous research does suggest 
that foundation funding has traditionally been the major source of funding for a lot of advocacy nonprofits 
(Jenkins and Halcli, 1999; Berry, 2015). For instance, Berry (2015) notes that, according to his interviews, 
roughly 1/3 of all the nonprofit advocacy groups that have begun in the past five years were obtaining at 
least half of their total income from foundations. 
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philanthropic portfolios. Also, the findings support the empirical significance of 
advocacy giving in terms of giving amount—especially in terms of what it means from 
the nonprofit recipient side. Not only does advocacy giving account for a substantial 
share of firms’ entire philanthropic expenditures, it represents an even bigger share of 
funding when it comes to advocacy nonprofits that are the recipients of corporate giving, 
implying the possibility that corporate funders’ influence on them can indeed be 
substantial. Finally, I observe a significant heterogeneity across firms in their engagement 
levels with advocacy giving. Some never give to advocacy, whereas a lot of companies 
do. Also, while many dedicate only a small portion of their philanthropic expenditures to 
advocacy, there exist corporate givers who give out substantial portions to advocacy—in 
some cases, the entire amount of philanthropic expenditure in that year. 
1.4. Distinctiveness of Corporate Advocacy Giving from Service Giving 
1.4.1. Are they different? 
Having established the empirical significance of the phenomenon of corporate 
advocacy giving, I turn to the next question: how distinctive is this phenomenon from the 
alternative forms of nonmarket strategies?  
This section focuses on the comparison with the first counterpart, by asking if 
corporate advocacy giving is different from service giving, and if so, how. After all, most 
studies in the nonmarket literature have long equated corporate philanthropic giving with 
service giving, which refers to donation to service nonprofits whose role focuses on 
provisioning various social goods and services to those in need (Porter and Kramer, 2002; 
Bénabou and Tirole, 2010; Kaul and Luo, 2018). Underlying this generalization in the 
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literature is the assumption that advocacy giving is not substantially different from 
service giving. This assumption serves as the null hypothesis of this section. 
Under this null hypothesis, corporate advocacy giving plays essentially the same 
strategic role with service giving; thus, the traditional understanding of how philanthropic 
giving can create strategic value to firms can be readily extended to the case of advocacy 
giving. According to this logic, firms give to advocacy nonprofits because external 
stakeholders want them to meet social needs. That is, there exist external stakeholders 
who care about advocacy issues (e.g., LGBTQ rights, racial equality issues, school 
reform, environmental protection), and firms can buy goodwill from those stakeholders 
by supporting advocacy nonprofits in those issues that are salient in stakeholders’ minds, 
which is then likely to form goodwill with multiple external stakeholders such as 
customers, investors, and regulators (Elfenbein and McManus, 2010; Lev et al., 2010; 
Mackey et al., 2007; Bode et al., 2015; Burbano, 2016; Wang and Qian, 2011). Overall, 
this scenario posits that firms give not just to service nonprofits, but also to advocacy 
nonprofits simply because it enables them to manage various demands and threats of 
external stakeholders better. To evaluate the validity of this claim, I now turn to 
empirical evidence that examines the patterns of similarity and dissimilarity between 
advocacy giving and service giving. 
I begin with the simplest evidence: the correlation between the amount of 
advocacy giving and service giving. I find that the amount of advocacy giving is highly 
correlated with the amount of service giving: the mean value of correlation at the firm–
year level is 74%. Thus, it seems that, not surprisingly, big service givers are the ones 
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that also give a lot to advocacy. In other words, there does exist a significant similarity 
between the two phenomena in terms of who gives, indicating that service giving is 
indeed an important empirical counterpart to the phenomenon of advocacy giving.  
 However, a closer look at the data starts to reveal systematic differences that 
exist between the two in other dimensions. For one, when I examine the data at a more 
granular level of firm–cause–year level, the average level of correlation between 
advocacy giving and service giving significantly drops down to 24%. In other words, 
firms tend to spend their advocacy giving in areas that are different from where they 
spend service giving. This points to significant differences that exist between advocacy 
and service giving in terms of how firms spend their money. Indeed, the cause priority 
structure in advocacy giving looks significantly different from that in service giving, as 
shown in Figure 1.3. This gap in issue priority structure between the two types of giving 
can be more systematically observed in the following Figure 1.4, which calculates the 
average level of correlation between advocacy and service giving at the cause level. On 
the one hand, in issue areas such as Community, Education, and Environment, the 
average correlation is over 40%, meaning that firms’ advocacy giving closely maps their 
service giving in these areas. On the other hand, in areas such as Recreation, Public 
safety, and Science, the average correlation stands below 15%, showing that how much 
firms spend in advocacy and service giving in these areas is largely independent of each 
other. I find an even more significant variance at the firm level, which is shown in Figure 
1.5. While there are some firms that spend their advocacy and service giving largely in 
the same areas, more firms spend their advocacy giving in areas very different from 
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where they spend service giving. Indeed, a substantial number of firms even show a 
negative correlation in how much they give to advocacy and service giving in a given 
cause area, again, demonstrating that advocacy and service giving mean two separate 
choices to many of the firms in the population. 
This observed difference between corporate service giving and advocacy giving is 
not a simple artifact of the differences in the distribution of advocacy organizations 
across different causes in the nonprofit population. Appendix Figure 1.1 shows how the 
pattern of corporate advocacy giving shows a significant divergence from this baseline 
distribution. As shown in Appendix Figure 1.2, I also find a substantial difference in the 
pattern of advocacy giving that exist among corporate foundations and general, non-
corporate foundations. 
***Insert Figures 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 about here*** 
1.4.2. Where does the difference come from? 
The evidence so far is inconsistent with the null hypothesis, indicating that there 
does exist significant differences between advocacy and service giving. Importantly, this 
suggests that the existing model of corporate philanthropy cannot be easily extended to 
explain why firms give to advocacy. The logical next question is then, where does this 
difference between the two phenomena come from? How should we understand advocacy 
giving in a different way? 
One possibility of interest is that firms give to advocacy not to fulfill the 
externally given demands of stakeholders in their institutional environment as assumed in 
the case of service giving, but rather to change such demands. That is, firms may give not 
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because stakeholders interested in certain issues want them to give, but rather because 
firms themselves want to make stakeholders more (or less) interested in those issues. This 
conjecture is based on the understanding that the core function of advocacy nonprofits as 
“issue entrepreneurs” is centered around changing the perceived importance and public 
understanding of various social issues in society (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; p. 1215). 
This important role of advocacy organizations as an agent of institutional change has 
been well noted in the existing literature. These activist groups have historically been 
powerful advocates of social and cultural changes, playing a critical role in reshaping 
society’s perceptions about minority rights, need for environmental protection, and most 
relevantly, the social responsibilities of corporations regarding those issues as well 
(Baron, 2001; King, 2008; King and Soule, 2007; Hiatt et al., 2009; Soule, 2009). Thus, 
corporate advocacy giving may be internally driven attempt by the firm’s organizational 
members to make use of this main role of advocacy nonprofits for their benefits: shaping 
people’s shared perception on what issues matter and how they should be dealt with. For 
one, the firm’s organizational members may want to use its philanthropic resources to 
shape the issue priority structure among stakeholders to their private preferences, either 
by playing up the saliency of the issue area that they personally care a lot about, or by 
keeping a certain issue area off the public discourse that they don’t care as much (i.e., 
making people care less about the issue). Also, firms’ advocacy giving can be used to 
shape the nature of public discourse regarding those issues to make sure that society 
reaches a type of solution that would benefit them. For example, LGBTQ employee 
groups within Fortune 500 companies often used their organizations to collectively 
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sponsor political events such as annual Gay Rights parades and to fund nonprofit groups 
that advocate for gay and lesbian rights (Briscoe and Safford, 2010; Briscoe and Gupta, 
2016). In these scenarios, the public understanding and saliency of social issues are no 
longer taken as given—rather, they become the subject of endogenous change to advance 
their organizational members’ internal interests.  
Importantly, if this is the main consideration behind firms’ decision to give to 
advocacy, we should observe significant differences in the pattern of firms’ philanthropic 
giving to advocacy nonprofits vs. service nonprofits. In particular, I focus on two criteria 
to compare the pattern of allocation in service and advocacy giving: the level of focus 
and differentiation. In terms of focus, a firm can vary its philanthropic portfolio by either 
diversifying—i.e., spreading their giving across a wide variety of cause areas—or 
specializing—i.e., concentrating on a single or a few selective causes (Su and Tsang, 
2015; Dorobantu, Henisz, and Nartey, 2017). Firms’ giving approaches can also vary in 
the level of differentiation, which is about how similar a given firm’s giving portfolio is 
to those of other corporate givers (Kaul and Luo, 2018). Which approach to giving would 
make more sense depends critically on what strategic goals a firm is trying to achieve by 
its philanthropic activities. 
First, let’s consider how the expected level of focus would vary between service 
and advocacy giving, if the two are indeed driven by the distinct strategic goals as 
discussed above. In service giving, firms give to fulfill what stakeholders want. The 
question is how firms would allocate their giving to achieve this goal. The chances are 
that firms are better off spreading their giving across a variety of causes. This is due to 
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the high level of stakeholder heterogeneity in philanthropy market, where people tend to 
disagree on which social areas should be prioritized (Mackey et al., 2007). Under this 
condition, diversification can be a superior strategic choice, as it allows the firm to appeal 
to stakeholders with heterogeneous preferences and thus to maximize the share of 
stakeholders who would value its philanthropic efforts. This is especially true because the 
extant research suggests that external stakeholders lack in both their capability and 
willingness to closely monitor and evaluate the quality of a firm’s philanthropic 
contribution to a given issue, thus caring only about whether or not a firm gives to the 
issue that they care about, but not much about how much it gives (Su and Tsang, 2015; 
Seo, Luo, and Kaul, 2019). For this reason, a relatively lower level of focus is likely to be 
preferred for firms’ service giving in general, the main strategic goal of which is to meet 
the given external demands of stakeholders.  
In contrast, if firms give to advocacy to achieve a different goal—to change the 
nature of issue-related public discourse to their internal organizational members’ 
preference—, a higher level of focus may make more sense. This is because the range of 
social and environmental advocacy issues that the firm’s organizational members feel 
passionate about is likely to be narrower than what broader external stakeholders of the 
firm would care about. Moreover, unlike many other types of external stakeholders such 
as customers or investors, employees—as internal stakeholders of the firm—have the 
capacity to effectively observe the firm’s donation practices, develop a lot deeper 
knowledge about the firm’s donation practices. Employees may also be more motivated 
to monitor firms’ giving practices, since they have a stronger stake in the effectiveness of 
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such efforts, with their identity often at stake in the companies’ policies and reputation. 
This difference means that firms may be incentivized to target their advocacy giving to 
the a few areas that is of primary concern to its employees. Thus, if advocacy giving is 
indeed driven by the strategic goal of a different nature—internally driven rather than 
externally driven—to service giving, firms would concentrate their advocacy giving to 
more selective areas of interest. Empirically, this means that firms’ advocacy giving 
portfolios are      likely to show a significantly higher level of focus than their service 
giving portfolios. 
Another dimension of giving that helps to evaluate the qualitative difference 
between advocacy and service giving is the level of differentiation. As noted, in service 
giving, firms are incentivized to match their giving portfolios to the external preferences 
and demands of stakeholders. This would naturally result in a relatively low level of 
differentiation among firms that face similar institutional environments—that is, a lot of 
firms’ giving portfolios would look largely similar in terms of where and how much they 
give. Such a high level of similarity can result organically when companies’ efforts to 
map their giving portfolios to the demand structure of the environment are aggregated at 
the higher level (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983). Or, it can also occur by some firms’ 
intentional efforts to imitate other firms’ philanthropic practices. This is particularly 
likely when the observed actions of elite institutional actors have evolved into a shared 
normative and cognitive model of giving, thus exerting strong institutional pressures 
(Marquis, Glynn, and Davis, 2007; Marquis and Lee, 2013; Marquis and Tilcsik, 2016). 
On the other hand, firms’ advocacy giving, if it reflects firms’ proactive efforts to shape 
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the environment to the internal, private preferences of their organizational members, is 
likely to exhibit a higher level of differentiation. As discussed, firms that use their giving 
to shape the external environment have incentives to customize it to their distinctive 
profiles and preferences of their workforce. Importantly, the composition of the firm’s 
labor force on which firms would base the decision of how to structure their giving 
portfolios—which is essentially a dimension of firms’ resources and capabilities—are 
unevenly distributed (Barney, 1991). Even among firms within the same market 
environment, there exists a significant heterogeneity in the profile of their organizational 
membership, such that given social issues of the same nature can represent a key concern 
to some firms while eliciting little interest from others. Thus, contrary to the case of 
service giving when firms give in accordance with the external pressures of institutional 
stakeholders, firms’ advocacy giving portfolios would show a substantially higher level 
of variance when based on the goal of shaping the environment to their unique needs. 
Table 1.1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the level of focus in firms’ 
advocacy and service giving. Comparison based on the simple count measure shows that 
firms’ advocacy giving goes to 4 causes on average, whereas their service giving goes to 
10. The findings at the recipient level are consistent as well, with the difference growing 
bigger. The same pattern shows up with a more systematic measure of focus; I find that 
the mean value of the Herfindahl index for the distribution of advocacy giving is 0.63 at 
the cause level, and 0.53 at the recipient level, which compare to the corresponding 
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figures of 0.28 and 0.24 for service giving6; in other words, firms are clearly more 
targeted in their advocacy giving than in service giving. The following Table 1.2 
tabulates the mean and median values of differentiation for advocacy and service giving. 
I measure the level of differentiation as the vector distance between a firm’s giving 
portfolio across cause areas and the average giving portfolio in the broader population. 
When the value of differentiation is calculated against the population mean, the average 
in advocacy giving is 0.17 and the median is 0.16. These figures compare to the mean 
value of 0.12 and median of 0.04 in service giving, showing that firms’ advocacy giving 
portfolios are indeed more differentiated than their service giving portfolios. Importantly, 
I find the same pattern with the level of differentiation calculated against the industry 
mean. In this result that narrows down the comparison point of firms’ philanthropic 
portfolios to companies in the same industry, the level of differentiation is still 
significantly higher in advocacy giving compared to service giving; the median level of 
differentiation in advocacy giving is 0.1, whereas the corresponding value is 0.04 in 
service giving. These systematic differences that advocacy and service giving exhibit in 
both the level of focus and differentiation find strong statistical support as well 
(p=0.000).  
 
6 While one may wonder if this comparison is misleading given the difference in the sheer amount of 
giving that exists between service and advocacy giving, the correlation that exists between the amount of 
advocacy giving and the level of focus in my data is fairly modest, ranging from 8% (recipient-level focus) 
to 15% (cause-level focus), indicating that the significant gap in the level of focus between service and 
advocacy giving cannot be explained away as being largely associated with the differences in the absolute 
amount of giving itself. 
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Overall, the results point to the significant differences in how firms structure their 
giving portfolios when they give to advocacy vs. service nonprofits; that is, firms are 
significantly more targeted and differentiated in their advocacy giving than in service 
giving. Not only does this evidence clearly show that advocacy and service giving are 
qualitatively different, but it also points to the nature of the difference between the two; 
unlike the traditional form of philanthropic giving understood to be mostly a reactive 
strategy driven by external institutional pressure, advocacy giving may indeed be firms’ 
proactive choice directly linked to their internal needs and unique organizational profiles. 
***Insert Tables 1.1 and 1.2 about here*** 
Importantly, this finding lends credibility to the aforementioned idea of this paper 
that firms may be giving to advocacy not to meet external demands of stakeholders but 
rather to shape such demands endogenously to suit the unique interests of their 
organizational members. If this is the case, we can expect that firms who have strategic 
incentives to care a lot about their organizational members’ demands would have the 
most incentive to engage in advocacy giving. To explore this possibility, I now turn to the 
last evidence in this section; I investigate if and how Fortune 1000 firms’ sensitivity to 
employees (measured by the amount of staff-related annual expense of the firm, scaled by 
total sales) explain their choice of advocacy giving vs. service giving. Included in the list 
of additional firm-level and industry-level variables as controls are: firm size (total asset), 
performance (ROA), operating characteristics (the amount of expenditure on advertising 
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expense, CAPEX, and R&D expense scaled by total sales), KLD strengths and concerns7 
and market competition (the Herfindahl index of firms’ market shares in a given 
industry)8. Specifically, I run the multinomial logistic regression to investigate if firms’ 
social performances, controlling for other firm- and market-level characteristics, explain 
their decision to engage in 1) both advocacy and service giving, 2) only service giving, 
over not giving at all (which serves as a base outcome in the specification)9. Industry 
(NAICS 2 digit) and year dummies are included in the specification. To be clear, the 
purpose of this regression is not to test a specific prediction that implies causal effects; 
rather, this analysis is designed to explore which firms are more likely to give to 
advocacy than others, by invoking only the cross-sectional variance.  
The results are reported in Table 1.3. M1a explains firms’ decision to give both to 
advocacy and service nonprofits in a given year, whereas M1b explains the decision to 
give only to service nonprofits. My expectation is that firms’ decision to give both to 
advocacy and service, compared to the exclusive service giving decision, would be more 
strongly associated with their employee sensitivity, if advocacy giving reflects firms’ 
 
7 I calculate KLD strengths and weaknesses in five major dimensions of environment, diversity, 
community, governance and product. Note that I exclude the philanthropy-related scores (a sub-category in 
KLD community dimension) in the calculation of KLD rating scores to make sure that the measured social 
performances are not already capturing the variation in firms’ service or advocacy giving. Also, given the 
high correlation between firm size, KLD strengths and KLD weaknesses, I include the orthogonalized 
measure of these variables in the specification, though the use of raw measures produces the same findings. 
8 Appendix Table 2 reports summary statistics and correlation of variables. In all specifications, mean VIF 
and individual VIF for any of the variables does not exceed 2, which is below the threshold that signals a 
multicollinearity issue (Greene, 2012). 
9 As there does not exist enough number of firm-year observations when firms engage only in advocacy 
giving to warrant statistical power (N: 5), these cases are excluded from the regression. 
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attempts to shape stakeholder demands to unique internal needs of their employees. The 
results are consistent with such expectation; as shown in M1a, employee expense-to-sales 
ratio is very strong and positive predictor (β=8.4178, p=0.0000) of Fortune 1000 firms’ 
decision to give both to service and advocacy. In contrast, M1b shows that the effect of 
this variable is not significantly associated with the decision to exclusively engage in 
service giving at conventional levels. Such stronger effect of employee sensitivity on 
their advocacy giving decisions persists in the M2a and M2b, where I further control for 
the (logged) total amount of giving and re-run the estimations. narrow down the sample 
of analysis to Fortune 1000s that make donation at least once during the study period10. In 
fact, employee sensitivity is one of the only two main regressor that has an 
asymmetrically stronger effect on the firms’ choice to give both to service and advocacy 
nonprofits, compared to the choice of exclusive service giving, across both sets of 
estimations.  
Another firm characteristic that is shown to uniquely predict firms’ decision to 
also give to advocacy nonprofits is KLD concern (β=0.1378, p=0.0001 in M1a; 
β=0.0976, p=0.0379 in M2a) but not the decision to exclusively fund service nonprofits, 
whereas KLD strength are the significant predictor of both giving choices. This finding 
that advocacy givers turn out to be the firms that have not just advantages but also 
disadvantages in various dimensions of social and environmental performances makes 
sense. As noted, if an advocacy giver’s philanthropic and social practices are primarily 
 
10 This narrows down the baseline sample for comparison from the firm-year observations of no giving by 
the entire Fortune 1000 firms (N: 6,057) to observations of no giving by Fortune 1000 donor firms that give 
at least once during the study period (N: 1,269). 
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driven by internal organizational members’ interests, the firm is likely to be a lot more 
selective in which issue areas they choose to excel at, and focus their efforts on those 
specific areas; not surprisingly, this focused and differentiated strategy comes with the 
trade-off of relatively limited investment and lower performances in other areas that 
garner less attention from their workforce. 
***Insert Table 1.3 about here*** 
Taken together, the collective evidence suggests that the answer to the main 
question of this section is yes; that is, corporate advocacy giving indeed seems to be a 
phenomenon distinctive from service giving. Importantly, the systematic pattern of 
dissimilarity we observe between the two phenomena also allows us to understand the 
nature of the difference between the two and the unique strategic role that advocacy 
giving may play in firms’ broad repertoires of nonmarket strategies. I find that, while 
firms that spend a lot of money in service giving also spend a lot in advocacy, the way 
they spend it—in terms of where and how they give—is significantly different between 
the two types of giving. Not only do firms allocate their advocacy giving to causes that 
are different from service giving, but they also spend their advocacy giving in a more 
targeted and differentiated manner than they do with their service giving, suggesting that 
advocacy giving is a proactive form of strategy that is more internally driven (based on 
what they want) and should thus be distinguished from a traditional reactive from of 
philanthropic giving that is known to be externally driven (based on what external 
stakeholders want). I also find that advocacy givers, compared to exclusive service 
givers, exhibit a far higher sensitivity to their employees; that is, advocacy givers are the 
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ones that have the most incentive to attend to unique preferences of their organizational 
members, who may want to change the nature of civic discourse to their private 
preferences by using advocacy nonprofits as an agent of such institutional change. 
1.5. Distinctiveness of Corporate Advocacy Giving from Lobbying 
1.5.1. Are they different?                                                                                               
Now, I turn to the comparison of advocacy giving against its second counterpart: 
corporate lobbying activities. After all, the empirical evidence presented so far produced 
initial evidence that advocacy giving, at least to some extent, might reflect firms’ 
internally driven attempts to shape external stakeholder demands to their employees’ 
preferences. Importantly, this suggests that corporate lobbying can indeed be a close 
counterpart to the phenomenon of advocacy giving, in the sense that they can both be 
understood as nonmarket strategy of proactive nature whereby firms attempt endogenous 
changes to the institutional structure. In this section, I thus focus on the following 
question: if and to what extent corporate advocacy giving can be viewed as a 
phenomenon parallel to lobbying. That is, how similar and dissimilar is it to lobbying?  
Consistent with the previous section, I begin this section by considering the null 
hypothesis that posits that the two phenomena are essentially the same. According to this 
hypothesis, advocacy giving should share the same strategic goal to lobbying; that is, it 
can be understood as an effort by firms to influence institutional environments: in 
particular, public politics (Hillman et al., 1999; De Figueiredo and Tiller, 2001; De 
Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006; Bonardi and Keum, 2005; Jia, 2014). Thus, this 
scenario posits that firms use advocacy giving as a complementary tactic to traditional 
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lobbying activities to maximize their success rate of shaping public policies to their favor. 
Indeed, recent papers of Bertrand et al. (2018; 2020) find empirical evidence consistent 
with this conjecture, showing that firms allocate a portion of their philanthropic giving to 
the nonprofits that are closely connected to key policymakers for their strategic interests. 
Yet, it is still an open question if the primary audience whose preferences firms are 
targeting to shape via advocacy giving is limited to those institutional stakeholders in the 
policy arena of traditional lobbying activities. 
The first evidence I examine to evaluate the validity of this claim is how many 
advocacy recipients are lobbying organizations: i.e., if firms prefer to give their money to 
advocacy nonprofits that lobby. After all, even though political activities of tax-exempt 
501(c)3 advocacy nonprofits are strictly limited by law, they can still legally engage in 
some extent of lobbying11, as long as not a “substantial” part of its activities is devoted to 
it (usually, the threshold is about 20% of an organization’s total annual expenditures). In 
light of this possibility, I check how many recipients of corporate advocacy giving 
engage in lobbying at all, and when they do, how much they spend. The findings are 
clear; advocacy nonprofits that receive philanthropic donations from companies are not 
lobbying organizations in general. On average, only 7.4% of the recipients engage in any 
 
11 Some tax-exempt nonprofits – notably, 501(c)4 social welfare organizations – can engage in politics 
without many constraints. The political roles of these nonprofits have especially garnered much attention in 
recent years since the Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens United v. FEC decision, which stipulated that 
501(c)4 nonprofits are no longer required to disclose their donors and thus made them an ideal channel for 
covert influence of private money into the political arena (Werner and Coleman, 2014; Werner, 2017). Yet, 
the vast majority of corporate foundation giving does not go to these so-called “dark money” 501(c)4 
nonprofits. The data show that a mere 0.2% of the entire corporate foundation grant goes to 501(c)4 
organizations. The rest of the grants from corporations go to the 501(c)3 nonprofits, which are the focus of 
this study and are subject to much more stringent legal constraints in their political engagements. 
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form of lobbying. Even among the ones who do lobby, the average ratio of the 
expenditure spent on lobbying is merely 1.1%, and the median is 0.5%, showing that 
even those that do engage in lobbying are not organizations whose main organizational 
function is lobbying activities. The legal constraints on lobbying activities are not 
binding—not even close. 
Yet, it still does not rule out the possibility that firms can use advocacy 
organizations as a channel to influence public politics, albeit in a more indirect way12. 
One way to look at whether this is happening or not is to examine the pattern of similarity 
between firms’ advocacy giving and their traditional lobbying activities. The first 
evidence I start with is the similarity that exists in the population group who engages in 
corporate advocacy giving and lobbying activities—that is, similarity in terms of who 
does each activity. My sample frame is the entire Fortune 1000 companies during the 
period of 2003 to 2010. Within this sample, I compare the population of firms that give to 
advocacy to those that lobby. By their choice to engage in each type of activities, firms 
are categorized into three categories: 1) firms that engage in both advocacy giving and 
lobbying; 2) firms that only do advocacy giving; and 3) firms that only do lobbying. The 
breakdown of Fortune 1000 firms into each category is illustrated in Figure 1.6. The main 
two takeaways of this figure are the following. The first takeaway is that there exists a 
significant overlap between the population of firms who do advocacy giving and 
 
12 Although 501(c)3 are not permitted to expend a significant portion of their activities on lobbying, they 
are able to advocate before administrative agencies and initiate litigation. Also, 501(c)3 groups are 
permitted to communicate with the Congress in an educational capacity, which lets them provide 
"technical" assistance (Berry, 2015). 
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lobbying; that is, a lot of firms do both (32%). This points to the relatedness that might 
indeed exist between the two activities, which is consistent with findings of recent studies 
(Bertrand et al., 2018; 2020) that a part of philanthropic giving is politically motivated. 
Yet, on a different note, the figure also shows that there exist a lot of firms (68% of the 
entire population) who choose to do one or the other, with 51% of them only doing 
lobbying and 17% only doing advocacy giving. Furthermore, even within the population 
of firms that do both, the correlation between the amount of advocacy giving and 
lobbying at firm-year level is fairly modest (21%), which is illustrated in Figure 1.7. 
Thus, firms’ choice of advocacy giving seems to be largely independent of the choice of 
lobbying for many firms in the population. These findings serve as an initial set of 
evidence against the null hypothesis that advocacy giving and lobbying are qualitatively 
the same phenomena. That is, advocacy giving may not simply be an alternative channel 
of lobbying. Rather, the correct conclusion so far seems to be that the two phenomena are 
significantly related, but distinctive from each other at the same time.  
***Insert Figures 1.6 and 1.7 about here*** 
1.5.2. Where does the difference come from?                                                               
Then the next logical questions are, where does this similarity and dissimilarity 
come from? How should we understand corporate advocacy giving differently, especially 
in relation to lobbying? An important consideration that may help to distinguish the two 
phenomena theoretically is that, unlike what is often assumed in the public politics 
literature, changing government regulations and policies in a way that favors firms’ 
business models and operations (e.g., taxation, government subsidies) is not the sole 
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target of firms’ proactive efforts to shape the nature of institutional environment. Missing 
from the traditional scholarship on firms’ influence on the institutional environment built 
around lobbying activities is the potential influence of firms on the issues that have little 
direct relevance to the way firms run their businesses and are rather a part of bigger 
political and social debate. Yet, an emerging literature on corporate activism and related 
movement literature pays attention to how firms and executives are increasingly 
weighing in on the issue that is peripheral to their core business operation, essentially 
acting like activist themselves by mobilizing the public (Walker and Rea, 2014; Chatterji 
and Toffel, 2019; Hambrick and Wowak, 2020). Oftentimes, the target of such corporate 
activism is not limited to a narrow range of actors in the public policy arena such as 
policymakers or regulators, but rather includes other stakeholders in the private arena: 
activists, customers, investors, and the public in general. In other words, the influence of 
business to shape public agenda to their favor may extend far beyond the legislative 
agenda to the broader values held by those diverse constituents of society. In 2016, more 
than a hundred CEOs signed a public letter in opposition of proposed legislation in North 
Carolina that would limit transgender individuals’ access to public restrooms (Human 
Rights Campaign, 2016). In 2017, thirty CEOs took out a full-page ad in the Wall Street 
Journal criticizing President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Paris climate accord 
(Winston, 2017). Sometimes, firms also engage in collaboration with social movement 
groups, which is shown to have not only cooptation effects on direct recipients 
(McDonnell, 2015) but also broader effects on the other groups in the field 
(Odziemkowska and McDonnell, 2019), thus influencing the nature of broader 
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movements. Importantly, what these recent findings suggest is consistent with the 
possibility that corporate advocacy giving might be a tool to not only influence laws and 
legislations around the issues with direct relevance to the firms’ core business model 
(which is the target of most lobbying activities), but also shape the nature of 
sociopolitical discourse around many advocacy issues that are less directly related to the 
firms’ operation yet highly salient to their stakeholders. In particular, the aforementioned 
finding that employee sensitivity is what distinguishes advocacy givers from exclusive 
service givers suggests that those advocacy issues might be what their employees are 
particularly concerned about; in other words, corporate advocacy giving can be, at least a 
part of it, understood as a channel of employee activism whereby employees use firms’ 
resources to express their stance on the issue and potentially shape the nature of issue-
related discourse in society to their private preferences (Briscoe and Safford, 2010; 
Briscoe and Gupta, 2016). After all, one of the key organizational characteristics that 
define 501(c)3 advocacy nonprofits (that are the recipients of corporate advocacy giving) 
is, as already noted, clear legal constraints on their political engagement, making this 
possibility all the more likely. Such transformative capabilities of firms in private politics 
matter not only as an outside lobbying strategy for certain firms’ eventual goal of shaping 
laws and policies (Kollman, 1998; Walker and Rea, 2014), but also matters on its own, 
allowing firms to alter civic discourse and norms to their advantage, which constitutes the 
fundamental pillar of any institutional environment (Scott, 2001; Hiatt et al., 2009). 
To evaluate this possibility, I look at the industry-level variation of both advocacy 
giving and lobbying activities. Figure 1.8 plots which industries are top advocacy givers 
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and lobbying firms. On the one hand, there definitely exists a significant level of 
similarity between the two phenomena in terms of which industries are top givers. In fact, 
the following four industries are ranked among the top five giving industries in both 
advocacy giving and lobbying, albeit in slightly different order: Finance and Insurance 
(NAICS 52), Computer and Electronics (NAICS 33), Information (NAICS 51), 
Petroleum and Chemical Manufacturing (NAICS 32). A defining characteristic of these 
industries is that they are heavily regulated or concentrated, the importance of which has 
been already well documented in the lobbying literature (De Figueiredo and Richter, 
2014). Clearly, the importance of regulation intensity is shared by the case of corporate 
advocacy giving as well. This shows that corporate advocacy giving does share the same 
target audience with lobbying, at least to some extent: institutional actors in public 
politics, whose decisions shape laws and regulations. 
On the other hand, the rest of the list shows quite a bit of the difference. For 
example, Food and Apparel (NAICS 31) is the top 5th industry that accounts for 7% of 
the entire advocacy giving, whereas the portion of lobbying attributable to this industry is 
significantly smaller at 3%. The difference is even bigger in the case of the industry 
sector General Merchandise Stores (NAICS 45); while this industry ranks as the top 6th 
corporate advocacy giving field, accounting for about 6% of advocacy giving, it only 
accounts for 1% of lobbying activities. Similarly, Couriers and Messengers industry 
(NAICS 49) does a lot more of advocacy giving than lobbying; their portion of advocacy 
giving is 6%, whereas it is below 2% in lobbying. These fields of disproportionately 
higher levels of advocacy giving than lobbying share one important characteristic that 
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they are so-called service industries whose bottom line critically depends on employees’ 
motivation and commitment toward customer satisfaction13. In other words, these 
industries have in common that they exhibit higher sensitivity to the demands and 
preferences of their internal stakeholders (i.e., employees) around sociopolitical issues. 
Taken together, the overall industry-level results provide an initial evidence that, 
while a significant portion of corporate advocacy giving is about changing laws and 
policies directly related the firm’s core operation (just like lobbying), some portion of it 
may indeed target changes in the nature of broader sociopolitical discourse around the 
issues that firms’ employees personally care about, with the goal of changing the issue-
related preferences of broader audiences in the society. In other words, this finding is 
consistent with the idea that the key distinction between corporate advocacy giving and 
lobbying expenditures may lie in the differences in target audience, albeit with some level 
of overlap. 
***Insert Figure 1.8 about here*** 
To get closer to the answer to the question of where the similarity and 
dissimilarity between these two phenomena come from, I further look at firm-level 
variation. In this section, I explore which firm characteristics are most strongly correlated 
with the choice of advocacy giving versus. lobbying. Included as additional regressors are 
the same set of firm-level and industry-level variables to those used in the previous 
 
13 Of course, another key stakeholder that critically matters in these industries is customers, which raises 
the possibility of alternative explanations that advocacy giving is driven by customer preferences, 
compared to employee preferences. Yet, this pattern is inconsistent with the finding in the comparison 
between service vs. advocacy giving. Also, in the next section that analyses firms’ choice of lobbying vs. 
advocacy giving based on more granular firm-level variation, I look at varying roles of employee 
sensitivity and consumer sensitivity. 
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section: firm size, performance, operating characteristics, social performances, and 
industry competition. I run the multinomial logistic regression with industry and year 
dummies, which investigates which firm characteristics makes firms more likely to 
engage in: 1) both advocacy giving and lobbying, 2) only advocacy giving or, 3) only 
lobbying, over doing neither of these two (which serves as a base outcome in the 
specification). Again, the purpose of this regression is not to test or imply any causal 
relationship; rather, it is designed to explore which firm characteristics are associated 
with the choice of advocacy giving relative to lobbying in a more systematic manner.  
The results are presented in Table 1.4. One important takeaway is that advocacy 
giving firms and lobbying firms share a lot of key characteristics. The results show that 
firm size is, not surprisingly, the strong and positive predictor of both advocacy giving 
and lobbying activities, showing that the bigger the firm is, the more likely it is to spend 
money on both activities (De Figueiredo and Richter, 2014). Interestingly, the ratio of 
expenditure on advertising to sales, which can be understood as a proxy for firms’ 
sensitivity to another type of stakeholders in the private arena (i.e., customers), is shown 
to be another characteristic of firms that advocacy givers and lobbying firms share. As 
shown in Table 1.4, its effect is significant and positive in all models, indicating that 
firms that engage in either advocacy giving or lobbying, compared to those that do 
neither, spend significantly more money on advertising. Another set of firm 
characteristics shared by advocacy givers and lobbying firms are firms’ social 
performances. I find that both KLD strengths and concerns are highly significant and 
positive predictors of lobbying and advocacy giving, which indicates that good and bad 
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firms—the firms at the opposite ends of the social performance spectrum—are the main 
participants of both activities. Not only does this finding support the idea of both 
lobbying and advocacy giving as internally driven activities as previously noted (Delmas 
et al., 2016), but it is also consistent with the finding in the previous section that 
compared the choice of advocacy giving vs. service giving, thus adding more confidence 
to the overall reliability of the results. 
On the other hand, the second important takeaway from the result is that there do 
exist firm characteristics that seem to distinguish advocacy givers and lobbying 
companies. One important characteristic that clearly distinguishes lobbying-only firms 
from advocacy givers is, consistent with the pattern of results comparing service vs. 
advocacy giving choices, the level of employee sensitivity proxied by employee expense-
to-sales ratio. Indeed, employee expense-to-sales ratio is significant and positive both in 
M3a (β=7.7515, p=0.0000) and M3b (β=8.9527, p=0.0402), which explains firms’ 
choices to engage in advocacy giving either along with lobbying or on its own. In 
contrast, this measure of employee sensitivity loses its significance completely in M3c 
whose estimation is based on the sample of firms who exclusively engage in lobbying 
(β=-2.2503, p=0.2316). This unique role of employee sensitivity as a predictor of firms’ 
advocacy giving decisions shows that advocacy giving matters among firms whose 
performance is highly dependent on employee motivation and loyalty, and thus tend to 
spend a lot more on employee-related expenses. Importantly, this suggests that, unlike 
lobbying, which is often understood as an activity to pursue firm-level strategic interests 
by changing government regulations and policies directly related to the firm’s core 
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businesses, the firm’s advocacy giving activities may indeed be driven by employees’ 
unique private preferences around social and environmental issues that may have little to 
do with firms’ core operations and business model.   
Overall, this pattern of findings goes back to the idea that the main target of 
corporate advocacy giving is not limited to the policy issues that have direct impact on 
corporate business model and operations. Rather, a significant portion of corporate 
advocacy giving is likely to target issues of fundamentally different nature that have little 
direct relevance to the firm’s short-term bottom line yet elicit strong interests and 
reaction from its internal stakeholders, suggesting that it may indeed be understood as 
another channel of employee activism by which employees use their firm as a vehicle for 
activism to communicate their ideological views on the issues of concern.  
***Insert Table 1.4 about here*** 
1.6. Discussion and Conclusion 
My paper is, to my best knowledge, one of the first systematic studies on the 
phenomenon of corporate advocacy giving. Taking a fact-based approach (Helfat, 2007; 
Oxley et al., 2010; Moeen and Agarwal, 2017), the goal of this paper is to provide a set of 
key empirical facts around the understudied phenomenon of corporate advocacy giving. 
This empirical exercise is centered around essentially one key question: is corporate 
advocacy giving a significant and distinctive phenomenon? The findings of this paper 
indicate that the answer to the main question is yes, for both. First, corporate advocacy 
giving is indeed an empirically significant phenomenon, in the sense that it is an action 
taken by the majority of firms, and their amount of spending is likely to serve as a 
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significant influence on the part of recipient advocacy organizations. Second, corporate 
advocacy giving is a phenomenon qualitatively different from its two nearest counterparts 
(service giving and lobbying activities), suggesting that it may play a unique strategic 
role in the broad repertoire of firms’ nonmarket strategies. In particular, the systematic 
patterns of dissimilarity that I find in the comparison against each counterpart are 
consistent with the view that corporate advocacy giving may be understood as an 
internally driven activities of firms to shape stakeholder demands in broad society to the 
unique and private preferences of their employees. For one, compared to service giving, 
advocacy giving is pursued by firms in a more differentiated and focused manner, 
especially by those that have strong incentives to care about employees’ demands. This 
importance of internal organizational members is also shown in the comparison against 
lobbying, with the result suggesting that firms seem to use advocacy giving to influence 
civic discourse around many advocacy issue areas of high salience to their employees’ 
intrinsic and private interests, unlike lobbying that is targeted to influence specific 
legislations and policies that are directly related to firms’ operations and business models. 
Of course, the findings of this paper are exploratory and thus far from conclusive; 
after all, the goal of this study was not to imply or test any causal claims about the role of 
corporate advocacy giving. However, what this paper does suggest is that corporate 
advocacy giving seems to be indeed a unique phenomenon that deserves a lot more 
scholarly attention, with the view of it as a tool to influence public discourse being one of 
the most promising theoretical possibilities. I hope that the key findings and multiple sets 
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of empirical facts I provide throughout this paper provide a useful ground for future 
empirical and theoretical research on this matter. 
This paper also contributes to the corporate philanthropy literature by challenging 
existing conceptions of what corporate giving is and how it benefits firms. By the 
existing accounts, firms are understood to give because their external stakeholders want 
them to, in expectation of rewards from those stakeholders who would appreciate firms’ 
philanthropic efforts (Bénabou and Tirole, 2010; Kaul and Luo, 2018). That is, firms give 
to make stakeholders happy by supporting the social issues that are dear to those 
stakeholders. However, what is missing from this line of literature is the fact that the 
saliency and public awareness of social issues are not exogenous to firms, and more 
importantly, that firms can use their philanthropy as a tool to endogenously shape the 
issue priority structure. This means that, while the extant view of corporate giving as a 
reactive tool of stakeholder management applies well to the traditional form of service 
giving, it does not to the case of advocacy giving, where firms can fund and use advocacy 
nonprofits as “issue entrepreneurs” (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Although both forms of 
giving have the potential to benefit companies strategically, the findings of this study 
suggest that why firms give and how they benefit as a result of such giving is 
fundamentally different between the two types of giving, thus extending our 
understanding on how firms create and appropriate value from their philanthropic giving 
and broader CSR activities. In doing so, this study joins a recently growing body of 
literature that explores firms’ proactive use of CSR for their own private and political 
benefits (Werner, 2015; McDonnell and King, 2018). Moreover, the argument that firms 
48 
 
can shape stakeholder demands to fit their unique interests and thus influence society for 
better or worse connects this work to the recent literature that critically examines the 
welfare implications of CSR efforts (Barnett, 2016; Kaul and Luo, 2018).  
Finally, this paper informs the body of nonmarket research on firms’ use of 
proactive strategies and its implications. Firms’ strategic use of proactive strategy has 
traditionally been the focus in the public politics literature, with scholars studying how 
firms influence public officials to shape government legislations and policies in their 
favor (i.e., policymakers and regulators) via lobbying and campaign contributions (De 
Figueiredo and Tiller, 2001; De Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006; Jia, 2014). However, 
public actors are not the only type of stakeholders that matter to firms; included in the 
long list of diverse stakeholders whose roles matter are those in the private arena such as 
activists, customers, and the public in general, which connects to firms’ strategic need to 
shape demands and preferences of these private stakeholders to their favor. Indeed, the 
finding of this paper suggests that corporate advocacy giving may reflect attempts of 
firms to shape stakeholder demands in broader society and, unlike what has been 
suggested in a few recent papers (Bertrand et al., 2018; 2020), may be more than yet 
another political tool to influence the government and legislations. In particular, 
advocacy giving may reflect firms’ efforts to influence the nature of movements and 
public discourse around issues salient in broader sociopolitical discourse, which garner a 
lot of attention from many private stakeholders in society: in particular, the firm’s own 
employees. This finding suggests that firms’ proactive role in the arena of private politics 
may indeed be more prevalent than previously thought (Walker and Rea, 2014), thus 
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broadening our understanding of the repertoire of firm strategies used to deal with 
demands of private stakeholders—notably, activists. While private politics scholars have 
long focused on understanding firms’ defensive performance repertoire in times of 
activist attacks (McDonnell and King, 2013), this study shows that firms can use 
corporate philanthropy as a channel of proactive influence on advocacy groups and the 
direction of broader movements, thus joining a recent stream of research that challenges 
traditional scholarly focus on the reactive role of firms in the private politics literature 














Cause priority in corporate advocacy vs. service giving 
 
 
Figure 1.4  
Average correlation between advocacy and service amount  
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Summary statistics for focus in advocacy and service giving 
  
Advocacy giving Service giving Paired  
t-test   
Mean Median Mean Median P-value 
Cause level Count 4 3 10 10 0.0000  
Herfindahl 0.63 0.58 0.28 0.38 0.0000 
Recipient level Count 10 3 122 31 0.0000  




Summary statistics for differentiation in advocacy and service giving 
 
Advocacy giving Service giving Paired  
t-test  
Mean Median Mean Median P-value 
Against Population Mean 0.17 0.16 0.12 0.04 0.0000 





Regression of firm characteristics on the choices of advocacy and service giving 
 M1a M1b M2a M2b 
















Size 0.5477*** 0.2618*** 0.2854*** 0.1341*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) 
ROA 0.0686 0.0016 0.0485 -0.0158 
 (0.2233) (0.9871) (0.5439) (0.8997) 
R&D-to-sales ratio 0.7687 -1.3475 1.3199 -0.9032 
 (0.2316) (0.1487) (0.1037) (0.3532) 
Advertising-to-sales 
ratio 
4.6094** -1.8461 2.1587 -3.4180 
(0.0017) (0.3723) (0.2720) (0.1290) 
Capex-to-sales ratio -0.6405 -1.2975* -0.6989 -1.0832+ 
 (0.1963) (0.0194) (0.2765) (0.0570) 
Employee expense-to-
sales ratio 
8.4178*** -0.3799 6.5788*** -1.2995 
(0.0000) (0.9029) (0.0006) (0.7009) 
KLD strength 0.4332*** 0.2241*** 0.2528*** 0.1185* 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0102) 
KLD concern 0.1378*** 0.0073 0.0976* -0.0098 
 (0.0001) (0.8638) (0.0379) (0.8310) 
Market concentration -2.1756 3.1153 -3.1218 2.8791 
(0.3736) (0.3695) (0.3830) (0.4353) 
Total amount of giving   0.2799*** 0.1805*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Constant -4.4398*** -4.4155*** -3.6125*** -3.9731*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
N 1038 675 1038 675 
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Results of the multinomial regression. Baseline for all the models 
is when firms do not give at all in the entire sample of Fortune 1000 – i.e., the firm-year 
observations when the amount of giving is zero (N=6057). All models include year and industry 




Figure 1.6. Population of advocacy givers and lobbying firms among fortune 1000 
 
Figure 1.7. Scatterplot of advocacy - lobbying amount at firm-year level 
 














































































































Regression of firm characteristics on the choices of advocacy giving and lobbying 
 M3a M3b M3c 









Size 0.7282*** 0.6166*** 0.3281*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
ROA 0.0938 0.0548 -0.0829 
 (0.1458) (0.5685) (0.5958) 
R&D-to-sales ratio 4.6359*** -5.6852** 3.0973*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0046) (0.0000) 
Advertising-to-sales ratio 5.9787** 9.4849*** 5.4556*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Capex-to-sales ratio -0.7752 -0.1009 -0.1048 
 (0.2355) (0.8854) (0.7116) 
Employee expense-to-sales ratio 7.7515*** 8.9527* -2.2503 
(0.0000) (0.0402) (0.2316) 
KLD strength 0.7181*** 0.6157*** 0.4616*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
KLD concern 0.5232*** 0.2315*** 0.4650*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Market concentration -0.8169 1.2049 6.8010** 
(0.8015) (0.7409) (0.0071) 
Constant -5.0042*** -23.7121 -3.0365*** 
 (0.0000) (0.9960) (0.0000) 
N 614 424 2155 
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Results of the multinomial regression. Baseline for this model is 
when Fortune 1000 firms do neither of the two activities – i.e., the firm-year observations when the 
amount of advocacy giving and lobbying is zero (N=4577). M5 runs the OLS panel regression. All 




CHAPTER 2: EMPLOYEE IDEOLOGY AS A DRIVER OF 
CORPORATE ACTIVISM: EVIDENCE FROM 




From 2018 to 2019, more than 1,000 corporations and executives have taken a 
stand on a wide spectrum of socio-political issues that are hotly contested and seem to 
have little direct relevance to their core business operations (Hogan, 2019), such as 
abortion rights, LGBTQ rights, gun control, immigration, and global warming, etc. 
Examples include Dick’s Sporting Goods and Sales Force taking a stand against gun 
violence; Barbara Green, a co-founder of Hobby Lobby filing a lawsuit against the 
mandate that required corporations to provide emergency contraceptives; more than 
2,000 companies including Airbnb, Best Buy, Cargill publicly stating opposition to 
Donald Trump’s 2017 decision to withdraw the US from the Paris Climate Agreement 
and signing the “We Are Still In” pledge letter. 
Rise in corporate activism in recent years have begun to garner attention from 
scholars, with recent studies starting to examine the consequences of such activism on 
both firms—whether it benefits firms’ financial performances (Burbano, 2019)—and 
society—whether such activism can effectively shape the public discourse (Chatterji and 
Toffel, 2019). However, a lot remains unknown about this relatively nascent 
phenomenon; especially, it is unclear why firms would engage in these forms of proactive 
activism in the first place. After all, the convention wisdom holds that firms prefer to stay 
under the radar when it comes to contentious issues that most of the activism is centered 
around (McDonnell, 2016). As a for-profit organization, the argument goes, firms do not 
have the informal source of power such as public trust and legitimacy to engage the 
public effectively. Unlike traditional service issues (e.g., educational scholarship, 
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children’s safety, natural disaster giving) whose need elicit broad agreement among 
stakeholders, stakeholders—especially those with varying ideologies—often hold 
multiple and heterogeneous preferences around advocacy issues, disagreeing over what 
firms should do about the issues. Thus, while firms may make a group of stakeholders 
happy by taking a stand that supports their position, the argument goes, it comes with the 
risk of alienating a different group of stakeholders who disagree with that position, which 
minimizes the expected benefits from getting involved with advocacy issues. The best 
course of strategic action for most firms is thus to stay neutral, which makes it all the 
more puzzling why we are observing a lot more cases of corporate activism (Chatterji and 
Toffel, 2019). 
In this study, I offer an initial answer to this question by exploring the possibility 
that firms’ activism is driven by internal ideological preferences of the firm’s employees. 
An emerging literature on corporate political ideology shows how firms often develop a 
distinctive ideological preference in their workforce, with employees being drawn to 
firms whose employees have already similar moral and ideological preferences to 
themselves (Gupta, Briscoe & Hambrick, 2017; Bermiss & McDonald, 2018; Gupta & 
Briscoe, 2019). This suggests that firms may face relatively homogeneous preferences 
among their workforce on how to engage with the advocacy issues, compared to 
ideological composition among other types of stakeholders (e.g., consumers); thus, firms 
who have their own employees as primary stakeholders may be uniquely positioned to 
engage in the advocacy issue in a way that is aligned with stakeholder preferences, while 
not facing the strategic risks of alienating stakeholders that firms without such 
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homogeneous employee base would otherwise face. Moreover, ideologically charged 
nature of many advocacy issues suggests that stakeholders’ ideological preferences play 
an especially salient role, suggesting that focus on employees’ ideological preferences 
might allow us to understand a growing phenomenon of corporate activism. 
Yet, there are reasons to expect that simple extension of what we know from 
existing studies on the role of organizational political ideology would be insufficient to 
explain corporate activism. For one, most of the existing studies focus on the relationship 
between the direction of the firm’s ideological leaning among their top executives or 
broader workforce and the level of its social engagement, by showing that liberal firms 
are willing to invest more in CSR than conservative firms (Chin, Hambrick & Trevino, 
2013; Briscoe, Chin & Hambrick, 2014; Gupta & Briscoe, 2019). Yet, unlike traditional 
service issues that have been the context of these studies, which focus on provisioning 
necessary social goods and services to those in need and thus appeal disproportionately to 
liberals who care more about inclusiveness and egalitarianism, advocacy issues are 
unique in that they tend to attract attention from people of both ideological leanings. 
Therefore, it remains unclear which ideological characteristics within the organization 
would shape firms’ engagement around advocacy issues of contentious nature, and in 
what ways.   
This paper addresses this gap by uncovering multiple ideological attributes of the 
organization as important antecedents that jointly affect firms’ willingness to engage in 
corporate activism, thus departing from the existing focus on the direction of ideological 
leaning. First, I begin by examining the role of the intensity of employees’ ideological 
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preferences, which refers to the importance of ideology to average organizational 
members’ self-concept. After all, not all employees are ideologically motivated, as shown 
in the extensive literature on political psychology demonstrates a significant variance 
across individuals in the relative importance of ideological values to their self-identity 
(Huddy, 2001; Mason, 2018). This variation matters, as only those with higher 
ideological intensity are willing to put a high price tag on the firm’s action, as they care a 
lot about if their firm behaves around issue areas of their interests in the way aligned with 
their personal values. The higher average ideological intensity among their workforce, 
the bigger strategic benefits the firm can thus expect from their employees in return for 
taking a stand on the issue. Second, I also consider additional ideological attributes of the 
organization, by considering how the effect of ideological intensity varies by the level of 
ideological homogeneity and radicalness among the workforce. My expectation is that 
ideological firms whose employees hold homogeneous and extreme ideological 
preferences are uniquely positioned to benefit from their employees’ ideological interests 
and willingness to reward the firm for engaging in corporate activism. 
 I test this theoretical claim by examining one of the channels by which firms can 
engage in activism: donation to advocacy nonprofits, which are viewed as the moving 
force behind most of the major movements and cultural changes (King and Soule, 2007; 
Hiatt, Sine, and Tolbert, 2009). Based on a novel database comprising about $1 Bil in 
advocacy donations, I demonstrate the role of employees’ ideological intensity on 
corporate advocacy giving. While controlling for the effect of the average ideological 
position of the firm’s workforce, I find that firms with a higher ideological intensity, 
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proxied as firms with a higher number of employees that make campaign political 
contributions, do give more to advocacy issues. I also confirm the moderating influences 
of both ideological homogeneity and radicalness, finding that the positive effect of 
ideological intensity holds only for those whose members think not only similarly to each 
other but also hold extreme preferences. In all the estimations, I further explore varying 
role of ideological intensity among senior executives vs. lower-level employees, and find 
that it is lower-level employees’ preferences that matters, which suggests that this reflects 
strategic, profit-maximizing decisions of the firm to meet demands of their employees 
(rather than an agency behavior to advance CEO and other top executives’ personal 
ideological agenda, which is a potential alternative explanation). This interpretation is 
also consistent with the findings from the supplementary analyses, where the effect of 
ideological intensity is pronounced for firms with stronger governance, and those facing 
stronger labor market competition. 
First and foremost, this paper contributes to a fast-growing body of literature on 
corporate activism. To my best knowledge, this is the first study that examines the 
antecedents of firms’ engagement in socio-political issues, based on novel, large-scale 
empirical dataset that systematically tracks not only multiple organizations’ advocacy 
engagement over time but also their engagement across the entire issue universe. Due to 
data limitations, most existing studies have employed experimental designs or 
observational studies sampling on a few selective advocacy issues, which may suffer 
from generalizability issues. Also, while scholarly attention on this understudied 
phenomenon of corporate activism has recently been growing (Chatterji and Toffel, 2019; 
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Burbano, 2019; Hambrick and Wowak, 2019), the fundamental question of why firms 
increasingly engage in such behavior—despite the strategic disincentives to do so—
remains largely unanswered. In this study, I provide solid evidence on the role of 
ideological intensity and other multiple ideological attributes of firms’ employees in 
explaining the observed rise in corporate activism.  
Second, this paper contributes to the burgeoning literature on corporate political 
ideology. As noted, most scholarly attempts have been focused on the effect of the 
direction of ideological leaning, demonstrating an asymmetry in the level of participation 
in traditional service issues between liberal and conservative firms. However, an 
ideologically-charged nature of advocacy issues suggests that firms at both ends of the 
ideological spectrum (i.e., both conservatives and liberals). This difference suggests that 
the simple extension of existing knowledge on corporate political ideology is insufficient 
to account for the pattern of corporate activism, which is a gap I address in this paper by 
uncovering and empirically demonstrating multiple ideological attributes of the firm that 
deserve more scholarly attention. Extensive supplementary analyses also reveal how 
ideological preferences of employees, which are often conceptualized as intrinsic, 
normative drivers of CSR by scholars (Chin, Hambrick, and Trevino, 2013; Gupta and 
Briscoe, 2019), are factored into firms’ advocacy engagement only when they are 





2.2. Literature Review 
Organizational political ideology, which corresponds to a conservative-liberal 
continuum in the US context, refers to a deeply-held core values and preferences shared 
by organizational members about “how the social world operates, including convictions 
about what outcomes are desirable and how they should be achieved” (Simons and 
Ingram, 1997). While initial studies have focused on the variance in ideological 
preferences among CEOs and other top executives (Chin, Hambrick and Treviño, 2013; 
Briscoe, Chin and Hambrick, 2014; Chin and Semadeni, 2016; Gupta, Briscoe and 
Hambrick, 2018), recent studies highlight how firms can often develop a distinctive 
organizational ideological leaning within their broader workforce in one way or the other, 
showing how many for-profit corporations can be positioned on a conservatism-
liberalism continuum in the U.S. context (Gupta, Briscoe and Hambrick, 2017; Gupta and 
Briscoe, 2019). As a result, some firms lean “red” (conservative), while other firms lean 
“blue” (liberal). Such distinctive ideological leaning at the firm-level is the consequence 
of an organic sorting process, which is widely known as attraction-selection-attrition 
(ASA) model (Schneider, 1987; Schneider, Goldstiein and Smith, 1995); individuals are 
attracted to and stay with the firms whose executives and employees exhibit similar 
preferences to themselves (Van den Steen, 2010; Bermiss and McDonald, 2018).  
Ideological orientation of the firm’s workforce is shown to shape various firm 
behaviors within ideologically-valenced strategic domains, including the pattern of firms’ 
social actions such as philanthropic donations, employee volunteering, etc. In particular, 
scholars have paid a lot of attention to the asymmetry in the willingness to invest in social 
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and environmental issues that is expected to arise between conservatives and liberals. The 
argument is that organizational members of liberal ideologies will value CSR more, as 
they have stronger preferences for social equality and highly value philanthropic and 
other forms of social efforts that are expected to increase equality among different 
socioeconomic groups represented among the firm’s constituents (Skitka and Tetlock, 
1993). In contrast, people with conservative ideologies have fundamentally different 
moral assumptions and perspectives, believing in individual responsibilities and more 
accepting of inequality (Poole and Rosenthal, 1984; Graham, Haidt, and Nosek, 2009). 
These differences suggest that firms with liberal-leaning labor force can expect higher 
strategic rewards in their social engagement compared to firms with conservative-leaning 
membership, with empirical studies finding strong support for a disproportionate level of 
CSR engagement among liberal firms (Gupta, Briscoe and Hambrick, 2017; Gupta and 
Briscoe, 2019). 
However, these existing arguments do not consider the fact that not all corporate 
social engagement is focused on the goal of “giving back” to improve socioeconomic 
equality. Indeed, while many firms’ CSR investments do revolve around traditional so-
called service issues whose goal is centered around providing social goods and services 
(e.g., food and shelter) to the underprivileged in need, an emerging body of literature on 
corporate activism shows an increasing participation of corporate actors in the civic 
discourse around many advocacy issues, which tend to elicit strong reactions from people 
of both ideological leaning (Chatterji and Toffel, 2019; Hambrick and Wowak, 2019). 
Contention around socio-political issues often follow along ideological fault lines, such 
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that differences in ideological preferences among people translate into opposing positions 
within those issues. For example, conservatives and liberals often fundamentally disagree 
about the approach that should be taken to address the issues such as LGBTQ rights, 
immigration, abortion rights, etc. Thus, the salience of contentious issues is likely to be 
higher for employees with stronger ideological preferences on both ends of the 
ideological spectrum. In fact, liberals’ growing interest in a given issue can be precisely 
why conservatives are motivated to care about it more, and vice versa. Importantly, this 
means that the direction of ideological disposition among the firm’s workforce is unlikely 
to account for the variation in the firms’ willingness to engage in advocacy issues, as both 
liberal and conservative firms have ideological motivations to engage with advocacy 
issues than non-ideological firms (Hambrick and Wowak, 2019); this suggests other 
ideological attributes at play in explaining the variation in the strategic incentives that 
firms face in considering their actions around advocacy issues.  
2.3. Ideological Attributes of Firms as Antecedents of Advocacy Engagement 
What incentivized firms to take a stand on advocacy issues? I argue that whether 
or not a firm engages in advocacy issues, and if so, how much, depend on the 
composition of the firm’s workforce in terms of their ideological characteristics. In 
particular, I define three ideological attributes of a firm’s internal workforce, which 
haven’t received much attention in the extant literature, and consider how they impact a 
firm’s advocacy engagement.  
First, ideological intensity of the workforce refers to how many employees of the 
firm have strong ideological preferences. After all, not every organizational members of 
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the firm are likely to have strong ideological convictions. While most individuals do have 
intrinsic ideological preferences that translate into varying positions with respect to many 
politically contested issues (Erikson and Tedin, 2003; Haidt, Graham & Joseph, 2009), 
not many people are willing to do anything about it, especially when promoting the 
position aligned with their own values entail investments of their time and money (Green, 
Kahneman, & Kunreuther, 1994; Halfpenny, 1999; Elfenbein & McManus, 2010; 
Fischbacher & Gachter, 2010). This can be attributed to the inherent nature of with many 
social issues as a public good (Olson, 1965); when an individual makes an active effort to 
promote the preferred issue position, it is hard to exclude those who don’t make such 
effort yet have similar ideological preferences from feeling good for knowing that their 
preferred issue position is being promoted. If a firm’s employees similarly exhibit such 
limited intention to invest their own time and money to advance the issue, the firm cannot 
expect significant strategic returns from their activism.  
Yet, extensive literature on political psychology documents a significant variance 
across different individuals in the perceived importance of ideological and political 
values to their self-identity, with some individuals who exhibit the highest interests in 
such values often willing to bear personal costs to advance the ideologically-charged 
causes (Oliver, Marwell & Teixeira, 1985; Huddy, 2001). When a firm has a sufficient 
number of these employees who are passionately concerned about the cause and thus 
willing to reward the firm by investing their own time and energy (e.g., stronger 
commitment and motivation to work, prosocial organizational citizenship behavior), the 
firm would have enough strategic incentives to engage in the issue in ways aligned with 
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their values (Chatman, 1989; Dineen & Noe 2009, Cable & DeRue 2002; Kutcher, 
Bragger & Masco, 2013). These employees may directly pressure firms to use their 
resources to advance their issue-related agenda, thus using their firm as a vehicle for 
activism to communicate their ideological views on the issues of concern. Even when 
they account for a small segment of the broader workforce, these employees with 
stronger preferences may play a significant role in driving firms’ activism by acting as a 
group that constitutes “critical mass” that is required to solve collective action problem 
(Hardin, 1982; Oliver, Marwell & Teixeira, 1985). By lowering interests necessary for 
subsequent issue-related actions by others, they may induce broader (albeit passive) 
participation of employees with lower interests who may act as movement allies (Lipsky, 
1968), thus further facilitating firms’ engagement in activism14. 
H1: Firms with stronger ideological intensity give more to advocacy issues. 
Second, ideological homogeneity within the workforce is likely to act as one of 
the key contingencies that may moderate the positive relationship between ideological 
intensity among employees and firms’ activism behaviors. Ideological homogeneity 
refers to how similar the firm’s organizational members are in terms of their ideological 
preferences; put simply, whether they think similarly or not. The aforementioned ASA 
process at the organizational level is expected to promote a relatively high level of 
homogeneity among the workforce (Gupta, Briscoe & Hambrick, 2017; Gupta & Briscoe, 
2019). Not only are individuals attracted to workplaces where existing employees and a 
 
14 Research in political science has found that individuals who donate to political parties tend to be socially 
influential, ideologically minded, and motivated to promulgate their beliefs among friends and colleagues 
(Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Ansolabehere et al., 2003). 
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range of firm policies and behaviors suit them, but the firms are also more likely to select 
these similar-minded individuals who appear to have better fit with their organizations. 
Moreover, individuals with different ideologies to the prevailing ideologies in the 
workplace often leave the firm in search of other alternative workplaces that provide a 
better person–organization fit or value congruence (Bermiss and McDonald, 2018; 
McDonnell and Cobb, 2019). In fact, this unique clustering of similar-minded individuals 
within the organizations is why I consider employees’ ideological preferences as a key 
driver of corporate activism, compared to ideological preferences of other stakeholders 
such as consumers which are more likely to be characterized by a high level of 
divergence and heterogeneity15. Internal preferences of employees would be pronounced 
in the group of ideologically homogeneous firms whose employees think similarly to 
each other, which gives rise to a prevailing system of beliefs that would enable firms to 
reach internal consensus in their advocacy giving decisions as to which issues to support 
and in what ways (Schneider, 1987; Gupta et al., 2017). 
However, not all firms face skewed and homogeneous member profiles. Indeed, 
Gupta, Briscoe & Hambrick (2017) document the existence of many ‘purple’ firms 
whose employees are split in their ideological preferences, with some employees leaning 
blue, and others leaning red. In such an organization whose employees hold conflicting 
ideological preferences from each other, no clear consensus as to which issue stand to 
 
15 Of course, this is not to suggest that the dynamics of ideological clustering may not arise among other 
types of stakeholders, such as consumers. A smaller, specialized firms such as Patagonia may indeed 
pursue an explicit differentiation strategy based on their ideological positions on salient divisive issues 
appeal to niche customer segments (Giarratana and Fosfuri, 2007; Barroso and Giarratana, 2013). The point 
is that the dynamics of ideological clustering may arise organically among the group of employees even 
without an explicit positioning strategy, via between- and within-firm organizational processes. 
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pick is likely to emerge. Corporate activism by such ideologically heterogeneous firm 
that face such challenge of preference aggregation may backfire severely by alienating a 
significant portion of their employee base by choosing to pick a side on the issue. The 
portion of employees who disagree with the firm’s chosen position may develop negative 
attitude toward their job and the organization because of their value incongruence with 
the firm, thus showing reduced engagement and motivation. Moreover, Burbano (2020) 
shows that this strategic penalty from different-minded employees can be 
disproportionately bigger than the strategic benefit the firm can expect from the portion 
of employees who do agree with the firm’s stance on divisive issues16. Thus, the firm 
characterized by a high level of within-firm ideological heterogeneity may be 
strategically better off staying neutral by not taking any sides, even when there exist 
many employees with strong ideological preferences who would like to see a firm to take 
an action on the cause in one way or the other. In other words, these arguments suggest 
that the positive relationship between higher ideological intensity in the firm’s workforce 
and its activism would hold only for ideologically homogeneous firms, but not for 
ideologically heterogeneous firms. 
H2: The positive association between ideological intensity and firms’ advocacy 
giving is strengthened by the level of ideological homogeneity. 
Third, I consider ideological radicalness of the firm’s employees as another 
ideological attribute that is expected to moderate the positive effect of ideological 
 
16 According to Burbano (2020), this asymmetry can be partly explained a false consensus bias (Marks & 
Miller 1987), which refers to how individuals tend to overestimate the degree to which others share their 
preferences and beliefs, including the work contexts (Martinko & Gardner, 1987, Mowday 1981). 
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intensity on corporate advocacy engagement. Within the group of firms that hold 
ideologically aligned positions to each other, there is a range in the level of radicalness in 
their ideological positions (Abramowitz, 2010; Hall, 2015; Utych, 2020), such that some 
firms are placed on the extreme end of the ideological spectrum (i.e., ideological 
radicals), whereas others are placed more closely towards the middle (i.e., ideological 
moderates). People with extreme ideological preferences have more incentives to make 
substantial commitments to promote their agenda around the cause or defend against the 
competing positions advanced by others, because their preferred issue position is likely to 
be further away from the preference of the median. This means that those “ideologues” 
with radical ideological preferences are less likely to derive indirect utility from others’ 
action on the issue area, as such action is less likely to be aligned with their own, unique 
preferences; therefore, they are often willing to bear the costs of their action around the 
issue that they care about. Thus, the chances are that employees with extreme preferences 
are likely to put a high price tag on the firm’s action, should it choose to behave in ways 
aligned with their values by promoting the issue stand that they believe in. 
Ideological radicalness may also strengthen the willingness of the firm to act on 
the demands from employees with strong ideological intensity, as it amplifies the 
strategic benefits that the firm can expect from their activism by allowing firms to gain 
additional differentiation advantages. The firm that faces workforce with a more extreme 
ideology is uniquely positioned to take an extreme position on the issue of interest. In 
doing so, for example, a liberal-leaning firm with radical ideological membership can 
distance itself not only from the other firms that take conservative positions but also from 
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those that do take a relatively moderate liberal position. That is, ideological radicalness 
among the firm’s workforce allows it to occupy less crowded positioning and maximize 
its competitive advantages. While this notion that for-profit corporations can use 
ideological contention around divisive social issues as the basis for their strategic 
differentiation and competitive advantage is relatively new to our management and CSR 
literature, it harkens back to the classic model of competition between opposing parties in 
political science, where parties with varying ideological positions differentiate 
themselves by espousing different positions on advocacy issues of divisive nature (Cox, 
1990; Burden, 2004; Carrillo and Castanheira, 2008; De Sio and Weber, 2014; Thomsen, 
2014). 
H3: The positive association between ideological intensity and firms’ advocacy 
giving is strengthened by the level of ideological radicalness. 
2.4. Methodology 
2.4.1. Research Context and Data 
Finding a large-scale data that allows systematic tracking of multiple firms’ 
advocacy engagement across the entire issue universe is not easy. For this reason, most of 
the initial attempts made to understand the phenomenon of corporate activism have taken 
the approach of small-group experimental studies (Chatterji and Toffel, 2019; Burbano; 
2019; Voegtlin et al., 2019), which may suffer from generalizability issues related to 
experimental conditions. Recent working papers have alternatively used few available 
archival records of firms’ performance around advocacy issues but the availability of 
such records limited the coverage of these studies typically to a single or a few issues 
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(Mohliver et al., 2020; Mohliver and Hawn, 2020), raising concerns on the 
generalizability of these findings in other issue space. Others have broadened their 
studies’ issue coverage based on the media report-based sampling (e.g., media articles, 
press release) to track corporate advocacy engagement across multiple issues (McKean 
and King, 2019), but this approach may suffer from the potential selection bias (Earl et 
al., 2004), especially the bias that the advocacy engagement that firms choose to actively 
advertise is more likely to be captured in the media search and thus overrepresented in 
the sample, whereas the actions of advocacy that do not get advertised—potentially 
because such activity is more geared towards meeting the demands of internal 
employees—are likely to be underrepresented. Finally, many media-based records of 
advocacy can reflect firms’ symbolic efforts rather than substantive efforts of corporate 
activism, i.e., a mere ‘talk’ that firms use to win the favor of stakeholders without 
significant outlay of resources (Hambrick and Wowak, 2019). 
I test my theoretical arguments by building a novel dataset which allows progress 
regarding several of these empirical issues. Specifically, I build a database of corporate 
advocacy giving: that is, firms’ support of 501c3 advocacy nonprofits via philanthropic 
donations. In the nonmarket literature, corporate philanthropy has primarily been 
conceptualized as the voluntary mechanism of corporate wealth redistribution—the way 
in which firms give back to society—by funding so-called service nonprofits (e.g., soup 
kitchen, homeless shelter) that provision various social goods and services such as food 
and shelter to those in need. However, the population of potential recipients of corporate 
giving include not only service nonprofits, but also advocacy nonprofits such as activist 
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groups and think tanks, as noted in the examples (e.g., Patagonia) above. Importantly, 
this suggests that corporate giving to advocacy nonprofits can be used as a novel channel 
to systematically track firms’ advocacy issue engagement at a large scale. As noted in 
previous studies (Luo, Kaul, and Seo, 2018), the main advantage using the donation 
records of corporations—especially, donation of corporate foundations—lies in its 
comprehensiveness; corporate foundations are legally required to file detailed 
information in their grant records annually via IRS Form 990s (Returns of Organization 
Exempt from Income Tax). This data is compiled from the Foundation Center, a 
nonprofit organization that compiles information on U.S. philanthropic foundations and 
their grants. Its Foundation Directory Online (FDO) database is understood to provide the 
single most comprehensive coverage on U.S. based philanthropic foundations and their 
grants, and I identify corporate foundations that are affiliated to U.S. public firms in this 
database and collect their grant records from 2003 to 2015.  
Of course, the key challenge for this study’s interest is identifying the sub-sample 
of corporate advocacy giving out of over 1 Mil individual records of entire corporate 
foundation giving made during this period, by tracking which grants specifically go to 
advocacy nonprofits. This requires collecting information on not just corporate 
grantmakers (which most of the previous studies on corporate giving focus on), but also a 
uniquely detailed information on the nonprofit recipients of corporate giving: most 
importantly, a nonprofit’s primary organizational function, based on which I can break 
down giving to advocacy vs. service nonprofits at an individual grant level. Following the 
previous studies (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Minkoff and Agnone, 2010; Suárez, 2012), I 
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operationalize a given grant as advocacy giving if it goes to nonprofit whose primary 
purpose is advocacy as defined by National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities Core Codes 
(NTEE-CC; a standard classification system in nonprofit sector similar to SIC in for-
profit sector)17. To this end, I hand collect the unique organizational identifier (EIN) on 
the 48,325 recipients of entire corporate foundation giving from 2003 to 2015, and then 
match this recipient list based on EIN to the second main database of this study: Exempt 
Organizations Business Master File Extract (EO BMF), which is a master file providing 
granular organizational characteristics on over 1 Mil U.S. tax-exempt nonprofits during 
my study period18. This matching process allows me to identify 22,812 records of 
corporate advocacy grant made to 4,021 advocacy nonprofits across 22 different issue 
areas from 2003 to 2015, which amount to around one billion dollars. Using this data, I 
can track not only a variation in multiple firms’ advocacy engagement across the entire 
issue universe, while minimizing the bias of sample selection by capturing the 
comprehensive records of corporate giving that flows into advocacy nonprofits.  
In addition to the data on corporate advocacy giving, this paper’s inquiry also 
requires the dataset on firms’ ideological characteristics. I follow the approach of 
identifying organizational ideologies of firms based on campaign contributions of 
 
17 This mostly includes R (Civil Rights, Social Action, Advocacy) in NTEE major code, or 01 (alliances & 
advocacy) and 05 (public policy analysis) in NTEE subcode. The details of categorization scheme are 
reported in Appendix Table 1. 
18 While the threshold was lowered to $25,000 as of 2009, I keep the $50,000 cutoff throughout the entire 
period to ensure the consistency in the sample of 501(c) nonprofit recipients. Also, an important limitation 
with this approach should be noted. As the NTEE-CC categorization system categorizes nonprofits only by 
their primary mission, I cannot track advocacy giving that goes to nonprofits whose core mission is not 
advocacy but still engages in it as a secondary function. While the extant understanding is that most of the 
nonprofit advocacy are performed by core advocacy groups (Kimberline, 2010), it does warrant that my 
observation about the prevalence of corporate advocacy giving, especially its relative prevalence compared 
to service giving, should be interpreted strictly as a conservative, lower-bound estimate. 
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individuals within a firm, whose empirical validity has been demonstrated in a 
considerable body of literature (Gupta et al., 2017; Bermiss and McDonald, 2018; 
Carnahan and Greenwood, 2018; Gupta and Briscoe, 2019; McDonnell and Cobb, 2019). 
The data on individuals’ campaign contributions are obtained from Bonica’s 2013 
database on Ideology, Money in Politics and Elections (“DIME”)19. Building on the 
insight of recent papers (Gupta et al., 2017; Gupta and Briscoe, 2019) that firms’ CSR 
practices are often a reflection of the ideological characteristics exhibited by the entire 
body politic, not just only those of corporate elites, I collect political contributions of all 
individuals that report their main employer as a given firm in my sample to calculate the 
organization-level ideological characteristics20. Finally, a variety of other sources I draw 
on include Compustat, KLD Research & Analytics, lobbyview.org (Kim, 2018)21, and 
Labor Force statistics from the Current Population Survey, which provide additional 
firm-level financial and operational information. 
2.4.2. Variables 
Dependent Variable  
            The dependent variable of this study is the Amount of Advocacy Giving, which is 
measured as the dollar amount of advocacy giving that a focal firm made in a given year. 
To correct for skewed values, I log-transformed the variable. I also confirm the stability 
 
19 Data.stanford.edu/dime. 
20 In my analysis, I separate out the effect of organizational ideological intensity into that of ideological 
intensity by senior executives vs. ideological intensity by lower-level employees. 
21 This is the firm-level lobbying database (Kim, 2018), which is originally generated from lobbying reports 
filed between 1999 and 2017 and recorded at the Senate Office of Public Records. 
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of my findings in the design using the dummy variable indicating whether a focal firm 
made donation to advocacy issues in a given year as an alternative dependent variable. 
Independent Variables 
Ideological Intensity of a given firm is measured as the total number of employees 
who make a positive amount of campaign contributions in each year as a measure of 
firm-level ideological intensity (note that the total number of employees is included as a 
control in estimations), which would capture how many employees are strongly 
ideologically motivated and thus likely supporters of the firm’s advocacy engagement. 
The Federal Election Commission (FEC) requires individuals to provide information on 
their employers for any campaign contribution of $200 or more, allowing me to identify 
individuals who identify themselves as an employee of the firms in my sample and 
comprehensive records of their political gift. This approach of using the number of 
individuals who are campaign contributors as a proxy for ideological intensity builds on a 
widely influential work of Ansolabehere, De Figueiredo & Snyder, 2003), which 
demonstrate that most of the campaign contributions, especially those of individuals, are 
primarily as a type of consumption good, whereby ideological individuals express their 
intrinsic preferences on various political and social issues. A recent paper of Bonica 
(2016) finds the same pattern of ideological and partisan giving in his study on the 
sample of political contributions by corporate decision makers. These findings suggest 
that organizational members’ relative amount of campaign contribution spending can 
proxy for the level of ideological intensity of individuals within a given firm. I also find 
the same pattern in my data on political contributions of individuals who are employed to 
77 
 
U.S. public companies in my sample; most of the employees who give exhibit patterns of 
partisan giving, with most of the employees giving to either highly liberal or highly 
conservative candidates, which is shown in Figure 2.1.  
Note that this measure of firm-level ideological intensity is time-varying, as it 
captures the variation in the count of employees that make campaign contributions from 
year to year. I also test the robustness of the results using the alternative measure of the 
aggregated amount of campaign contributions made by these employees in each year, 
which allows me to take advantage of further variation in how much these employees are 
willing to spend when they give. While there exists an impressive body of work has 
emerged that demonstrates the validity of the political ideology measure based on 
individual campaign contribution records, it is worth noting that the firm-level 
ideological intensity based on this approach is likely to correspond to a conservative, 
lower-bound estimate of how many employees are strongly ideologically motivated, and 
if so, how much. Not only do only a small percentage of those interested in ideologically-
charged social and environmental issues actually make campaign contributions at all 
(after all, political giving is one of many channels in which people can express their 
ideological interests)22, but the cut-off used by FEC ($200) prevents me from capturing 
those who do make political donations but in an amount less than $200. Also, those who 
are willing to spend more than $200 are likely to be relatively senior employees who 
 
22 According to OpenSecrets.org, “Only a tiny fraction of Americans actually give campaign contributions 
to political candidates, parties or PACs. The ones who give contributions large enough to be itemized (over 
$200) is even smaller… Just 0.51% of the United State population contributed more than two hundred 




have enough discretionary income, which is consistent with the empirical regularity that 
individual campaign contributions come disproportionately from higher-income, more 
educated and older Americans (Pew Research Center, 2017)23.  
The second main ideological attribute of the organization of interest is Ideological 
Homogeneity of the firm, which is measured by the standard deviation of ideological 
positions among firm employees that made campaign contributions during my study 
period. Ideological scores of each firms’ individuals used to calculate this measure are 
derived from the common-space CFScore in DIME dataset (Bonica, 2013). Using the 
intuition that individuals with similar ideologies donate to similar political candidates, 
Bonica’s CFScore places individuals’ ideology on a scale of –2 (highly liberal) to +2 
(highly conservative) based on their political contribution patterns. The third firm-level 
ideological attribute is Ideological Radicalness of the firm, which is measured as the 
absolute value of ideological scores of a focal firm’s employees who made campaign gift 
in a given year, averaged across the total number of employees who made a giving. 
Control Variables 
First, I control for the logged amount of Giving by Industry Peers, which indicates 
how much a focal firm’s industry peers made donation to advocacy issues in a given year, 
based on the existing studies that highlight the mimetic influences in firms’ philanthropic 
and social practices among firms that face similar institutional environment (Useem and 
Kutner, 1986; Bertels and Peloza, 2008; Marquis and Tilcsik, 2016). I define firms’ peers 





Other Firms, which indicates whether or not firms outside the boundary of a focal firm’s 
industry gave to a given issue in a given year. 
Second, in light of the studies that highlight the effect of the direction of 
ideological leaning within the firm’s workforce, I include Ideological Position of a focal 
firm as a control, by calculating the average ideological score of the firm’s individual 
employees that made campaign contributions during my study period, with each 
individual’s ideological scores weighted by the frequency of their contributions.  
Third, I control for firm-level financial and operational attributes. I also include a 
firm’s R&D-to-Sales Ratio, Advertising-to-Sales Ratio, and Capex-to-Sales Ratio, 
measured by its expenditure in each area scaled by total sales, all of which have been 
shown to affect the firm’s philanthropic activities in previous studies (Surroca, Tribó and 
Waddock, 2010; Zhao and Murrell, 2016). Additional controls include a firm’s Size, 
which is a logged measure of its total revenue, Total Employees, which is the total count 
of firms’ employees, and a firm’s financial performance, measured by return on assets 
(ROA). I include the index of CSR rating to control for the potential role of firms’ other 
areas of social engagement on their advocacy giving decisions, which is measured as the 
firm’s net KLD score, i.e., its number of strengths minus number of concerns in four 
major dimensions (environment, diversity, employment, community) (Mattingly and 
Berman, 2006)24. I also control for Female Board Ratio, which is calculated by the 
number of a firm’s female board members scaled by its total board size, given the prior 
 
24 Note that I exclude the philanthropy-related scores (a sub-category in KLD community dimension) in the 
calculation of KLD rating scores to make sure that the measured social performances are not already 
capturing the variation in firms’ service or advocacy giving. 
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evidence that documents its link to firms’ social actions (Marquis and Lee, 2013). I 
further control for a firm’s logged Amount of Lobbying, to account for the extent to which 
its advocacy giving is politically motivated and used as a complementary tactic for 
lobbying (Bertrand et al., 2020).  
The last set of controls is to account for the potential influence of external market 
conditions on firms’ advocacy giving decisions. Specifically, I account for the product-
market competitive intensity in the firm’s main market by including the ratio of Market 
Concentration, measured by the Herfindahl index of market share distribution across 
firms in the same NAICS 2 digit code as the focal firm. In light of previous studies that 
highlight the importance of a firm’s geographic community in its CSR and corporate 
philanthropic practices (Marquis et al., 2007), I also include the size of Headquarter 
Population (in millions) and the Headquarter Poverty Ratio in the firm’s headquartered 
state. 
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics and correlations of variables. Mean VIF in all 
specifications is less than 2, with the highest individual VIF being 1.54, suggesting little 
reason to be concerned about multicollinearity. My sample frame is 505 U.S. public firms 
that are identified with at least one record of advocacy giving, and their 5,713 firm-year 
level observations. 
***Insert Table 2.1 about here*** 
2.5. Results 
2.5.1. Main Results 
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Table 2.2 reports the results of a OLS regression analysis predicting the amount of 
a firm’s advocacy giving as its ideological intensity. In all estimations, I include year 
fixed effects to account for changes in the external environment around advocacy giving 
over time, and also firm fixed effects to alleviate concerns about unobserved firm 
heterogeneity. M1 reports the baseline regression with a full set of controls. It shows a 
highly significant and positive coefficient for Ideological Intensity (𝛽=0.0021, 
p=0.0010), controlling for the total number of employees. Based on the point estimate, 
this result means that a presence of additional 100 employees within the firm is 
associated with a 5% increase in the amount of advocacy giving over its mean value.  
In M2 and M3, I check the robustness of this finding to the alternative measures 
of Ideological Intensity. First, I use the logged total amount of campaign contribution 
made by a firm’s employees in a given year. This result making use of further variation in 
how much employees spent, when they give, is reported in M2. The result shows that the 
observed effect of Ideological Intensity (𝛽=0.1135, p=0.0179) stay to be significant and 
positive. Given that both this main regressor and the dependent variable of advocacy 
giving amount are logged, the coefficients in this model can be interpreted as an 
elasticity, suggesting that a 100% increase in the size of political gift made by a firm’s 
employees is associated with a 11.35% increase in the firm’s advocacy spending.  
Second, I divide the variable of Ideological Intensity among the entire workforce 
into Top Executive Ideological Intensity (i.e., the number of top executives who make 
political contribution) vs. Non-executive Ideological Intensity (i.e., the number of non-
executive employees who make political contribution), and re-run the regression to see 
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ideological intensity of which group of employees is driving firms’ advocacy 
engagement. Specifically, individuals who are identified as a firm’s CEO and top 
executives in a given year (based on Execucomp) are coded as top executives in my 
sample, and the rest of the individuals are treated as lower-level employees. While the 
baseline measure of Ideological Intensity does not consider the rank of employees in an 
organization, if the observed positive effect of ideological intensity reflects firms’ efforts 
to satisfy their employees’ ideological interests in expectation of strategic returns from 
them as suggested in my theory, the effect should stay when we use the measure of Non-
executive Ideological Intensity as the main regressor. The result of this analysis is shown 
in M3; it finds that the effect of Non-executive Ideological Intensity is indeed strong and 
positive (𝛽=0.0019, p=0.0026), whereas the effect of Top Executive Ideological Intensity 
is shown to be not significant, albeit positive. In economic terms, an addition of 100 
employees who make campaign contribution to the firm’s workforce is associated with a 
4.4 increase in advocacy giving over its mean value, suggesting that the positive relation 
between Ideological Intensity and advocacy giving amount in the baseline analysis (M1) 
came largely from ideological intensity among regular employees who are not executives.  
In M4, I test the robustness of the effect of Ideological Intensity to the use of 
alternative dependent variable: the dummy variable of advocacy giving (i.e., whether or 
not a firm made advocacy giving in a given year). Ideological Intensity is still shown to 
have a highly significant and positive coefficient (𝛽=0.0002, p=0.0003). 
Finally, in M5, I re-estimate my results using a system dynamic panel model 
(Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). This is because the most salient 
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empirical threat to my estimation is the potential reverse causality—the direction of the 
influence from ideological intensity of the firm’s employees to its level of advocacy 
engagement can work in the opposite way; for example, when a firm takes a stand on an 
advocacy cause that appeals to liberals, the firm is likely to attract people of liberal 
leaning, while existing employees of conservative leaning may choose to leave the firm. 
While my main specification uses a lagged structure to alleviate this concern, the 
possibility of potential reverse causality and autocorrelation in my baseline model 
remains. Controlling for the recent past of a focal firm’s advocacy giving, this re-
estimation still produces consistent results; the coefficient of Ideological Intensity is 
significant and positive, with the estimate highly similar with an estimate of the main M1 
(𝛽=0.0022, p=0.0095). These overall results lend strong support for Hypothesis 1, 
showing that firms with higher ideological intensity—firms that have a higher number of 
ideologically engaged individuals as a part of their workforce—do give more to advocacy 
issues. 
***Insert Table 2.2 about here*** 
2.5.2. Moderation Analyses 
Having demonstrated support for my main conjecture, I now turn to consider the 
effect of other two ideological attributes of the organization as key contingent factors. 
these analyses would not only help to better understand the mechanisms underlying my 
observed main findings, but also to add credibility to the results. Based on the results of 
Model 3, which highlight varying effects of ideological intensity among executives vs. 
non-executives, I run all models with the measure of Non-executive Ideological Intensity 
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as my main regressor, with Top Executive Ideological Intensity as an additional control 
added to the full set of controls.  
The first ideological attribute we consider as a moderator is the level of 
ideological heterogeneity, which refers to whether organizational members who have 
strong ideological convictions think differently from each other. To test its moderating 
effect on the observed positive relationship between Non-executive Ideological Identity 
and advocacy giving, I run a split sample analysis based on the median value of within-
firm ideological heterogeneity. As shown in Table 2.3, the results presented in M6a and 
M6b are consistent with my expectation. While the positive effect of Non-executive 
Ideological Intensity holds for both samples, its effect is not only stronger but also bigger 
in the sample of ideologically homogeneous firms with a lower level of ideological 
heterogeneity (𝛽=0.0038, p=0.0551), compared to the observed effect among 
ideologically heterogeneous firms (𝛽=0.0014, p=0.0937) that may face the risk of 
alienating a significant portion of their employees should they choose to take a stand on 
advocacy issues by making a donation. This observed pattern thus supports Hypothesis 2, 
showing that firms respond to the demands of ideologically motivated employees only 
when those employees hold similar preferences to each other.  
Now, I turn to test the moderating effect of the second ideological attribute: the 
level of radicalness in employees’ ideological preferences. To test this prediction, I split 
the sample into the group of ideological radicals (M7a) and ideological moderates (M7b), 
based on the median value of firm-level ideological position in each ideological camp of 
conservatives and radicals. Consistent with my expectation, the results show that having 
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ideologically engaged individuals among the workforce leads to more active advocacy 
engagement only when those employees hold relatively radical ideological preferences 
(𝛽=0.0020, p=0.0138), presumably because they are more likely to reward the firm for its 
action by committing their own time and energy (e.g., higher motivation and 
productivity). On the other hand, the effect of ideological intensity among lower-level 
employees is shown to be only marginally significant and positive at 10%. This finding is 
consistent with Hypothesis 3, suggesting that higher advocacy engagement by firms with 
ideologically motivated employee base is primarily coming from the group of firms with 
radical ideological positions, but not those with moderate positions. Note that, consistent 
with the previous results, the effect of Top Executive Ideology stays insignificant in all 
sub-samples, even in those whose employees hold homogeneous or radical preferences. 
In Appendix Table 2.1, I re-run these moderation analyses using the logged 
amount of traditional service giving as an alternative dependent variable. Interestingly, 
not only is the effect of Non-executive Ideological Intensity only marginally significant at 
10%, I also find that both ideological attributes—ideological homogeneity and 
ideological radicalness—are shown to have no significant strengthening effect on the 
positive relationship between ideological intensity among the workforce and the firm’s 
service giving. If anything, interestingly, I find that the pattern is reversed, such that the 
effect of ideological intensity on service giving is relatively stronger for firms with 
employees who have heterogeneous (AM2a) and moderate preferences (AM3b). 
***Insert Table 2.3 about here*** 
2.5.3. Supplementary Analyses: Alternative Explanations  
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The findings so far support my posited theoretical argument that firms whose 
employees are ideologically motivated are more likely to engage in advocacy giving, 
with this effect pronounced for those whose employees hold not only homogeneous but 
also radical preferences. According to my theory, these observed positive relationship 
between ideological intensity among the firm’s workforce and its advocacy giving, and 
the way the effect of ideological intensity gets amplified by other ideological makeup of 
the workforce, reflect firms’ strategic considerations to do what’s best for them to win 
favor from their ideologically engaged employees and thus earn profits. 
However, one alternative explanation to these findings is that this observed 
sensitivity to the ideological preferences of internal organizational members reflects the 
firm’s intrinsically and normatively motivated behaviors, rather than extrinsically 
motivated attempts of profit-maximization. Indeed, Gupta, Briscoe and Hambrick (2017) 
argues how ideology-based ASA process can give rise to organization’s prevailing ethos 
and culture, which can be the basis of corporate social actions, with decision makers 
following the “rules of thumb” regarding acceptable and wise behavior. From this 
perspective, ideological preferences of the workforce can actually be a source of bias, 
with decision makers acknowledging the intrinsic merits of embracing stakeholders’ 
concerns in day-to-day organizational routines (Crilly and Sloan, 2012; Chin, Hambrick, 
and Trevino, 2013) and potentially justifying the instrumental merits of their decisions to 
suit their organizational values (Higgins and Molden, 2003).  
However, if this normative and intrinsic motivations are the central mechanism 
driving the positive effect of ideologically engaged organizational members on the firm’s 
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advocacy giving, we can expect that this effect would not systematically vary by the 
strategic incentives that make it necessary for certain firms to care and meet what their 
employees want. I explore this idea by running a split sample analysis based on the level 
of labor market competition (proxied by unemployment rate in a focal firm’s industry in 
each year); the intuition is that firms in a more competitive labor market environment 
have incentives to be more responsive to the ideological preferences of employees. The 
results shown in Model 8a and 8b of Table 2.4 report that the effect of lower-level 
employees’ ideological intensity do get stronger for firms in a higher level of 
competition. This evidence is consistent with the interpretation that strategic motivations 
are indeed the main driver behind the positive effect of ideological intensity. 
Another alternative explanation is that the observed effect of ideological intensity 
among the workforce may simply reflect agency behavior of top executives (Friedman, 
1970; Ang, Cole and Lin, 2000; Tan and Tang, 2016). According to this scenario, CEOs 
and other top executive members may be using advocacy giving to pursue their private 
ideological preferences separate from other employees’ preferences, which may not 
necessarily be aligned with the firm’s strategic interests. Of course, this concern is 
already significantly alleviated by the consistent findings that demonstrate how the effect 
of Ideological Intensity is primarily driven by the effect of Non-executive Ideological 
Intensity; as shown above, Top Executive Ideological Intensity did not significantly 
predict a firm’s advocacy giving in most models. The observed difference in the effect of 
ideological intensity between top executives vs. broader workforce shows that what 
88 
 
matters is what employees—who are one of the key stakeholders that top executives have 
to try to satisfy—want, rather than personal preferences of CEOs and other executives.  
To add confidence to this result, I also run the analysis that tests how the positive 
relationship between ideological intensity and advocacy giving varies by the level of firm 
governance, which is proxied by the number of independent board members scaled by 
total board size. Inconsistent with the possibility that the effect of ideological intensity 
may reflect agentic behavior based on top executives’ personal preferences, M9a and 
M9b report that the observed main effect holds only for the firms with strong governance 
(i.e., firms with a higher ratio of independent directors), but not for those with weak 
governance.  
Of course, it is important to note that my results are correlational. As this is often 
the case for studies of organizational ideology, the primary concern is that the same 
underlying factors that may drive the ideological composition of the workforce may also 
drive the pattern of firms’ advocacy engagement. Specifically, the main concern is that 
advocacy engagement of the firm may actually lead to a change in the firm employees’ 
ideological attributes (as expected in the ASA process mentioned above). While I do find 
consistent results using a dynamic panel model that may partly alleviate these concerns, I 
do not have an identifying instrument to separate these effects and present causal 
evidence. Thus, note that my results can be interpreted as highlighting the importance of 
fit between the pattern of a firm’s strategy and its internal workforce. 





First and foremost, this study makes contribution to a small but rapidly growing 
body of literature on corporate and CEO activism. Recently, many scholars have called 
for scholarly attention to the mounting evidence that corporate actors are increasingly 
engaging in social issues of contentious and political nature, which have long been 
understood to lie outside the traditional boundary of firms’ participation. Such growing 
trend in corporate activism is puzzling, the argument goes, especially given that these 
issues’ direct strategic connection to firms’ core businesses seems to be limited (Chatterji 
and Toffel, 2019) and firms inevitably risk alienating a significant portion of stakeholders 
who disagree with the firms’ position, again, given its contentious nature. Indeed, recent 
studies that investigated the consequences of corporate activism have found ambiguous 
or, in some cases, even negative performance implications of firms’ decisions to take a 
stand on these contentious issues (Burbano, 2019), making the need to answer the why 
question (i.e., why firms do this) all the more salient. This study provides an initial 
answer to this question by highlighting how firms characterized with unique ideological 
composition among their workforce are uniquely positioned to derive strategic benefits 
from engaging in activism, while minimizing risks and costs of potentially alienating 
those who disagree, thus joining few recent studies that examine the antecedents of 
corporate activism (Hambrick and Wowak, 2019; McKean and King, 2019). Empirically, 
this paper is one of the very first studies that provide systematic evidence on the 
antecedents of corporate engagement in contentious issues based on a large-scale dataset, 
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which captures variations in corporate engagement on a wide range of contentious issues, 
not only across firms, but also within firms over multiple years.  
Second, my study also contributes to the large body of literature on the role of 
corporate political ideology. The growing acknowledgement on the importance of 
internal values and beliefs of corporate actors has generated an impressive body of 
research on the role of actors’ ideology in recent years; numerous works have 
demonstrated that political ideology of corporate elites and more recently, that of entire 
organizational entity (including lower-level employees) shape firms’ willingness to 
contribute to social issues, shaping a wide variety of executive-level and firm-level 
behaviors and decisions related to social issues (Briscoe, Chin and Hambrick, 2014; 
Carnahan and Greenwood, 2018; Gupta, Briscoe, and Hambrick, 2018). I extend this 
research by exploring how multiple ideological characteristics of the organization jointly 
shape firms’ advocacy engagement. These moderation analyses not only allow a rich 
understanding of the mechanism behind the positive relationship between ideological 
intensity and the firm’s amount of advocacy giving, but they also present valuable 
additional evidence that shed further light on potential social implications of growing 
importance of ideology in the context of for-profit organizations, thus contributing to a 
small but growing body of work that questions the impact of firms’ social initiatives on 
society (Margolis and Walsh 2003, Luo et al. 2018).  
On the one hand, ideological actors’ active participation in advocacy issues and 
its cascade effect on others can be socially beneficial as it forces other firms to up their 
game, increasing the total supply level of corporate action around key socio-political 
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issues from which many firms would otherwise stayed away. In a sense, ideological 
actors can thus be understood as a group that constitutes “critical mass” that is required to 
solve collective action problem in the provision of social goods and induce broader 
participation of actors, as they are willing to pay the initial start-up costs of 
institutionalizing a given issue as a legitimate area of firms’ participation in general. On 
the other hand, ideological firms’ influence on others’ pattern of philanthropic provision 
may undermine social welfare, given that the norms they create might not be 
representative of the true needs of society. After all, ideological actors are likely to be the 
actors biased with their own beliefs and preferences; it is thus possible that the power that 
ideological actors get to exercise as agenda setters may result in distributional 
inefficiency in the supply of philanthropic support across various social issues; the 
chances are that certain social areas that are most salient to and favored by ideological 
actors would be over-provisioned with philanthropic support, leaving other areas under-
provisioned. Moreover, my finding that corporate activism may be driven 
disproportionately by firms whose employees are not only ideologically engaged but also 
hold particularly homogenous and extreme preferences raises concerns that corporate 
participation in advocacy issues may result in increased gridlock and polarization 




Figure 2.1. Individual employee-level distribution of ideological positions 
 
 




Table 2.1. Summary Statistics and Correlation Tables 
 
VARIABLE MEAN SD MIN MAX 
1 (Logged) amount of advocacy giving 4.304 5.502 0.000 17.009 
2 Dummy of advocacy giving 0.392 0.488 0.000 1.000 
3 Ideological intensity 78.914 193.561 0.000 2671.000 
4 Executive ideological intensity 1.811 2.390 0.000 13.000 
5 Non-executive ideological intensity 77.103 192.580 0.000 2668.000 
6 Giving by industry peers 14.496 3.217 0.000 17.413 
7 Giving by other firms 17.656 0.298 16.955 18.112 
8 Ideological position -0.190 0.594 -1.595 3.074 
9 Size 8.004 2.482 0.000 13.061 
10 # of total employees 36.385 94.087 0.000 2100.000 
11 ROA 0.043 0.083 -2.283 0.953 
12 R&D-to-sales ratio 0.023 0.082 0.000 3.351 
13 Advertising-to-sales ratio 0.011 0.028 0.000 0.371 
14 Capex-to-sales ratio 0.059 0.111 0.000 2.955 
15 Board female ratio 0.112 0.110 0.000 0.556 
16 Lobbying amount 5.680 6.767 0.000 17.911 
17 CSR rating 0.663 2.055 -7.000 13.000 
18 Market concentration 0.027 0.030 0.011 0.276 
19 Population in HQ state 13.075 10.239 0.567 39.250 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 1.00 
                   
2 0.97 1.00 
                  
3 0.18 0.13 1.00 
                 
4 0.13 0.09 0.42 1.00 
                
5 0.18 0.13 1.00 0.41 1.00 
               
6 0.09 0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.07 1.00 
              
7 0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 -0.27 1.00 
             
8 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 0.11 -0.05 0.04 -0.17 1.00 
            
9 0.27 0.22 0.32 0.30 0.32 0.02 0.10 0.11 1.00 
           
10 0.21 0.15 0.35 0.09 0.35 -0.05 0.05 -0.04 0.37 1.00 
          
11 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.08 0.06 -0.03 0.16 0.07 1.00 
         
12 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.03 -0.10 0.04 0.00 -0.08 1.00 
        
13 0.08 0.06 0.00 -0.07 0.00 -0.02 0.07 -0.20 0.09 0.05 0.14 0.07 1.00 
       
14 0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.05 -0.04 -0.10 0.17 0.07 0.06 -0.03 -0.10 0.26 -0.04 1.00 
      
15 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.24 0.17 0.05 0.16 -0.02 0.35 0.15 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.03 1.00 
     
16 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.29 0.18 -0.03 0.08 0.04 0.36 0.15 0.09 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.29 1.00 
    
17 0.17 0.13 0.25 0.15 0.25 0.12 -0.06 -0.19 0.20 0.12 0.10 0.16 0.19 -0.08 0.34 0.18 1.00 
   
18 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.31 0.20 -0.10 0.07 0.37 0.07 -0.05 0.13 0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 1.00 
  
19 0.00 -0.02 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.03 0.05 -0.19 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.21 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.22 -0.03 1.00 
 
20 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.04 0.13 -0.08 0.20 -0.03 0.13 0.11 -0.04 0.01 0.05 0.07 -0.03 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.40 1.00 
Notes: Number of firm-year observations for all variables is 5,713. Missing values of all variables are recoded as zero. 
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Table 2.2. Main Results 
 (M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) (M5) 









Ideological intensity 0.0021***   0.0002*** 0.0022** 
(0.0006)   (0.0001) (0.0008) 
Size of political gift from 
firm employees 
 0.1135*    
 (0.0478)    
Executive ideological 
intensity 
  0.0767   
  (0.0619)   
Non-executive ideological 
intensity 
  0.0019**   
  (0.0006)   
Giving by industry peers 0.0050 0.0038 0.0060 0.0004 0.0332 
(0.0395) (0.0393) (0.0395) (0.0036) (0.0504) 
Giving by other firms 0.4860 0.3610 0.5048 0.0496 2.2626 
(1.0975) (1.0995) (1.0985) (0.1081) (1.3931) 
Ideological position 0.3637* 0.3823* 0.3386+ 0.0366* 0.6270** 
(0.1723) (0.1730) (0.1736) (0.0174) (0.2403) 
Size 0.1928** 0.1902** 0.1911** 0.0198*** 0.0268 
 (0.0627) (0.0623) (0.0624) (0.0058) (0.1029) 
Total employees 0.0007 0.0025 0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0189* 
 (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0003) (0.0080) 
ROA -2.6400*** -2.6508*** -2.6669*** -0.2474** -2.9785** 
 (0.7867) (0.7868) (0.7816) (0.0768) (1.1554) 
R&D-to-sales ratio -1.7250* -1.5635+ -1.7164* -0.1526+ -1.6776 
 (0.8286) (0.8239) (0.8233) (0.0835) (1.5111) 
Advertising-to-sales ratio -9.0955 -9.2904 -8.9736 -0.8403 2.6372 
 (9.1869) (9.0659) (9.1579) (0.8693) (10.7846) 
Capex-to-sales ratio 1.4875 1.4375 1.4461 0.1089 -0.4353 
 (1.0497) (1.0447) (1.0431) (0.1045) (1.8276) 
Board female ratio 0.4005 0.4453 0.3926 0.0821 0.0561 
(1.1995) (1.1837) (1.1986) (0.1128) (1.6889) 
Lobbying amount 0.0276 0.0260 0.0266 0.0013 0.0091 
(0.0292) (0.0293) (0.0293) (0.0028) (0.0371) 
CSR rating -0.0196 -0.0159 -0.0201 0.0010 0.0716 
 (0.0551) (0.0552) (0.0551) (0.0050) (0.0699) 
Market concentration -5.6521 -6.2192 -6.0007 -0.4749 5.8902 
(14.7604) (14.7381) (14.7164) (1.3880) (21.8010) 
Population in HQ state  
 
0.2075 0.2140 0.2007 0.0233 0.1673 
(0.1673) (0.1691) (0.1664) (0.0151) (0.1741) 
Poverty rate in HQ state  
 
0.1293* 0.1303* 0.1236+ 0.0104+ 0.1631* 
(0.0638) (0.0640) (0.0643) (0.0061) (0.0740) 
Lag(amount of advocacy 
giving) 
    0.1989*** 
    (0.0208) 
Constant -10.3575 -9.2786 -10.6445 -1.0766 -41.7548+ 
 (19.1460) (19.1675) (19.1508) (1.8865) (24.2518) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.0804 0.0795 0.0808 0.0790  
N 5713 5713 5713 5713 5713 
Notes: Dependent variable is logged amount of advocacy giving of a focal firm in a given each year, except for M4 
that uses dummy variable of advocacy giving as an alternative DV. Coefficients of OLS panel regressions. Standard 
errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 2.3. Moderation Analyses 
 (M6a) (M6b) (M7a) (M7b) 
 Ideological heterogeneity Ideological radicalness 
 High Low High Low 
Executive ideological 
intensity 
0.1677 -0.0480 0.0266 0.1143 
(0.1158) (0.0958) (0.0893) (0.0838) 
Non-executive ideological 
intensity 
0.0014+ 0.0038+ 0.0020* 0.0016+ 
(0.0008) (0.0020) (0.0008) (0.0009) 
Giving by industry peers 0.0086 -0.0245 -0.0757 0.0743 
(0.0591) (0.0481) (0.0461) (0.0605) 
Giving by other firms 1.3665 1.6030 -0.2374 0.9268 
(2.1178) (1.9465) (1.3713) (1.7028) 
Ideological position 0.5547 0.4349 0.4980* 0.1104 
(0.3734) (0.3564) (0.2160) (0.2829) 
Size 0.1971+ 0.1994* 0.1873* 0.2155* 
 (0.1185) (0.0890) (0.0787) (0.1035) 
Total employees 0.0015 0.0075 0.0033 0.0010 
 (0.0042) (0.0094) (0.0098) (0.0047) 
ROA -1.7627* -4.1004* -3.9624*** -1.5136 
 (0.8464) (1.6282) (1.0955) (0.9200) 
R&D-to-sales ratio -2.1242 -1.8335 -1.3132 -8.0878** 
 (1.4158) (2.6143) (0.8952) (3.1102) 
Advertising-to-sales ratio -26.7293* 2.2839 -15.0673 11.1326 
 (10.9986) (11.0947) (9.8397) (12.9256) 
Capex-to-sales ratio 2.3286 1.5332 0.6037 3.0392 
 (3.3622) (1.5450) (1.0365) (2.4156) 
Board female ratio 2.0991 1.3718 -0.3327 0.9486 
(1.6779) (1.8501) (1.8113) (1.6001) 
Lobbying amount 0.0359 -0.0100 0.0546 -0.0037 
(0.0393) (0.0419) (0.0443) (0.0393) 
CSR rating -0.0329 0.0349 -0.0615 0.0120 
 (0.0722) (0.0978) (0.0903) (0.0680) 
Market concentration 7.4827 -24.2295 -6.7799 -5.0746 
(21.4074) (19.6370) (19.2048) (23.5797) 
Population in HQ state  
 
0.0067 -0.0737 0.3586 0.1037 
(0.1208) (0.3859) (0.2379) (0.1903) 
Poverty rate in HQ state  
 
0.1282 0.1041 0.0934 0.1617+ 
(0.0922) (0.1096) (0.0919) (0.0893) 
Constant -23.5869 -25.1905 1.3498 -18.1532 
 (36.8856) (34.0490) (24.3319) (29.3435) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.0834 0.0592 0.1003 0.0714 
N 2475 2507 2866 2847 
Notes: Dependent variable is the logged amount of advocacy giving of a focal firm in a given each year. 
Coefficients of OLS panel regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** 




Table 2.4. Supplementary Analyses 
 (M8a) (M8b) (M9a) (M9b) 
 Labor market competition Corporate governance 
 High Low Strong Weak 
Executive ideological 
intensity 
0.0944 0.0512 -0.0010 0.1002 
(0.0822) (0.0902) (0.0765) (0.0999) 
Non-executive ideological 
intensity 
0.0022** 0.0016+ 0.0017* 0.0026 
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0017) 
Giving by industry peers 0.0699 -0.0567 -0.0256 0.0360 
(0.0575) (0.0569) (0.0662) (0.0450) 
Giving by other firms 0.2510 4.8851 1.0256 0.0248 
(1.5215) (3.6347) (1.7981) (1.3880) 
Ideological position 0.7102** 0.0730 0.3506 0.2524 
(0.2313) (0.2624) (0.3219) (0.2032) 
Size 0.1548* 0.2373** 0.6665* 0.1701** 
 (0.0760) (0.0879) (0.2625) (0.0622) 
Total employees 0.0014 -0.0047 -0.0026 0.0044 
 (0.0053) (0.0081) (0.0053) (0.0050) 
ROA -1.5023 -3.1491** -2.3187* -2.8300** 
 (1.5296) (0.9519) (1.0479) (1.0844) 
R&D-to-sales ratio 2.1496 -2.6171* 0.5601 -1.7594** 
 (2.2958) (1.2867) (2.8012) (0.6559) 
Advertising-to-sales ratio -7.1709 -11.3353 1.0639 -13.9328 
 (14.6315) (8.2536) (14.1018) (10.7828) 
Capex-to-sales ratio 1.1769 0.8555 3.5388 0.8913 
 (1.6440) (1.4591) (2.1545) (0.9495) 
Board female ratio -0.5119 1.1790 -0.6685 1.4537 
(1.6247) (1.7295) (1.7898) (1.6474) 
Lobbying amount 0.0248 0.0497 -0.0192 0.0626 
(0.0365) (0.0445) (0.0420) (0.0392) 
CSR rating -0.0009 -0.0835 -0.0649 0.0111 
 (0.0792) (0.0749) (0.0678) (0.0988) 
Market concentration -2.9469 -30.9570 -31.4737 24.0177 
(26.6294) (18.9577) (20.5560) (19.1469) 
Population in HQ state  
 
0.0935 0.1426 -0.0052 0.3161 
(0.2720) (0.2400) (0.2549) (0.2541) 
Poverty rate in HQ state  
 
0.1596+ 0.0570 0.2726** -0.0035 
(0.0878) (0.1030) (0.0934) (0.0874) 
Constant -6.0965 -83.6283 -20.5709 -4.1473 
 (26.4420) (62.9039) (30.8758) (24.3886) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.0907 0.0832 0.0566 0.1349 
N 3307 2320 2844 2869 
Notes: Dependent variable is the logged amount of advocacy giving of a focal firm in a given each year. 
Coefficients of OLS panel regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** 




CHAPTER 3: COMPETITIVE SPILLOVER EFFECTS  
OF CORPORATE ACTIVISM:  
CONSEQUENCES OF HETEROGENEITY IN ACROSS-




Recently, there have been increasing cases of corporate activism, with firms 
taking a stand on advocacy issues of contentious nature, such as global warming, 
immigration, abortion rights, gun control, LGBTQ rights, etc. In some cases, top 
executives and employees take a public stand on issues, as seen in a recent New York 
Times ad which CEOs of Ben & Jerry’s, Bloomberg, Twitter, and many others signed to 
oppose state abortion bans in 2019 (Chatterji and Toffel, 2019; Hambrick and Wowak, 
2019). In other cases, firms collaborate with advocacy groups such as activists or think 
tanks specialized in framing civic discourse (Rich, 2005; Walker, 2014; McDonnell, 
2016). For example, Patagonia funded $10 Mil to grassroots advocacy groups fighting 
climate change in 2018. According to a growing body of literature on corporate political 
ideologies (Chin, Hambrick and Treviño, 2013; Gupta, Briscoe, and Hambrick, 2017; 
Carnahan and Greenwood, 2018; Bermiss and McDonald, 2018; McDonnell and Cobb, 
2019), instances of corporate activism reflect ideological preferences of the firm’s 
employees around advocacy issues of contentious nature, the contention around which 
follows ideological fault lines. Firms whose employees hold a strong ideology (i.e., 
strong conservatives or liberals) have internal incentives to engage in these ideologically-
charged issues that their employees care about, as doing so promotes greater employee 
loyalty and commitment (Bode, Singh, and Rogan, 2015; Burbano, 2016; Flammer and 
Luo, 2017; Carnahan, Kryscynski, and Olson, 2017), even when clear external norms 
around such action are yet to emerge.  
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This rising trend in corporate activism led by ideological firms is often celebrated 
in the media as a catalyst for broader social change around the issue (Bersin, 2018; 
Murray, 2019). Given the extant focus in the literature on the direct effect of a focal 
firm’s ideology on its own social actions, however, we are yet to study the implications 
of these ideological firms’ actions on the broader field: in particular, if initiating 
ideological firms can indeed enable widespread issue support from other firms, 
essentially acting as “issue entrepreneurs” that put an issue into play by raising its 
salience in their field (McCarthy and Zald 1977, p. 1215). The existing accounts of how 
firms influence others’ social actions based on practice diffusion (Briscoe and Safford, 
2008; Briscoe, Gupta, and Anner, 2015) and normative pressures (Marquis, Glynn, and 
Davis, 2007; Marquis and Tilcsik, 2016) support this possibility, suggesting that initial 
action of ideological firms would be closely followed by other firms in the same 
stakeholder environment—notably, industry peers—as a useful cue to guide their own 
social actions.  
However, what remains underexplored is the possibility that initiating ideological 
firms’ advocacy may open the door for not just their ideological allies, but also their 
ideological opponents, whose organizational members hold opposing issue positions. 
After all, polarizing nature of many advocacy issues points to this very possibility of 
ideological contestation (Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996; McCright and Dunlap, 2000; 
Barnett and Woywode, 2004; Blee and Creasap, 2010), suggesting that ideological 
opponents may respond to initiating firms’ actions by joining in the debate around the 
given issue with a different position (e.g., by funding nonprofits whose issue position is 
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aligned with their own preferences). Moreover, the imperatives of strategic differentiation 
(Porter, 1997; Baum and Haveman, 1997; Zhao et al., 2017) suggest a potential 
asymmetry in the response between the two groups, ideological opponents can gain 
additional strategic benefits of differentiation in the eyes of their organizational members 
by distancing themselves from original contributors in their issue position. These 
arguments suggest that ideological firms’ initial activism to promote the cause may 
backfire by inviting a disproportionately stronger response from their ideological 
opponents compared to their allies, thus contributing to increased gridlock and conflict 
around the issue.  
To test these theoretical arguments, I build a novel database on corporate 
advocacy giving, which corresponds to one of the few ways to systematically track 
corporate activism across multiple issues on a large scale. By collecting uniquely detailed 
information on the grant records of U.S. corporate foundations and their recipients from 
2003 to 2015, I test my predictions using over 22,812 records of advocacy grants from 
441 corporations made to 4,021 501(c)3 advocacy groups across 22 different issue areas, 
comprising about $1 Bil in donations. My analyses show that while ideological firms’ 
giving encourages their ideological allies’ giving in the issue area of their choice, it also 
invites their ideological opponents’ giving, with the response from the opponents often 
dominating the response from the allies. Such selective counter-response from 
ideological opponents is stronger among firms with homogeneous and radical 
preferences, and in swing states, consistent with my theory that this response reflects the 
dynamics of within-issue competition between firms that lie at the opposite ends of the 
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ideological spectrum. My findings survive my most stringent specifications with firm-
issue pair fixed effects, issue-level time trends, and a battery of robustness checks. In the 
supplementary analyses, I further confirm the pattern of ideological clustering in firms’ 
recipient choices, finding an evidence that firms with different ideologies do fund 
different nonprofits within each issue area. 
First, this study contributes to an emerging body of literature on corporate 
activism and especially the line of scholarship that highlights the role of corporate 
ideology as the main driver for such action (Chin et al., 2013; Briscoe, Chin and 
Hambrick, 2014; Hambrick and Wowak, 2019; McDonnell and Cobb, 2019; Chatterji and 
Toffel, 2019; Burbano, 2019), by answering the open question of how ideological firms’ 
advocacy actions affect other firms in the broader field. An answer to this question 
matters not only resolves a theoretical ambiguity about the indirect spillover effects of 
corporate activism, but also may have important societal implications. While media 
accounts often celebrate corporate activism as a catalyst for social change that enables 
broader issue support in society, my paper offers a strategic differentiation-based account 
of corporate social counterpositioning (Porter, 1997; Zhao et al., 2017), which shows that 
ideological firms’ actions to promote a cause may backfire by creating a stronger 
economic incentive for opposing voices of their ideological opponents. In doing so, I 
challenge the current, narrow conceptualization of socio-political contention around 
social issues as a source of strategic liability that presents risks of alienating stakeholders, 
by highlighting how such contention can be leveraged by firms as a unique source of 
competitive advantage and value creation. 
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Second, my work extends our understanding of how firms influence others’ social 
actions. Most studies on this topic have focused on the normative pressures and 
homogeneity by showing how a uniform consensus emerges on an appropriate form of 
corporate social action (Marquis et al., 2007; Raffaelli and Glynn, 2014, Marquis and 
Tilcsik, 2016), paying limited attention to contested and fragile nature of the diffusion 
process. My paper addresses this gap by highlighting stakeholders’ heterogeneous 
preferences around many social issues shown in broader work in political psychology, 
based on which I argue that the firm’s initial activism can alienate stakeholders who 
disagree and create strong economic incentives for its rivals to take a different issue 
position. In doing so, this paper highlights that what may look like smooth mimicry on 
the surface can mask dynamics full of contention in the way that corporate social 
practices are diffused throughout the field. I also uncover the across-firm heterogeneity in 
the ideological position of firms’ organizational members as an underexplored source of a 
variation—and even a direct contention between firms—in the diffusion process, thus 
enriching our knowledge on how firms respond to external pressure in diverse ways 
(Oliver, 1991; Briscoe and Safford, 2008; Fiss, Kennedy and Davis, 2012). 
Further, my study points to additional ideological attributes of firms including 
ideological homogeneity and radicalness, and the level of institutional uncertainty as key 
organizational and environmental contingencies that moderate the posited asymmetry in 
the response between ideological allies and opponents. These moderation analyses not 
only allow a rich understanding of the mechanism behind the observed competitive 
response from ideological opponents, but they also present valuable additional evidence 
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that shed further light on potential social implications of this strategy of socio-political 
differentiation. Specifically, I find that competitive entry from ideological opponents is 
driven by those with extreme and homogeneous preferences, and also concentrated in 
swing states, which further raise concerns that this dynamic may indeed result in 
increased gridlock and polarization, thus contributing to a small but growing body of 
work that questions the impact of firms’ social initiatives on society (Margolis and Walsh 
2003, Luo et al. 2018). 
3.2. Literature Review  
3.2.1. Corporate Political Ideologies and Advocacy Engagement 
From 2018 to 2019, more than 1,000 corporations and executives have taken a 
stand on a wide spectrum of advocacy issues that are hotly contested and have little direct 
relevance to their core business operations (Hogan, 2019). Such recent rise in corporate 
activism has begun to garner attention in the nonmarket literature, with scholars calling 
for studies that answer why a lot of firms are taking a stand on hot-button issues, the 
contention around which has long been understood to make firms stay away (Chatterji 
and Toffel, 2019; Burbano, 2019). One of the most salient explanations for this question 
can be found in the growing body of literature that focuses on the internal preferences of 
a firm’s organizational members: especially, the role of organizational political ideology 
(Chin et al., 2013; Briscoe et al., 2014; Gupta et al, 2017; Carnahan and Greenwood, 
2018; Gupta and Briscoe, 2019). Defined as the core values and preferences shared by a 
collectivity about “how the social world operates, including convictions about what 
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outcomes are desirable and how they should be achieved” (Gupta et al, 2017; p. 1019), 
organizational political ideology refers to the notion that many organizations—including 
for-profit corporations—exhibit a strong ideological leaning among their membership, 
allowing themselves to be positioned on a conservatism-liberalism continuum in the U.S. 
context. Such distinctive ideological leaning at the firm-level is the consequence of a 
sorting process, whereby individuals are attracted to and stay with the firms whose 
executives and employees exhibit similar preferences to themselves (Van den Steen, 
2010; Bermiss and McDonald, 2018). This ideological clustering of like-minded 
individuals shapes the pattern of corporate social actions, prompting firms to support 
social issues that are aligned with their members’ internal preferences (Chin et al., 2013; 
Briscoe et al., 2014; Gupta and Briscoe, 2019).  
Such role of corporate political ideology is pronounced in firms’ engagement in 
advocacy issues of contentious nature, contention around which often follow ideological 
fault lines (Hambrick and Wowak, 2019; McDonnell and Cobb, 2019). Differences in the 
ideological preferences among people translate into different and even opposing positions 
within those issues (Skitka and Tetlock, 1993; Jost, 2006; Haidt, 2012), with 
conservatives and liberals often disagreeing over how to approach the issues of global 
warming, gun control, LGBTQ rights, etc25. The salience of advocacy issues is thus 
higher for firms whose workforce hold strong ideological preferences; naturally, 
 
25 According to 2018 Gallup survey, only 1% of the self-identified Democrats are skeptical about climate 
change, whereas 45% of the Republicans hold skeptical views on the issue. Similar differences are 
observed for other contentious advocacy issues such as same-sex marriage (supported by 83% of 
Democrats and only 44% of Republicans), gun control (supported by 87% of Democrats and 31% of 
Republicans), and abortion rights (supported by 39% of Democrats and only 12% of Republicans). 
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employees of these ideological firms may want to use corporate giving to advance their 
issue-related agenda, thus using their firm as a vehicle for activism to communicate their 
ideological views on the issues of concern (Briscoe and Safford, 2010; Briscoe and 
Gupta, 2016). These ideological firms have greater internal incentives to take a stand on 
advocacy issues that are dear to their employees, even when contentious nature of these 
advocacy issues prevent clear external norms from emerging and deter other firms’ 
participation. Such proactive advocacy engagement may allow firms to enjoy greater 
motivation and loyalty from their workforce who would appreciate such action (Bode et 
al., 2015; Burbano, 2016; Flammer and Luo, 2017; Carnahan et al., 2017; Bode and 
Singh, 2018). Ideological firms thus act as the main and early participants in the market 
of advocacy issues. For example, ideological firms with strong liberal values were more 
likely to accept the formation of LGBTQ employee groups within their organizations, 
and these groups often used their organizations to collectively sponsor political events 
such as annual Gay Rights parades and to fund nonprofit groups that advocate for gay 
and lesbian rights (Briscoe and Safford, 2010; Briscoe and Gupta, 2016).  
3.2.2. Spillover effects of ideological firms’ contributions 
The following question is, would ideological firms’ proactive support of advocacy 
issues encourage other firms to follow suit? Because most studies in the corporate 
ideology literature focus on investigating the nature of the relationship between a focal 
firm’s ideology and its own social actions, we are yet to study if and how advocacy by 
ideological firms affect the issue-related behaviors by other firms in the population. Yet, 
this is a serious oversight, given that how a firm’s activism impacts both it and society 
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would critically depend on how other firms would react to it (Hunt, Benford and Snow, 
1994; Briscoe and Safford, 2008; Briscoe et al., 2015). In particular, the key question of 
interest is if an ideological firm’s action can encourage participation of others that would 
create broader issue support, as often assumed in the media accounts that celebrate 
corporate activism as a catalyst for social change (Aiello, 2017; Bersin, 2018; Murray, 
2019). 
Existing scholarly accounts of diffusion and institutionalization of general 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices do suggest that such spillover effects may 
arise. Scholars have found that firms tend to give to the social and environmental issues 
that other firms gave to, showing a surprisingly high level of similarity in the portfolio of 
giving across competitors in the same industry (Useem and Kutner, 1986; Raffaelli and 
Glynn, 2014, Marquis and Tilcsik, 2016). For instance, housing characterizes the focus of 
corporate giving in the finance industry, whereas corporate giving in the electric utilities 
sector has long focused on the issue of technology education (Kirchberg, 1995). This 
pattern of homogeneity, the argument goes, arises from the uncertainty that many firms 
face in their decisions around how much to give, and where to give (Marquis et al., 2007; 
Marquis and Tilcsik, 2016; Peterson and Su, 2017). In face of such high uncertainty, 
firms closely observe and follow the pattern of giving by other firms that face a similar 
stakeholder environment—notably, industry competitors—as a valuable cue that can 
guide their own social actions. Rivals’ activism may signal public interest for the social 
issue (Yue et al., 2013; Briscoe et al., 2015). Also, it may endogenously create audience 
who increasingly expect other firms to speak up as well (Lipsky, 1968; Andrews, 2001), 
108 
 
thus putting an issue into play and creating rare windows of sociopolitical openness for 
institutional change (Cress and Snow, 2000; Meyer, 2004). In doing so, firms can 
essentially act as issue entrepreneurs—the role traditionally assumed to be that of extra-
institutional actors such as social movement organizations (Brayden and Mae?, xx)—that 
create and amplify the salience of the issue they care about (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). 
Overall, this argument suggests that ideological firms’ activism may indeed encourage 
activism from other competitors, potentially creating broader support for the issue that 
they hoped to champion.  
3.3. Possibility of Bifurcated Response from Followers 
However, this simple extension of existing accounts of CSR diffusion fails to 
consider a potential variation in the way that other competitors can react to an initiating 
ideological firm’s activism; specifically, potential followers can vary significantly with 
respect to not just whether they will follow the initiating firms’ issue engagement, but 
also how they will engage with the issue. Specifically, while some followers may expand 
issue support by advocating for the issue position of the original contributors, others may 
choose to promote different or even opposing positions in their issue engagement. This 
varied response is especially likely when firms have reasons to believe that not everyone 
agrees with original givers’ issue stand, as would be in the case of corporate activism that 
revolves around advocacy issues of socio-politically contentious nature. Existing 
literature highlighting mimetic influence in CSR tends to implicitly assume a uniform 
consensus that emerge on what constitutes normatively appropriate behavior. However, 
unlike so-called service issues whose need elicit broad agreement among most 
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stakeholders (e.g., providing food and shelter to people in need)—which has been the 
focus of most CSR studies—, recent studies linking insight from political psychology and 
movement literature to CSR have started to highlight that a substantial number of people 
take a stand both for and against advocacy issues. Contention around these issues often 
follows ideological fault lines, with conservatives and liberals holding different and often 
competing views on many advocacy issues such as LGBTQ rights and immigration 
(Skitka and Tetlock, 1993; Jost, 2006).  
Initiating firms’ activism to promote the issue stand aligned with their own 
ideological preferences is thus unlikely to garner universal support and fail to emerge as a 
dominant standard. While it may be celebrated by people of similar ideological leaning, it 
may alienate those of different ideological leaning who prefer a different issue position. 
Broader scholarship on diffusion highlight such absence of a clear norm as a source of a 
wide variation in the way firms adopt and implement organizational practices, instead of 
homogeneity that has long been the focus of the traditional scholarship examining how 
unitary practices of corporate action spread throughout the field. To uncover this 
potential variation behind what may look like smooth and irrational mimicry on the 
surface, it is thus crucial to go beyond existing focus on an aggregate increase in the 
issue engagement by all other peers and understand the distribution of response among 
different types of firms in the population of potential followers (i.e., which firms follow). 
Existing scholarship points to the across-firm heterogeneity in the population of 
followers as a source of a variation that emerges in the way firms adopt a given practice 
in the diffusion process, showing how followers often customize the practice to fit their 
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own unique organizational characteristics and interests (Ansari, Fiss and Zajac, 2010; 
Fiss, Kennedy, and Davis, 2012; Litrico and David, 2017). In this paper, I extend this 
insight by bringing attention to the overlooked role of the heterogeneity in the followers’ 
ideological identity: that is, how followers may vary significantly in the ideological 
preferences of their own employees, who act as key stakeholders that shape the nature of 
these followers’ response. As noted, emerging literature on corporate political ideology 
document how a sorting process at the organizational level allows firms to develop a 
distinctive ideology from each other—some firms lean ‘red’ (i.e., conservatives) and 
others lean ‘blue’ (i.e,. liberals)—, with such variation often emerging even among firms 
in the same industry. Ideologically-charged nature of advocacy issues make these firms at 
both ends of the ideological spectrum viable and willing participants in the public 
discourse around those issues (Hambrick and Wowak, 2019; McDonnell and Darnell, 
2020). Therefore, the population of potential followers may include not just firms whose 
employees hold similar ideological preferences to the original contributors (i.e., 
ideological allies), but also those whose employees hold different and even opposing 
preferences (i.e., ideological opponents).  
Importantly, this heterogeneity in the followers’ ideological disposition among the 
workforce may lead to the bifurcated response from these two groups in terms of how 
they would engage with the issue. On the one hand, response from original contributors’ 
ideological allies is likely to add support for their issue position. In the eyes of these 
allies’ employees, initiating ideological firms’ issue stand is closely aligned with their 
own ideological values and seen as an action to be emulated by their own firm. To win 
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favor from their employees who see the issue stand of the initiating firm as normatively 
desirable, ideological allies thus have an incentive to add further support for that position.  
On the other hand, ideological opponents of initiating firms have strategic 
incentives to behave differently. Given their contrasting ideological views from the 
original contributors, employees of ideological opponents may view initiating ideological 
firms’ issue stand as normatively undesirable and be inclined to reward the firm for 
taking a different or even an opposing stand. Indeed, perceptions of threats by opposing 
ideological interests is understood to be one of the main triggers for the rise of 
movement-countermovement dynamics (Useem, 1980; McCarthy and Wolfson, 1992; 
Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996). In this situation, ideological opponents have incentives to 
join in the debate around the given issue, but espouse a different issue position by 
funding alternative sets of advocacy nonprofits and think tanks that promote an 
alternative position aligned with their own ideological preferences, rather than that of 
original contributors (Desimone and Popoff, 2000; Bonardi and Keim, 2005). This 
posited dynamic is consistent with the extant understanding in the social movement 
literature that as the movement grows, an issue draws in diverse supporters that promote 
frames different from those employed by original contributors (Haines, 1988; Meyer and 
Staggenborg, 1996; Carlos et al., 2018). For example, Staggenborg (1991) notes that pro-
life movement by conservative ideological interests has grown primarily in response to 




3.4. Asymmetry in the Response between Ideological Allies vs. Opponents 
The following question is, which firms are likely to follow more than others? 
Depending on the relative magnitude of reaction from each group, the net social 
implications of initiating ideological firms’ actions may thus vary widely; in particular, 
when the latter response from ideological opponents dominates the response from 
ideological allies, not only may an initial action of ideological firms fail to create 
widespread issue support, it may even create damaging effects to the cause that they hope 
to champion by creating multiple and conflicting opinions around the issue. Indeed, 
proliferation of conflicting and fragmented views on advocacy issues is known to be the 
cause of the demise of many change initiatives (Levy, 1997; Bonardi and Keum, 2005), 
as it often prevents audiences’ opinions from coalescing around the final decision and 
promotes dissension, resulting in gridlock. 
Intuitively, initiating ideological firms would prefer to encourage a stronger 
reaction from their ideological allies who would support their issue positions, rather than 
from their ideological opponents with competing issue-related claims. Yet, my conjecture 
is that the strategic incentives for the subsequent action for ideological opponents will be 
stronger than the incentives for ideological allies’ action, so that, on average, the 
competitive response from ideological opponents would dominate the response from 
ideological allies.  
First and foremost, this claim rests on the logic that—as the classical theory of 
competitive differentiation posits (Porter, 1997; Baum and Haveman, 1997; Zhao et al., 
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2017)—the firm’s strategic gain and competitive advantage from its response would be 
maximized when it can differentiate itself from the original contributors: specifically, 
differentiation in terms of its issue position. While initial activism of the original 
contributors creates strategic incentives for both groups of their ideological allies and 
opponents to engage with the issue, one main strategic advantage that is unique to 
ideological opponents is that they can sufficiently distance themselves from the original 
contributors by taking a different stand (Mohliver, Crilly, and Kaul, 2019); this additional 
differentiation advantage is likely to be valued by their workforce and result in significant 
strategic gains such as stronger commitment and loyalty26. In contrast, ideological allies 
of initial contributors face relatively limited scope for strategic differentiation, as they are 
likely to stand close in their issue stance to original contributors, given their similarity in 
organizational members’ ideological preferences. Since they are not the first to take a 
given stand on the issue, these ideological allies’ actions are likely to be seen as less 
novel and unique—and even taken for granted—by their employees and thus less 
appreciated, which can limit strategic rewards that firms can expect in return for their 
action. The best that these ideological allies may hope to achieve by following original 
contributors’ actions is to do as well as them (Barnett and Woywode, 2004), or spend 
significantly greater resources to differentiate themselves from the initiating firms, all of 
which would limit the expected strategic returns from their issue investment. While this 
notion that for-profit corporations can use ideological contention around divisive social 
 
26 Positioning decisions on sociopolitical issues involve different considerations from positioning on 
traditional product market attributes. Given the externalities, while stakeholders wouldn’t be offended by a 
firm’s decision to sell products in a color that they do not like, they can be offended by its decision to take a 
issue position that they do not agree with. 
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issues as the basis for their strategic differentiation and competitive advantage is 
relatively new to our management and CSR literature, it harkens back to the classic 
model of competition between opposing parties in political science, where parties with 
varying ideological positions differentiate themselves by espousing different positions on 
advocacy issues of divisive nature (Cox, 1990; Kahn et al., 1999; Carrillo and 
Castanheira, 2008; De Sio and Weber, 2014).   
Ideological opponents’ action can also produce more strategic benefits compared 
to the action of ideological allies, as employees may see their decision to take a different 
stand from others as a more authentic representation of firms’ values. According to CSR 
scholars, perceived authenticity of corporate social actions is one of the key determinants 
of if and how much firms can benefit from those actions (Hawn and Ioannou, 2016; Clark 
et al., 2018). Corporate social action seen as driven by external pressures or incentives 
(e.g., impression management) is often discredited as inauthentic and less valued by 
stakeholders, which produce limited strategic benefits or even backfire (Moulard, Raggio 
and Folse, 2016; Joo, Miller and Fink, 2019). Unlike non-profit entities such as social 
movement organizations, for-profit firms usually do not operate in the realm of civic 
discourse—especially that revolve around contentious issues—and thus lack in public 
trust and moral authenticity that legitimize their participation, which makes stakeholders 
especially wary of potential ulterior motives behind firms’ activism (Selznick 1949; 
Duffy et al. 2010, Walker and Rea, 2014; Yue 2015; McDonnell, 2016; Korschun et al., 
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2018)27. Importantly, an ideological ally’s support of initiating firms’ issue stand can be 
especially prone to this authenticity-related concern; employees may see the firm’s 
decision to echo what other firms have already said as a forced and symbolic attempt to 
deal with external pressure from their peers and increasing public attention on the issue 
(Kim and Lyon, 2014; Marquis, Toffel and Zhou, 2016), rather than a sincere expression 
of its intrinsic issue-related interests. In comparison, ideological opponents’ issue 
counter-positioning would be less prone to such concern, given that such action would be 
at odds with external cue from their industry peers; this may lead employees to favorably 
see the firm’s action as an internally driven action based on organizational values and 
thus form positive attitudes and commitment toward the organization. Indeed, Cuypers, 
Koh and Wang (2016) find that stakeholders value a novel and unique practices of 
corporate giving—which differentiates the firm from other corporate givers—more than 
conventional forms of giving, because the former is believed to require a greater internal 
deliberation and involvement on the part of firms and thus reflect their sincere and 
substantive commitment of firms to social causes. 
These reasons suggest that, all else being equal, initial actions of ideological firms 
can ironically create disproportionately larger economic incentives for their ideological 
opponents’ subsequent action, compared to their ideological allies’ action. That is, 
 
27 As elite actors within the field, firms “lack one of the few (but central) advantages that insurgents 
traditionally enjoy: the appearance of speaking for the authentic interests of ‘the people’ in a fashion not 
motivated primarily by gaining economic resources or political power” (Walker 2015, p. 3). 
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ideological rivals may simply have more to gain from responding to initiating ideological 
firms’ actions than ideological allies. I therefore predict: 
H1: A positive relationship between a focal firm’s giving and its ideological 
opponents’ giving is stronger than the relationship between a focal firm’s 
giving and its ideological allies’ giving. 
3.5. Methodology 
3.5.1. Research Context and Data 
I use the same database used in the second essay of this dissertation for the 
records of corporate advocacy giving by US public companies28. In addition to the data 
on corporate advocacy giving, this paper’s inquiry also requires the dataset on firms’ 
ideological characteristics. I continue to follow the approach of identifying organizational 
ideologies of firms based on campaign contributions of individuals within a firm (Gupta 
et al., 2017; Bermiss and McDonald, 2018; Carnahan and Greenwood, 2018; Gupta and 
Briscoe, 2019; McDonnell and Cobb, 2019). The data on individuals’ campaign 
contributions are obtained from Bonica’s 2013 DIME database29. Building on the insight 
of recent papers (Gupta et al., 2017; Gupta and Briscoe, 2019) that firms’ CSR practices 
are often a reflection of the ideological characteristics exhibited by the entire body 
politic, not just only those of corporate elites, I collect political contributions of all 
individuals that report their main employer as a given firm in my sample to calculate the 
 
28 In Appendix Table 3.3, I run the main results in this paper using the records of corporate giving that goes 
to service giving, and find that the same pattern of results is not replicated, such that there exists no pattern 




organization-level ideological characteristics30. Finally, a variety of other sources I draw 
on include Compustat, KLD Research & Analytics, lobbyview.org (Kim, 2018)31, and 
Labor Force statistics from the Current Population Survey, which provide additional 
firm-level financial and operational information. 
My final sample frame is 433 U.S. public firms that are identified with at least 
one record of advocacy giving and whose employees made campaign contributions at 
least once during my study period32, and their 25,440 firm-issue-year observations. In this 
dataset, for each corporation-advocacy issue pair in each year, I can observe whether or 
not the corporation gave to the issue in that year, and if so, how much. 
3.5.2. Variables 
Dependent Variable  
            The dependent variable of this study is the Choice of Advocacy Giving, which is 
measured as a dummy variable indicating whether a focal firm made donation to a given 
issue area in a given year, This measure proxies for a firm’s decision to engage in a given 
“market” of advocacy issue in each year. This builds on the understanding each advocacy 
issue area (e.g., environment, health, education, civil rights, etc.) can be understood as a 
market different from others that involve its own stakeholder base (e.g., customers, 
 
30 In the first mechanism analysis (reported in Table 3.4), I separate out the effect of organizational 
ideological intensity into that of ideological intensity by senior executives vs. ideological intensity by 
lower-level employees. 
31 This is the firm-level lobbying database (Kim, 2018), which is originally generated from lobbying reports 
filed between 1999 and 2017 and recorded at the Senate Office of Public Records. 
32 Most of the US public firms with affiliated foundations as reported in the FDO dataset do have 
employees who spent positive amount of campaign contributions at least once during my study period. Yet, 
there do exist firms in total whose employees cannot be matched to any records of campaign contributions, 
which are excluded from my analyses. 
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employees, and activists that care about the issue) and its own set of participants (e.g., 
advocacy nonprofits and grantmakers, including corporations). Accordingly, the market 
condition and opportunities of social action vary significantly across different issue areas 
over time (Meyer, 2004). The definition of cause areas follows, again, NTEE-CC 
classification system; thus, according to the construction of my data, in every year, each 
firm is assumed to make decisions on whether or not they would contribute to each one of 
22 issue areas, which would be reflected in the variation observed in this dependent 
variable. In the robustness check, I confirm the stability of my findings in the design 
using the logged amount of a firm’s advocacy giving (i.e., how much a focal firm gave to 
a given issue) as an alternative dependent variable. 
Independent Variables 
The main baseline regressor in this paper is Giving by Industry Peers. It is 
measured as the dummy variable indicating whether or not a focal firm’s industry peers 
made donation to a given issue in a given year, consistent with how advocacy giving of a 
focal firm (dependent variable) is measured. Building on the aforementioned studies that 
highlight industry peers as one of the most crucial reference sets for understanding the 
pattern of firms’ philanthropic contributions (Useem and Kutner, 1986; Bertels and 
Peloza, 2008; Marquis and Tilcsik, 2016)33, I define firms’ peers as those with common 
industry membership (NAICS 2 digit). 
 
33 According to Marquis and Tilcsik (2016), peer group can be further specified not just by their industry, 
but also by their geographic location, based on which firms can be categorized into four groups: 1) same 
industry x same state, 2) same industry x different state, 3) different industry x same state, 4) different 
industry x different state. While their paper posits and shows that the first group of so-called “institutional 
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 To test the main theoretical conjecture in this paper, I break down the variable of 
Giving by Industry Peers into two components based on the ideological position of 
givers: Giving by Ideological Allies and Giving by Ideological Opponents. To this end, I 
measure an ideological position of each firm, by calculating the average ideological score 
of the firm’s individual employees that made campaign contributions during my study 
period, with each individual’s ideological scores weighted by the frequency of their 
contributions. Ideological scores of each firms’ individuals used to calculate this measure 
are derived from the common-space CFScore in DIME dataset (Bonica, 2013). Using the 
intuition that individuals with similar ideologies donate to similar political candidates, 
Bonica’s CFScore places individuals’ ideology on a scale of –2 (highly liberal) to +2 
(highly conservative) based on their political contribution patterns. Corporate ideological 
position, which is calculated by aggregating these individuals’ positions at the firm-level, 
varies significantly across the entire ideological spectrum, which is shown in Figure 3.1. 
Firms whose ideological position takes the positive values are categorized as 
conservative firms (i.e., red firms), and firms with negative values are categorized as 
liberal firms (i.e., blue firms). Based on this categorization, Giving by Ideological Allies 
is defined as other blue industry peers’ previous advocacy giving for a focal blue firm, 
 
equivalents” has the strongest mimetic effect on a focal firm’s pattern of giving, I find no such pattern in 
my data of advocacy giving. If anything, only the second group of firms that are in the same industry but 
are located in different states exerts a significant effect on a focal firm’s giving. There can be two reasons 
behind this finding. Theoretically, unlike service giving, not a lot of advocacy giving corresponds to local 
giving (i.e., giving to nonprofits in firms’ headquartered states). This can be one reason why giving by 
firms in the same area do not have strong normative or informational values on a focal firm’s giving. 
Empirically, because advocacy giving is rarer than service giving, I can expect (and indeed find that) not 
many firms have institutional equivalents. That is, not many firms have peers that are advocacy givers and 
are operating in the same industry and same state. In fact, this observation is consistent with their finding 
that, for firms without any institutional equivalents, firms use giving by industry peers or giving by 
community peers as alternative reference points. 
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and other red industry peers’ previous giving for a focal red firm; Giving by Ideological 
Opponents is defined as red industry peers’ previous giving for a focal blue firm vs. blue 
industry peers’ previous giving for a focal red firm.  
Control Variables 
First, I control for the dummy variable of Giving by Other Firms, which indicates 
whether or not firms outside the boundary of a focal firm’s industry gave to a given issue 
in a given year. This serves as an empirical counterpart compared to which we can 
evaluate the effect of industry peers’ advocacy giving decisions on a focal firm’s giving. 
Second, I control for firm-level financial and operational attributes. They include 
a firm’s R&D-to-Sales Ratio, Advertising-to-Sales Ratio, and Capex-to-Sales Ratio, 
measured by its expenditure in each area scaled by total sales, all of which have been 
shown to affect the firm’s philanthropic activities in previous studies (Surroca, Tribó and 
Waddock, 2010; Zhao and Murrell, 2016). I also control for a firm’s Lobbying-to-Sales 
Ratio, to account for the extent to which its advocacy giving is politically motivated and 
used as a complementary tactic for lobbying (Bertrand et al., 2020). Additional controls 
include a firm’s Size, which is a logged measure of its total assets, and a firm’s financial 
performance, measured by return on assets (ROA). I include the index of CSR rating to 
control for the potential role of firms’ other areas of social engagement on their advocacy 
giving decisions, which is measured as the firm’s net KLD score, i.e., its number of 
strengths minus number of concerns in four major dimensions (environment, diversity, 
employment, community) (Mattingly and Berman, 2006). I also control for Female 
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Board Ratio, which is calculated by the number of a firm’s female board members scaled 
by its total board size, given the prior evidence that documents its link to firms’ social 
actions (Marquis and Lee, 2013).  
The third set of controls is to account for the potential influence of external 
market conditions on firms’ advocacy giving decisions. Specifically, I account for the 
product-market competitive intensity in the firm’s main market by including the ratio of 
Market Concentration, measured by the Herfindahl index of market share distribution 
across firms in the same NAICS 2 digit code as the focal firm. In light of previous studies 
that highlight the importance of a firm’s geographic community in its CSR and corporate 
philanthropic practices (Marquis et al., 2007), I also include the size of Headquarter 
Population (in millions) and the Headquarter Poverty Ratio in the firm’s headquartered 
state. 
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics and correlations of variables. Unsurprisingly, 
the measures of Giving by Ideological Allies and Giving by Ideological Opponents show 
a relatively high level of correlation with each other (31%), which raises concerns about 
potential multicollinearity. While my main analyses use raw measures of each variables 
for ease of interpretation of the findings, I find that the findings are consistent with the 
use of orthogonalized measures of two variables and also in the specifications that 
separately estimate the effect of each variables. 




            My main specification estimates the following regression that examines the 
relationship between a focal firm’s giving and its ideological opponents’ and allies’ 
giving in the previous year.  
𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑏𝑦 𝑎 𝑓𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡+1
= 𝑓(𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡, 𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑗 , 𝐹𝐸𝑡) 
where 𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑏𝑦 𝑎 𝑓𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡+1 is the dummy variable of advocacy giving by firm 𝑖 in 
issue 𝑗 at year 𝑡 + 1, 𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the dummy variable of 
advocacy giving made by firm 𝑖’s ideological opponents in issue 𝑗 at year 𝑡, and 
𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the dummy variable of advocacy giving made by firm 
𝑖’s ideological allies in issue 𝑗 at year 𝑡. In addition, I include a vector of time-varying 
firm and industry level characteristics 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 at year 𝑡. I further include year fixed 
effects 𝐹𝐸𝑡 in all specifications, and also control for issue and firm fixed effects.  
My preferred specification, as shown in the equation above, includes firm-issue 
pair fixed effects 𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑗. One of the most salient concerns in any empirical analysis that link 
different firms’ behaviors to identify interdependencies is the possibility of omitted third 
variables, which may cause behaviors of firm A and firm B in the same industry to vary 
in the same direction. For one, it is possible that the unobserved industry-issue specific 
factors may create strategic incentives for firms in the same industry to co-invest to a 
given issue than others (e.g., oil firms giving to environmental issue). Or, within a given 
industry, there may exist a sub-group of firms with shared organizational capabilities and 
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resources, which make them pay more attention to a set of issues than others. Firm-issue 
level fixed effects mitigate these concerns by controlling for all time-invariant firm-issue 
specific heterogeneity, with industry-issue specific influences also captured in these 
effects.  
I use a linear probability model in my main models reported below, though results 
are robust to a variety of other specifications including fixed effects logit or standard 
OLS regressions using the logged amount of giving by a focal firm and the logged 
amount of giving by its ideological opponents and allies as alternative dependent and 
independent variables. All regressions use robust standard errors clustered at the firm-
issue pair level. 
3.6. Results 
3.6.1. Main Results 
Before presenting the main findings, it is useful to confirm that the pattern of 
institutional isomorphism found in previous studies does arise in this context of advocacy 
giving, which would serve as a baseline for my analysis: that is, if firms are more likely 
to give to the issue areas that their industry peers gave to. Model 1 to 3 in Table 3.2 
reports this baseline result, where I examine the effect of Giving by Industry Peers of a 
focal firm on its subsequent choice of advocacy giving in a given issue area, with a full 
set of controls. M1 employs year and issue fixed effects, M2 employs year, issue, and 
firm fixed effects, and finally, M3 employs year and firm-issue fixed effects (the default 
and most preferred structure as described above). Across all three specifications with 
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different FE structure, I observe a highly significant and positive effect of Giving by 
Industry Peers. Such consistent and strong positive effect that peers’ giving has on a 
focal firm’s giving at the issue-level is in contrast with the insignificant effect of Giving 
by Other Firms, which is an important control against which we can gauge how the 
pattern of industry peers’ previous giving, but not those of firms outside the boundary of 
the industry, triggers a strong mimetic response by a focal firm. These results thus 
strongly suggest that firms do closely follow their industry peers’ issue area of 
investment in their advocacy giving, replicating the findings of previous papers that 
demonstrate largely the same patterns of conformity and learning between industry peers 
(e.g., Marquis and Tilcsik, 2016). 
Yet, as noted, this result does not account for the presence of heterogeneous types 
of actors within a given institutional environment. In particular, my theory focuses on the 
unexplored possibility that ideological firms’ giving might invite response not just from 
their ideological allies, but also from their ideological opponents, and how the response 
from the latter may be stronger than the response from the former. To test these 
possibilities, I divide the variable of Giving by Industry Peers into Giving by Ideological 
Opponents and Giving by Ideological Allies, and re-run the regression. The result of this 
analysis is presented in the Model 4 to 6 in Table 3.2, with each specification controlling 
for increasingly more demanding sets of fixed effects. According to the baseline result in 
M4 that only control for issue and year fixed effects but not for firm fixed effects (thus, 
between-firm estimation), both variables—not just Giving by Ideological Allies but also 
Giving by Ideological Opponents—exert a strong and positive effect on the focal firm’s 
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giving, with a Chi-square test reporting no statistically significant difference between the 
two coefficients.  
Yet, this baseline result does not account for the confounding effects of the 
unobserved firm heterogeneity that may act as omitted third variables, which may cause 
firm A and firm B to co-invest to a given issue due to their similar organizational 
characteristics. To account for this effect, I add firm fixed effects in M5, or firm-issue 
pair fixed effects in M6 (most preferred specification), which mitigates these concerns 
above by controlling for all time-invariant firm-issue specific heterogeneity. The results 
in M5 show that the observed effect of Giving by Ideological Opponents (𝛽=0.0377, 
p=0.0000) stay to be highly significant and positive, whereas the effect of Giving by 
Ideological Allies (𝛽=0.0110, p=0.1906) completely loses its significance in this model. 
A Chi-square test strongly confirms the significant difference between the two 
coefficients (p=0.0169) as well. The following M6 that control for more demanding firm-
issue pair level fixed effects reports largely the same pattern of results; the coefficient of 
Giving by Ideological Opponents (𝛽=0.0343, p=0.0001) is shown to be significantly 
bigger and stronger than that of Giving by Ideological Allies (𝛽=0.0139, p=0.1355), 
which stays insignificant at conventional levels. These findings lend strong initial support 
for Hypothesis 1, suggesting that firms react more strongly to the giving by their 
ideological opponents in the same industry, compared to the giving by their ideological 
allies.  
According to the estimates in M6, when a focal firm’s ideological opponents give 
to a given issue, the probability of its own giving to the same issue area increases by 
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3.4% in the subsequent year, which corresponds to a 13.6% increase over its baseline 
giving probability of 25.9%. This effect size is substantially bigger than the 
corresponding increase in a focal firm’s subsequent probability of giving associated with 
its ideological allies’ giving, which is 1.3% (i.e., a 5.5% increase over its mean value). In 
other words, the results confirm the posited asymmetry in the pattern of response to 
ideological opponents’ issue-related actions vs. allies’ actions, showing that ideological 
firms’ giving invites a disproportionately stronger reaction from ideological rivals whose 
issue position is likely to be opposed to their own. 
***Insert Table 3.2 about here***  
3.6.2. Robustness Analyses 
So far, the main findings provide support for the posited spillover effects of 
ideological firms’ giving on other ideological firms in the same industry: in particular, on 
their ideological opponents. Yet, there may still remain a concern about the confounding 
effects of the omitted third variables. Even though the main specification in my analyses 
use a demanding set of firm-issue and year fixed effects to mitigate this concern, one may 
still be concerned about the potential common shock of time-varying nature, which may 
drive adjacent giving behaviors of firms in the same direction. These common shocks 
could be exogenous events that raise the saliency of an issue over others (e.g., recent 
Supreme Court ruling on LGBTQ discrimination in the workplace), which may lead 
different firms to simultaneously increase their spending on the issue. 
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To remove confounding effects attributable to these common shocks, I add issue-
year fixed effects to the current fixed effect structure and re-run the analysis. The design 
in this set of robustness analyses thus correspond to my most stringent specification with 
firm-issue and issue-year level fixed effects, which absorb all time-invariant firm-issue 
specific heterogeneity and all issue-specific time trends. As shown in M7 of Table 3.3, 
Giving by Ideological Allies stays to be insignificant in this model, with its effect size 
getting sufficiently smaller than that observed in previous models; this finding suggests 
that the positive correlation between adjacent advocacy giving decisions among 
ideological allies observed in the previous models may in large part reflect their response 
to common issue trends in the environment. In contrast, the effect of Giving by 
Ideological Opponents stays highly significant and positive in this demanding 
specification (𝛽=0.0310, p=0.0006), with a Chi-square test conforming the statistical 
difference between two coefficients (p=0.0349).  
Of course, there may remain concerns about the possibility of certain geography-
specific time trends around the issue areas, which the general issue-level time trends may 
fail to capture. For example, the effect of certain external shocks that may change the 
salience of given issues over others may be geographically bounded (e.g., mass shooting, 
oil spill, demographic profile change). To address this concern, the following M8 
replaces main variables of giving by ideological opponents and allies with giving made 
by each group of firms that are headquartered in the different states to a focal firm. The 
intuition for these analyses is that, unlike giving by ideological firms that are located in 
the same geographic area to the focal firm, a variation in giving by industry peers located 
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in different areas would not be subject to the possibility of common geography-specific 
shock that may confound the results. The results using these alternative measures produce 
consistent findings, with a Chi-square test still conforming the statistical difference 
between two coefficients (p=0.0226).  
Another main issue in my analysis is the potential reverse causality—the direction 
of the influence from ideological firms to others in the industry can flow in the opposite 
way—as well as potential autocorrelation concerns. While my main specification uses a 
lagged structure to alleviate this concern, the possibility of potential autocorrelation in 
my baseline model remains. In M9, I re-estimate my results using a system dynamic 
panel model (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). I find the consistent 
results; the coefficient of Giving by Ideological Allies is shown to be insignificant and 
even negative, whereas Giving by Ideological Opponents is highly significant and 
positive (𝛽=0.0515, p=0.0000), with the statistical difference between the two 
coefficients strongly supported (p=0.0003). Controlling for the recent past of a focal 
firm’s giving, the effect size of giving by ideological opponents grows substantially 
bigger than that shown in the previous models; based on the estimates of M9, when a 
focal firm’s ideological opponents give to an issue, its own probability of entry into the 
same issue increases by 20.4% over its mean value, whereas the corresponding change in 
ideological allies’ giving is associated with -1.7% decrease in a focal firm’s subsequent 
probability of giving. 
In M10 and M11, I re-run my default model (M6 in Table 3.2 with firm-issue and 
year fixed effects) by using the logged amount of giving as an alternative independent 
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variable, dependent variable, or both. Specifically, in M10, I replace my main regressors 
of Giving by Ideological Opponents and Giving by Ideological Allies from dummy 
variables to the logged amount of giving (i.e., how much each group of ideological 
opponents and allies gave to a given issue area). In the following M11, I further replace 
my dependent variable of a focal firm’s Choice of Giving with the logged amount of its 
giving (i.e., how much a focal firm gave to a given issue) and re-run the OLS FE 
regression. While the effect of Giving by Ideological Allies gains its marginal 
significance in these models using the amount of giving as alternative regressors, both 
models continue to report a highly consistent pattern of asymmetry between the two 
regressors, which report that the effect of Giving by Ideological Opponents is 
significantly bigger and stronger than that of Giving by Ideological Allies.  
In the untabulated results, I check the robustness of the results in the design using 
the orthogonalized measures of Giving by Ideological Opponents and Giving by 
Ideological Allies, to address the concerns about the potential instability of the results that 
may arise from the high correlation between the two variables. The pattern of results also 
stays largely the same with the use of fixed effect logit model as an alternative 
specification.  
***Insert Table 3.3 about here*** 
3.6.3. Mechanism analyses (1): Role of Employees 
These overall results lend strong support for my Hypothesis 1, showing that 
ideological firms’ giving invites a strong reaction from their ideological opponents, and 
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such response from opponents is stronger than that shown from their allies. Having 
demonstrated support for my main conjectures, I now turn to consider the effect of 
several contingent factors (summarized in Figure 3.2); these analyses would not only help 
to better understand the mechanisms underlying my observed main findings, but also to 
add credibility to the results. Given the consistency between my main result and the 
estimation in the robustness check, I use firm-issue, and year level fixed effects for the 
analyses below, though the results adding issue-year level time trends are largely the 
same. 
***Insert Figure 3.2 about here*** 
Mechanism analyses (1.1): Executive ideology vs. Non-executive employee ideology 
According to my theory, selective response to ideological opponents’ giving is 
internally driven by the preferences and interests of their organizational members around 
given advocacy issues. After all, my empirical design based on which I identify such 
response categorizes firms into ideological allies vs. ideological opponents according to 
their organizational members’ ideological preferences, demonstrating the role of internal 
employees as key stakeholders in firms’ advocacy giving decisions. Yet, even within this 
scenario, there can be two explanations of different nature as to why firms do this. The 
first scenario, which is most consistent with my theory, is that firms respond to their 
ideological opponents because their organizational members care about a given issue, and 
this response is strategically beneficial as their members who appreciate such counter-
response would reward the firm by showing increased commitment and loyalty (Burbano, 
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2016; Flammer and Luo, 2017). Alternatively, this selective response to ideological 
opponents might simply reflect agency behavior of top executives (Friedman, 1970; Ang, 
Cole and Lin, 2000; Tan and Tang, 2016); according to this second scenario, CEOs and 
other top executive members may be using advocacy giving to pursue their private 
ideological preferences separate from other employees’ preferences, which may not 
necessarily be aligned with the firm’s strategic interests.  
To evaluate the validity of the first scenario compared to the second, I re-run the 
estimation by splitting the sample into four cases based on the separate measures of 
ideological intensity among the firm’s top executives vs. among its non-executives in 
Table 3.4: 1) high executive ideological intensity & high non-executive ideological 
intensity (M12a); 2) high executive intensity & low non-executive intensity (M12b); 3) 
low executive intensity & high non-executive intensity (M12c); 4) low executive 
intensity & low non-executive intensity (M12d). Ideological intensity is measured by 
how much each group of individuals spent on campaign contributions during my study 
period, which would capture which group is relatively more ideological than the other 
(Hambrick and Wowak, 2019). According to my findings, only the first group of firms 
(M12a)—where both top executives and lower-level employees are highly ideologically 
motivated—selectively respond to the previous giving of their ideological opponents; in 
contrast, such selective response does not arise in any other cases, including the sample 
where only the senior executives, but not the lower-level employees, exhibit strong 
ideological preferences (M12b). These findings are consistent with the aforementioned 
first scenario, suggesting that the observed response to ideological opponents is being 
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driven by ideological preferences of the entire body politic of the firm—not just senior 
executives, but also other organizational members of the firm (Gupta et al., 2017; Gupta 
et al., 2018)—, and is inconsistent with the second interpretation of such response as the 
agentic behavior based on top executives’ personal preferences (Gupta et al., 2017; Gupta 
et al., 2018)34.  
Mechanism analyses (1.2): Ideologically homogeneous vs. heterogeneous firms 
The second ideological characteristic of firms that may further shed light on the 
validity of the first scenario is the level of ideological heterogeneity within the firm: i.e., 
whether the firm’s organizational members hold similar ideological positions to each 
other or not. According to my theory, ideological firms give more when their opponents 
gave, because of their organizational members’ ideological interests to defend their 
preferred issue positions. Importantly, such role of internal preferences of employees 
would be pronounced in the group of ideologically homogeneous firms whose employees 
think similarly to each other, which gives rise to a prevailing system of beliefs that would 
enable firms to reach internal consensus in their advocacy giving decisions as to which 
issues to support and in what ways (Schneider, 1987; Gupta et al., 2017). Moreover, such 
counter-response to ideological rivals’ giving is likely to translate into a firm’s strategic 
advantages only when the firm faces a sufficiently low level of within-firm ideological 
diversity, whereas counter-response by a firm with a high level of ideological 
 
34 In the untabulated supplementary analysis, I run the analysis that tests how the pattern of response varies 
by the level of firm governance, which is proxied by the number of independent board members scaled by 
total board size. Inconsistent with the possibility that the asymmetric response to rivals’ giving may reflect 
agency costs, I find that such response is actually stronger among firms with strong governance, rather than 
those with weak governance.  
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heterogeneity may backfire by alienating a significant portion of their employee base who 
disagrees with the stated position and may show reduced engagement and motivation 
(Burbano, 2020). To explore this conjecture, I run a split sample analysis based on the 
median value of within-firm ideological heterogeneity, which is measured by the standard 
deviation of ideological positions among firm employees that made campaign 
contributions during my study period. As shown in Table 3.4, the results presented in 
M13a and M13b are consistent with my expectation, showing that it is the group of 
ideologically homogeneous firms (with a low level of within-firm ideological diversity) 
that respond selectively to their ideological opponents’ giving, but not the group of 
ideologically heterogenous firms. 
Mechanism analyses (1.3): Labor market competition 
Finally, I look at how the pattern of response to ideological rivals varies by the 
level of labor market competition. If it is the case that firms’ counter-reaction to their 
opponents is their strategic decision to make their ideologically motivated employees 
happy, it should be concentrated among firms that face ‘talent wars’, having to compete 
intensely to hire and retain personnel (Coff, 1997; Gardner, 2005; Somaya and 
Williamson, 2008; Tan and Rider, 2017). I test this conjecture by running a split sample 
analysis based on the median value of unemployment rate in a focal firm’s industry 
(NAICS 2 digit), which is used as the inverse proxy for the level of labor market 
competition that the firm faces. The results in Table 3.4 show that selective response to 
ideological opponents arises among the firms that face higher labor market competition 
(M14a), but not among firms that face lower labor market competition (M14b), 
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confirming the role of internal employees as the key stakeholder that drives firms’ 
counter-response to their ideological rivals. In the untabulated analysis using the proxy of 
labor intensity to capture firm sensitivity to employees’ preferences (measured by the 
average industry wage at NAICS 2 digit), I also observe similar results, finding that 
asymmetric response to ideological opponents is stronger among firms with higher labor 
intensity.  
In comparison, the supplementary analyses (the details shown in Appendix Table 
3.2) show that the role of external stakeholders (e.g., consumers) is rather limited in the 
firms’ decisions for counter-response to their ideological opponents. In the analysis 
where I examine the moderating role of product-market competition (using the inverse 
measure of market concentration as a proxy), I find that stronger response to opponents’ 
giving arises only among firms that face a low level of competition, not a high level of 
competition. I also find that the exclusive response to ideological opponents is coming 
from the group of firms that exhibit lower consumer sensitivity, which is proxied by the 
level of advertising spending ratio. Both results are inconsistent with the pattern of 
response that we would expect if the observed selective response to ideological rivals is 
driven by the preferences of external stakeholders such as consumers (Wang and Qian, 
2011; Flammer, 2015). Rather, stronger response to ideological rivals seems to be more 
pronounced among the group of firms in a market condition where the voice of internal 
employees can be maximized. 
***Insert Table 3.4 about here*** 
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3.6.4. Mechanism analyses (2): Ideological competition 
According to my theory, this observed selective response to ideological opponents 
reflects firms’ competitive attempts to appeal to their own organizational members who 
are alienated by the issue-related actions of initiating ideological firms with opposing 
ideologies and want to defend their preferred issue position against such actions. 
Mechanism analyses (2.1): Swing vs. non-swing states 
If this is the case, we can expect that the pattern of response would vary by the 
level of ideological competition in the environment. Specifically, I expect that the 
selective response to rivals would get stronger with the intensifying ideological 
competition in the firms’ stakeholder environment, with such pattern being concentrated 
in so-called swing or battleground states. In swing states characterized by high 
ideological heterogeneity among stakeholders, there is no solid status quo, with 
stakeholders disagreeing over how to approach a given issue. Such uncertainty in the 
stakeholder environment make swing states “sweet spots” for institutional change 
(Gamson and Meyer, 1996), where initiating ideological firms’ actions have the potential 
to move the needle and thus present threats to the firms with opposing ideologies. In 
contrast, in solidly red and blue states with low stakeholder heterogeneity, political 
opportunity structures for institutional change are relatively closed (Schneiberg and 
Lounsbury, 2008; York and Lenox, 2014; McDonnell et al., 2015), where ideological 
firms’ issue engagement is less likely to be perceived as salient threats for their 
ideological opponents. Accordingly, ideological firms’ efforts to undermine any issue-
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related change made by their ideological rivals would be strategically targeted to these 
battleground states (Gamson and Meyer, 1996; Briscoe et al., 2014).  
To test this prediction, in Table 3.5, I re-estimate my main analysis by using more 
granular measures of dependent variable: a focal firm’s advocacy giving in swing states 
(M15a) vs. advocacy giving in non-swing states (M15b). I measure the House election 
margin between Democratic votes and Republican votes in each election cycle during my 
study period, and categorize states with narrower-than-median margin as swing states, 
and the rest as non-swing states. Each grant of a focal firm is assigned to swing or non-
swing states based on its nonprofit recipients’ location information. Consistent with my 
expectation, the results show that selective response to ideological firms’ opponents arise 
only in swing states, but not in non-swing states. This pattern is consistent with the 
empirical regularity that competition between political parties, reflected in the 
distribution of campaign contributions and political ad spending, is concentrated in a few 
swing states. 
Mechanism analyses (2.2): Ideological radicals vs. Ideological moderates  
In addition to the level of ideological competition in the external environment, 
corporations’ own ideological attributes may also act as a key contingency that moderates 
their competitive response to ideological opponents. Specifically, I expect that 
radicalness of a focal firm’s ideological position would moderate its counter-response to 
ideological opponents’ giving. Within the group of firms that hold ideologically aligned 
positions to each other, there is a range in the level of radicalness in their ideological 
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positions, such that some firms are placed on the extreme end of the ideological spectrum 
(i.e., ideological radicals), whereas others are placed more closely towards the middle 
(i.e., ideological moderates). I expect this heterogeneity to shape the pattern of 
ideological firms’ response to their ideological opponents’ giving, such that selective 
response to ideological opponents would be stronger for the former group of ideological 
radicals, if it truly reflects competitive attempts to defend the issue position held by a 
focal firm’s organizational members. The more extreme a focal firm’s ideological 
position is, the distance between its organizational members’ preferred issue position and 
that held by its ideological opponents is likely to be greater. Accordingly, ideological 
radicals are more likely to perceive their ideological opponents’ issue-related actions as 
salient threats, which leads to a greater propensity for counter-response to defend their 
issue position (May, 1973; Fisher, 1999). For those with extreme ideologies, such 
struggle with alternative perspectives may even be seen as their reason for being 
(Selznick, 1960; Barnett and Woywode, 2004).  
To test this prediction, I split the sample into the group of ideological radicals 
(M16a) and ideological moderates (M16b), based on the median value of ideological 
position in each ideological camp of conservatives and radicals. Consistent with my 
expectation, the results show that the selective response to ideological opponents’ giving 
is primarily coming from the group of firms with radical ideological positions, but not 
those with moderate positions. This finding lends support for my theory, suggesting that 
the observed stronger response to ideological rivals may indeed reflect the dynamics of 
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within-issue competition between firms at polar ends of the ideological spectrum, which 
is likely to contribute to increasing polarization and conflict around the issue. 
Mechanism analyses (2.3): Ideological liberals vs. Ideological conservatives  
In addition, the tendency of stronger response to ideological opponents may vary 
also by the focal firm’s ideological position: in particular, whether a focal firm holds a 
liberal ideology (i.e., blue firm) vs. conservative ideology (i.e., red firm). While my main 
argument has treated the counter-mobilization by blue firms and red firms as symmetrical 
possibilities, the extensive literature on political psychology (Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2007) 
finds that liberals and conservatives tend to differ fundamentally in their preference of 
stability and preserving status quo, suggesting the potential asymmetry in the role played 
by two groups (Bermiss and McDonald, 2018). Specifically, scholars have found that, 
while liberals are relatively open to the prospect of change, conservatives put more 
emphasis on stability, exhibiting greater psychological needs to reduce the perception of 
uncertainty and threats (Skitka and Tetlock, 1993; Jost et al., 2003; Christensen et al., 
2015). This inherent psychological difference between individuals at two ideological 
poles suggests that, if the firm’s response to ideological rivals reflects the attempts of 
counter-positioning to defend the issue position preferred by their organizational 
members, such response should be stronger among the group of red firms with 
conservative workforce than blue firms with liberal workforce. Conservative 
organizational members in red firms would perceive any issue-related changes—
especially the changes made by their ideological opponents that would be undesirable in 
their eyes—as bigger threats than liberal members in blue firms, and thus are more likely 
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to mobilize to undermine such changes. Indeed, this is consistent with the extant notion 
that “rightist movements tend to be known for what they are against, not for what they 
support” (Blee and Creasap, 2010), as shown in the cases of anti-immigrant movements 
fueled by success of pro-immigrant movements, anti-LGBTQ movements mobilized by 
change in public perceptions around LGBTQ rights, etc. I test this conjecture by splitting 
the sample into ideologically liberal firms (M17a) and conservative firms (M17b) based 
on the average ideological position of their organizational members. The results support 
the posited asymmetry between the two groups, showing that stronger response to 
ideological opponents is coming from the group of ideological conservatives, whereas the 
response by ideological liberals does not vary by the ideological identity of original 
contributors. According to the estimates, ideologically liberal firms’ giving is associated 
with a 27.4% increase in the subsequent giving probability by ideologically conservative 
firms, whereas the corresponding change in giving by their ideological allies (i.e., 
conservatives) is only associated with a 3.8% increase.  
***Insert Table 3.5 about here*** 
3.6.5. Mechanism Analyses (3): Recipient choices within each issue area  
 Lastly, I run the supplementary analyses to examine whether firms that belong to 
two different ideological camps tend to support different issue positions within each 
issue, which is an implicit assumption in my interpretation of the observed response to 
ideological opponents as the competitive attempts of counter-positioning. While the ideal 
test is directly observing the issue positions held by advocacy nonprofits that each firm 
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supports, an indirect approach to test this dynamic using my dataset is to examine if the 
pattern of ideological clustering arises in firms’ recipient choices within each issue area. 
Specifically, within each issue, I can observe if ideologically adjacent firms tend to fund 
the similar set of nonprofits, such that ideological conservative firms fund the nonprofits 
that other conservative firms gave to, and ideological liberal firms fund the nonprofits 
that other liberal firms gave to. Empirically, this means that, when it comes to the choices 
of nonprofit recipients within each issue, we would observe the opposite pattern of 
asymmetry in the effects of giving by ideological allies vs. ideological opponents on a 
focal firm’s giving, with the effect of the former having a far stronger and positive effect 
on a focal firm’s own choice of nonprofit recipient than the latter. To examine this, I 
construct my dataset at a more granular, nonprofit recipient-firm dyad level to observe 
firms’ recipient choices within each issue area. The dependent variable in this analysis is 
whether or not a focal firm gives to the nonprofit in each year, and the main regressors 
are whether its ideological allies and opponents gave to the given nonprofit in the 
previous year. Consistent with my main analyses, I run a linear probability model, with 
year, firm and recipient fixed effects (issue-specific influences captured in recipient FE). 
The results shown in Table 3.6 are consistent with my expectation. As shown in 
M18, while both variables are significant and positive, the effect of giving by ideological 
allies (𝛽=0.0801, p=0.0000) is not only stronger but also significantly bigger in its effect 
size than the effect of giving by ideological opponents (𝛽=0.0258, p=0.0158), with the 
statistical difference between the two coefficients being strongly supported (p=0.0000). 
This result suggests that, within each issue, firms are more likely to give to the nonprofits 
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that their ideological allies gave to, compared to the nonprofits that their ideological 
rivals gave to, which demonstrates the posited dynamics of ideological clustering in 
firms’ recipient choices. The same pattern of results holds in M19, where I use the logged 
amount of giving by a focal firm as an alternative dependent variable and the logged 
amount of giving by its ideological allies and opponents as alternative regressors; in this 
model, giving by ideological opponents is shown to have only a marginally significant 
and positive effect, whereas the effect of giving by ideological opponents is still highly 
significant at p-value of 0.0000.  
In the following M20 and M21, I test the robustness of this finding by estimating 
the main effect of the variable of Ideological Gap on a focal firm’s giving, which I 
measure by calculating the absolute difference between the average ideological position 
of corporate donors that gave to the nonprofit in a previous year and a focal firm’s 
ideological position35. My expectation is that this variable would have a negative effect 
on a focal firm’s giving to the given nonprofit, which would suggest that a firm prefers to 
give to the nonprofits that other ideologically adjacent firms gave to. Consistent with this 
expectation, I find that the coefficient of Ideological Gap is highly significant and 
negative in both models that use the alternative construction of independent and 
dependent variables as dummy of giving (M20) and the logged amount of giving (M21), 
respectively. In other words, the higher the ideological gap between a focal firm and the 
 
35 Note that the construction of this analysis excludes firm-recipient-year observations in which no other 
firms made a giving to the given recipient in the previous year, significantly reducing N of this model. I 
also find the same result when I use the weighted average ideological score of previous corporate donors to 
the nonprofit (by amount) to calculate the variable of Ideological Gap, and also when I use the two year 
window as an alternative time frame to calculate the average ideology of previous donors. 
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nonprofit’s previous corporate funders, the less likely the firm is likely to fund the given 
nonprofit.  
Overall, these collective results strongly confirm that, when giving to an issue, a 
firm tend to fund nonprofits whose previous funders are ideologically similar to itself. 
***Insert Table 3.6 about here***  
3.7. Discussion 
The results of my empirical analyses strongly support my theoretical arguments 
about how ideological firms’ advocacy giving opens the door for not just their ideological 
allies, but also for their ideological rivals, which would lead to within-issue competition 
between firms on the opposite ends of the ideological spectrum. As hypothesized, I find 
that firms respond to the previous giving not only by their ideological allies but also by 
their ideological opponents, with the response to opponents dominating the response to 
allies. This result is robust across a variety of econometric specifications, with the most 
stringent specification with firm-issue and issue-year level fixed effects, which absorb all 
time-invariant firm-issue specific heterogeneity and all issue-specific time trends.  
Moreover, the results from my supplementary analyses validate the posited 
mechanisms underlying my main findings. I find that selective response to ideological 
opponents’ giving is driven by firms whose entire body politic tend to be highly 
ideologically motivated and think similarly to each other, especially when they face a 
higher level of labor market competition. These findings are highly consistent with my 
theory that the observed counter-response to ideological opponents reflects ideological 
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firms’ competitive attempts to defend the issue positions held by internal organizational 
members. Moreover, selective response to ideological opponents is stronger in swing 
states where initiating actions of ideological firms would be perceived as salient threats 
for the firms with opposing ideologies, and stronger among firms whose organizational 
members hold radical and conservative preferences. Finally, I find that, when supporting 
a given issue, ideological firms of different positions tend to fund different nonprofits, 
using a within-issue, nonprofit recipient-level variation to detect the pattern of ideological 
clustering in recipient choices. 
My findings make contributions to multiple streams of research. My study 
contributes to a rapidly growing body of literature on corporate engagement in socio-
political issues and, in particular, the line of literature that highlights the role of corporate 
organizational ideology as the main driver for such action. Recently, many practitioners 
and scholars called for attention to the mounting evidence that corporate actors are 
increasingly engaging in social issues of contentious and political nature, which have 
long been understood to lie outside the traditional boundary of firms’ participation. In 
light of this, scholars have started to explore the drivers of these activities, with a 
substantial body of research pointing to the role of political ideology among managers 
(Gupta, Nadkarni, and Mariam, 2019; Hambrick and Wowak, 2019) and employees as 
key internal drivers of such actions (Gupta et al., 2017; Gupta and Briscoe, 2019; 
McKean and King, 2019). However, the literature remains largely silent on the 
consequences of such corporate activism: in particular, how advocacy engagement by 
ideological firms affects the behaviors of other firms in the population.  
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On the one hand, ideological actors’ active participation in advocacy issues and 
its cascade effect on others can be socially beneficial as it increases the total supply level 
of corporate action around key socio-political issues from which many firms would have 
otherwise stayed away. In a sense, initiating ideological actors thus act as “critical mass” 
that solve collective action problem in the provision of social goods, as they are willing to 
pay the initial start-up costs of institutionalizing a given issue as a legitimate area of 
firms’ participation. On the other hand, ideological firms’ advocacy efforts may backfire, 
by inviting ideological opposition from their rivals and thus increasing conflict and 
polarization around the issue. This paper focuses on this tension, by showing that those 
initial actions by ideological firms do create an opening not just for the firms whose 
ideology is aligned to their own, but also for their ideological rivals who may undermine 
any issue-related changes that initiating ideological firms were trying to achieve. In doing 
so, I present a more nuanced and less optimistic take on the role of corporate activism in 
society, raising important questions about the appropriate limits on powerful business 
actors’ participation in civic discourse, and the use of tax-exempt philanthropic giving to 
those ends. 
Also, I bring into corporate activism and broader CSR literature a relatively new 
idea that growing socio-political contention around many issues in many societies can be 
leveraged by firms as a newly emerging source of strategic differentiation and 
competitive advantage. That is, firms can compete against each other not just based on 
traditional product or service attributes but also their stand on salient issues that 
stakeholders care about. This is a notably different take from the conceptualization in 
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existing studies on corporate activism that view such contention primarily as a source of 
strategic liability that expose firms to risks of alienating a portion of a firm’s key 
stakeholders who disagree (Burbano, 2020; Hambrick and Wowak, 2020). Yet, the 
imperatives of strategic differentiation suggests that such heterogeneous stakeholder 
preferences are not necessarily a bad thing from a strategic angle; in my paper, I highlight 
that ideological differences across different people can be used as a basis of firms’ novel 
differentiation strategy and value creation, as they espouse different positions to appeal to 
stakeholders with opposing preferences and thus maximize their competitive advantage.  
Second, my findings extend our understanding of how firms influence others’ 
social actions. Most studies on this topic tend to build on classic insight of the normative 
pressures and homogeneity in the institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Haunschild and Miner, 1997) and show how unitary practice spreads throughout the field 
as actors in similar stakeholder environment develop a uniform consensus on the 
appropriate level and focus of corporate social action (Marquis et al., 2007; Marquis and 
Tilcsik, 2016), Yet, recent work that started to connect political psychology literature to 
CSR highlights how CSR can be contested, pointing to heterogeneous and often 
polarizing stakeholder preferences around social issues (Rao, 2009; King and Pearce, 
2010). Importantly, this contested nature of social issues suggests that the diffusion 
process of CSR may not be as smooth as what one may expect based on existing studies, 
which is also the insight shared by broader diffusion and movement scholarship that 
emphasizes the fragile nature of institutionalization (Oliver, 1991; Fiss and Zajac, 2004; 
Lounsbury, 2008; Briscoe and Safford, 2008; Ansari et al., 2010; Fiss et al., 2012; Litrico 
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and David, 2017). My theory and findings extend this line of literature by offering a 
strategic differentiation-based account of corporate social counter-positioning (Porter, 
1997; Zhao et al., 2017), which shows that the firm’s initial issue-related action creates 
strong economic incentives for its rivals to take an opposing issue position. In so doing, 
this paper also uncovers an underexplored source of contention in the diffusion process of 
firms’ social practices: the across-firm heterogeneity in the ideological preferences of the 
labor force.  
This study also brings new insight into the social movement literature, which 
usually try to find the source of contention around corporate social practices from the 
outside of the institution: for example, contention between social movement 
organizations called ‘extra-institutional entrepreneurs’ (King and Soule, 2007; King and 
Pearce, 2010) or issue entrepreneurs (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). In these accounts, firms 
are portrayed as relatively passive actors around the market of social and environmental 
issues whose market-related activities are affected as a result of exogeneous competition 
between these movement organizations that attempt proactive changes to the issue 
priority structure of a society to their own preferences—especially between ideological 
contest between organizations with opposing ideologies (e.g., rightist vs. leftist 
movement). Even in few papers that do recognize how firms can participate in such 
contention, their focus goes to the dynamics of competition between firms and other 
activist groups, where firms are considered to be unitary actors with homogeneous 
interests fighting to defend existing quo against activists’ effort to change the system. 
Yet, this paper’s focus on varying ideological preferences of a firm’s organizational 
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members suggests not only that some firms may play a proactive role of issue 
entrepreneurs to promote their organizational members’ unique interests to change the 
system, but also that competition between different ideological interests may even arise 
within the population of firms themselves. In doing so, this paper broadens our 
understanding on the role of for-profit actors in the market of advocacy issues.  
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Table 3.1. Summary statistics and correlation table 
  
Mean SD Min Max 
1 Giving by a focal firm 0.259 0.438 0.000 1.000 
2 Giving by industry peers 0.787 0.410 0.000 1.000 
3 Giving by other firms 0.997 0.053 0.000 1.000 
4 Giving by ideological opponents 0.529 0.499 0.000 1.000 
5 Giving by ideological allies 0.700 0.458 0.000 1.000 
6 Firm size 9.679 2.710 0.000 14.936 
7 ROA 0.046 0.072 -2.283 0.953 
8 R&D-to-sales ratio 0.025 0.075 0.000 3.351 
9 Advertising-to-sales ratio 0.013 0.030 0.000 0.313 
10 Capex-to-sales ratio 0.060 0.100 0.000 2.955 
11 Board female ratio 0.134 0.110 0.000 0.556 
12 Lobbying-to-sales ratio 0.010 0.022 0.000 0.551 
13 CSR rating 1.098 2.428 -7.000 13.000 
14 Market concentration 0.031 0.043 0.011 0.321 
15 Headquarter population 13.266 9.905 0.567 38.994 
16 Headquarter poverty rate 13.378 2.868 6.800 25.800 






1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 1.000                
2 0.069 1.000               
3 0.009 0.043 1.000              
4 0.068 0.552 0.040 1.000             
5 0.080 0.796 0.040 0.315 1.000            
6 0.188 0.051 -0.026 -0.002 0.068 1.000           
7 -0.034 -0.088 -0.001 -0.059 -0.083 -0.017 1.000          
8 -0.026 0.073 -0.015 0.083 0.056 0.003 0.038 1.000         
9 0.006 -0.017 0.006 -0.069 -0.004 -0.034 0.203 0.092 1.000        
10 -0.022 -0.100 0.009 -0.038 -0.105 0.035 -0.042 0.173 -0.048 1.000       
11 0.137 -0.027 -0.013 -0.067 -0.009 0.302 0.104 0.036 0.141 -0.008 1.000      
12 -0.003 -0.009 -0.012 0.004 -0.014 0.047 0.068 0.353 -0.010 0.163 0.050 1.000     
13 0.078 0.061 -0.028 -0.040 0.104 0.230 0.089 0.191 0.163 -0.128 0.363 0.057 1.000    
14 0.048 -0.398 0.000 -0.290 -0.322 0.057 0.090 -0.047 0.027 0.022 0.165 -0.070 -0.003 1.000   
15 0.005 0.047 -0.026 -0.035 0.071 0.127 0.060 0.189 0.119 0.048 0.052 0.083 0.233 -0.127 1.000  
16 0.019 -0.074 -0.015 -0.069 -0.074 0.177 -0.027 -0.034 0.050 0.113 -0.006 0.028 -0.002 0.088 0.388 1.000 
Notes: Number of firm-issue-year observations for all variables is 25,440. Missing values of all variables are recoded as zero. 
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Table 3.2. Baseline Results 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Giving by industry 
peers 
0.0364*** 0.0234* 0.0277**    
(0.0086) (0.0095) (0.0106)    
Giving by other firms 0.0021 0.0064 0.0022 0.0030 0.0071 0.0036 
(0.0525) (0.0524) (0.0549) (0.0527) (0.0526) (0.0550) 
Giving by ideological 
opponents 
   0.0319*** 0.0379*** 0.0343*** 
   (0.0072) (0.0079) (0.0086) 
Giving by ideological 
allies 
   0.0242** 0.0110 0.0139 
   (0.0076) (0.0084) (0.0093) 
Firm size 0.0226*** 0.0107*** 0.0107*** 0.0223*** 0.0107*** 0.0107*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
ROA -0.2412*** -0.2136*** -0.2138*** -0.2423*** -0.2165*** -0.2164*** 
 (0.0530) (0.0608) (0.0629) (0.0529) (0.0608) (0.0630) 
R&D-to-sales ratio -0.1297*** -0.1603** -0.1602** -0.1377*** -0.1627** -0.1622** 
 (0.0373) (0.0508) (0.0525) (0.0379) (0.0506) (0.0524) 
Advertising-to-sales 
ratio 
-0.0785 -0.8327* -0.8333* -0.0571 -0.8364* -0.8358* 
(0.1824) (0.3429) (0.3551) (0.1820) (0.3436) (0.3556) 
Capex-to-sales ratio -0.0427 0.1007 0.1005 -0.0402 0.0990 0.0988 
(0.0401) (0.0778) (0.0805) (0.0400) (0.0768) (0.0796) 
Board female ratio 0.2181*** 0.0413 0.0411 0.2184*** 0.0420 0.0418 
(0.0397) (0.0526) (0.0545) (0.0397) (0.0527) (0.0546) 
Lobbying-to-sales 
ratio 
0.4810** 0.6882** 0.6875* 0.4899** 0.6921** 0.6925* 
(0.1832) (0.2659) (0.2752) (0.1837) (0.2650) (0.2744) 
CSR rating 0.0019 -0.0065** -0.0065** 0.0019 -0.0065** -0.0065** 
 (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0023) 
Market concentration 0.5880*** 1.6427** 1.6406** 0.6322*** 1.6666** 1.6616** 
(0.1332) (0.5283) (0.5468) (0.1337) (0.5283) (0.5469) 
Population in HQ 
state 
-0.0004 0.0010 0.0010 -0.0003 0.0010 0.0010 
(0.0005) (0.0062) (0.0064) (0.0005) (0.0062) (0.0064) 
Poverty rate in HQ 
state 
0.0041* 0.0096*** 0.0096*** 0.0041* 0.0094*** 0.0094*** 
(0.0018) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0018) (0.0027) (0.0028) 
Constant -0.0108 -0.4055* -0.2053 -0.0177 -0.4022* -0.2101 
 (0.0646) (0.1761) (0.1815) (0.0651) (0.1757) (0.1814) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Issue FE Y Y  Y Y  
Firm FE  Y   Y  
Firm-Issue FE   Y   Y 
R2 0.0759 0.1940 0.3325 0.0763 0.1951 0.3329 
N 25440 25440 25440 25440 25440 25440 
Notes: Dependent variable is the dummy variable of advocacy giving of a focal firm in a given issue area 
in each year. Coefficients of OLS panel regressions. Robust standard errors clustered by firm-issue level 




Table 3.3. Robustness analyses 
 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 










 IV as amount of 
giving 
IV and DV 
as amount of 
giving 
Giving by ideological opponents 0.0310***  0.0515***   
(0.0091)  (0.0104)   
Giving by ideological allies 0.0040  -0.0044   
(0.0095)  (0.0116)   
Giving by ideological opponents 
in different states 
 0.0331***    
 (0.0090)    
Giving by ideological allies  
in different states 
 0.0041    
 (0.0093)    
Amount of giving by ideological 
opponents’ giving 
   0.0037*** 0.0360*** 
   (0.0009) (0.0087) 
Amount of giving by ideological  
allies’ giving 
   0.0016+ 0.0177* 
   (0.0009) (0.0089) 
Giving by other firms 0.0153 0.0152 -0.0152   
 (0.0847) (0.0846) (0.0639)   
Amount of giving by other firms    0.0002 0.0019 
   (0.0037) (0.0369) 
Firm size 0.0110*** 0.0109*** 0.0092* 0.0107*** 0.1077*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0046) (0.0025) (0.0251) 
ROA -0.2224*** -0.2225*** -0.1900** -0.2178*** -2.1227*** 
 (0.0586) (0.0587) (0.0661) (0.0629) (0.5804) 
R&D-to-sales ratio -0.1658** -0.1658** -0.0783 -0.1609** -1.4543** 
 (0.0521) (0.0521) (0.0809) (0.0524) (0.4794) 
Advertising-to-sales ratio -0.8731* -0.8721* -0.2581 -0.8298* -8.8828* 
 (0.3583) (0.3584) (0.5188) (0.3557) (3.5933) 
Capex-to-sales ratio 0.0955 0.0953 -0.0814 0.0964 0.9446 
 (0.0780) (0.0779) (0.1035) (0.0794) (0.7405) 
Board female ratio 0.0455 0.0456 0.0385 0.0422 0.4513 
(0.0543) (0.0543) (0.0752) (0.0546) (0.5460) 
Lobbying-to-sales ratio 0.7116** 0.7127** 0.1097 0.6934* 6.4344* 
 (0.2753) (0.2752) (0.3411) (0.2740) (2.6755) 
CSR rating -0.0072** -0.0072** 0.0005 -0.0065** -0.0742** 
 (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0228) 
Market concentration 1.7041** 1.7017** -0.2303 1.6464** 15.3863** 
(0.5512) (0.5511) (0.8486) (0.5473) (5.3403) 
Population in HQ state 0.0018 0.0018 0.0061 0.0011 -0.0157 
(0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0068) (0.0064) (0.0650) 
Poverty rate in HQ state 0.0091*** 0.0091*** 0.0070* 0.0095*** 0.1071*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0028) (0.0273) 
Lag(amount of a focal firm’s 
advocacy giving) 
  0.2614***   
  (0.0095)   
constant -0.2831 -0.2846 -0.1308 -0.2131 -1.7293 
 (0.2485) (0.2485) (0.1351) (0.1839) (1.8654) 
Firm-issue FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Issue-year FE Y Y    
Year FE   Y Y Y 
R2 0.3428 0.3429  0.3330 0.3964 
N 25440 25440 25440 25440 25440 
Notes: Dependent variable is the dummy variable of advocacy giving of a focal firm in an issue in each year, with an 
exception of M11 which use the logged amount of a focal firm’s advocacy giving in a given issue in each year as an 
alternative DV. M7, 8, 10 and 11 report the results of OLS panel regressions. M9 runs dynamic panel regression. 
Robust standard errors. Standard errors in parentheses. +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
153 
 
Table 3.4. Mechanism analysis (1): Role of employees 
 M12a M12b M12c M12d M13a M13b M14a M14b 
 Executive vs. non-executive ideological intensity Ideological heterogeneity Labor market competition 




High exec & 
low non-exec 
intensity 
Low exec & 
high non-
exec intensity 
Low exec & 
low non-exec 
intensity 
High Low High Low 
Giving by ideological 
opponents 
0.0444** 0.0202 0.0277 0.0213 0.0356** 0.0378** 0.0331** 0.0449*** 
(0.0155) (0.0208) (0.0245) (0.0162) (0.0130) (0.0127) (0.0119) (0.0136) 
Giving by ideological 
allies 
0.0027 0.0144 0.0340 0.0167 0.0252+ 0.0009 -0.0007 0.0272* 
(0.0198) (0.0222) (0.0237) (0.0155) (0.0132) (0.0153) (0.0148) (0.0133) 
Giving by other firms -0.0584 -0.1657 0.0327 0.1626** -0.0370 0.0124 0.0143 -0.0127 
(0.0833) (0.1899) (0.0927) (0.0501) (0.0829) (0.0697) (0.0853) (0.0856) 
Firm size 0.0301 0.1476*** 0.1807*** 0.0030 0.0228*** 0.0128*** 0.0067* 0.0169*** 
 (0.0201) (0.0400) (0.0282) (0.0041) (0.0051) (0.0035) (0.0029) (0.0044) 
ROA -0.3038* 0.0031 -0.2710* -0.2513** -0.1603+ -0.2697** -0.3806*** -0.1738* 
 (0.1238) (0.1605) (0.1310) (0.0800) (0.0944) (0.0876) (0.1053) (0.0764) 
R&D-to-sales ratio -0.1207 -0.2019 0.4044 -0.1763* -0.2011* -0.1463 -0.1685 -0.1353* 
 (0.1634) (0.2968) (0.3017) (0.0829) (0.0932) (0.1492) (0.1736) (0.0640) 
Advertising-to-sales ratio 0.1229 -0.0077 -0.1410 -1.0511* -1.8673** -0.5227 -0.6130 -1.2477** 
 (0.8230) (1.5746) (0.8008) (0.5022) (0.5912) (0.4843) (0.5295) (0.4550) 
Capex-to-sales ratio 0.2960* 0.4909* -0.0594 0.1811 0.3164+ 0.0505 0.1050 -0.0406 
 (0.1259) (0.2243) (0.2049) (0.2129) (0.1715) (0.1009) (0.0869) (0.1053) 
Board female ratio 0.0598 -0.0865 0.0221 0.1947* 0.1146 0.0447 -0.0813 0.1666+ 
 (0.1004) (0.1331) (0.2095) (0.0990) (0.0854) (0.0826) (0.0780) (0.0851) 
Lobbying-to-sales ratio 1.0385* -0.7789 -0.2000 1.9758* -0.2480 0.6356+ 0.9589* 0.7836* 
 (0.4652) (1.0571) (0.4468) (0.8659) (0.4328) (0.3715) (0.3979) (0.3698) 
CSR rating -0.0112** 0.0112+ -0.0173* -0.0054 -0.0114*** 0.0026 -0.0036 -0.0104** 
 (0.0041) (0.0057) (0.0072) (0.0046) (0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0034) 
Market concentration -0.5527 2.4659+ 2.9193 1.1077 2.3123*** 0.3728 -0.7000 0.3665 
(1.0979) (1.4202) (1.9248) (0.9622) (0.6833) (1.0405) (1.2708) (0.7090) 
Population in HQ state 0.0110 -0.0023 0.0151 -0.0080 0.0020 -0.0226 0.0206+ -0.0105 
 (0.0165) (0.0362) (0.0238) (0.0076) (0.0082) (0.0154) (0.0115) (0.0073) 
Poverty rate in HQ state 0.0119* 0.0018 0.0079 -0.0000 0.0012 0.0143** 0.0162*** 0.0066 
 (0.0055) (0.0072) (0.0077) (0.0045) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0039) (0.0047) 
Constant -0.6368 -1.1119 -1.0609*** -0.1300 -0.2325 -0.2713* -0.4015 0.0387 
 (0.4755) (1.4706) (0.3038) (0.1011) (0.2453) (0.1157) (0.3060) (0.2324) 
R2 0.4198 0.4664 0.4490 0.3747 0.4210 0.3927 0.3882 0.3218 
N 8222 4470 4435 8313 12288 12364 13883 10849 
Notes: Dependent variable is the dummy variable of advocacy giving of a focal firm in a given issue area in each year. Coefficients of OLS panel regressions 
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Table 3.5. Mechanism analysis (2): Ideological competition 
 M15a M15b M16a M16b M17a M17b 
 Swing vs. non-swing states  Ideological radicals vs. moderates Ideological liberals vs. conservatives 
 DV: Advocacy 













Giving by ideological 
opponents 
0.0165* 0.0164* 0.0314** 0.0356** 0.0258** 0.0596** 
(0.0068) (0.0071) (0.0122) (0.0123) (0.0096) (0.0199) 
Giving by ideological 
allies 
0.0015 0.0183** 0.0004 0.0249+ 0.0205+ 0.0083 
(0.0073) (0.0068) (0.0127) (0.0135) (0.0113) (0.0165) 
Giving by other firms -0.0273 0.0048 0.0098 0.0045 0.0450 -0.3166 
(0.0377) (0.0486) (0.0713) (0.0848) (0.0484) (0.2149) 
Firm size 0.0044* 0.0041* 0.0136*** 0.0113 0.0107*** 0.0155* 
 (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0029) (0.0072) (0.0027) (0.0072) 
ROA -0.1385** -0.1169** -0.2694*** -0.1356 -0.2946*** 0.0516 
 (0.0457) (0.0376) (0.0682) (0.0937) (0.0831) (0.1013) 
R&D-to-sales ratio -0.0385 -0.1164** -0.1652+ -0.1471* -0.1304* -0.4528* 
 (0.0364) (0.0430) (0.0942) (0.0613) (0.0614) (0.1782) 
Advertising-to-sales ratio -0.4849+ -0.3791 -1.0380** 0.4469 -0.8206* -1.3865 
 (0.2553) (0.2723) (0.3495) (0.7125) (0.3650) (1.5507) 
Capex-to-sales ratio 0.0228 0.0600 0.0791 0.1562 0.0138 0.1803+ 
 (0.0532) (0.0563) (0.0934) (0.1319) (0.1094) (0.1040) 
Board female ratio 0.0336 0.0437 -0.0548 0.1733* 0.0381 0.0166 
(0.0419) (0.0432) (0.0790) (0.0809) (0.0595) (0.1353) 
Lobbying-to-sales ratio 0.2490 0.4120* 0.5363 0.7692* 0.7559* 1.1558+ 
 (0.1947) (0.2031) (0.3695) (0.3834) (0.2984) (0.6189) 
CSR rating -0.0055** -0.0043* 0.0021 -0.0139*** -0.0043+ -0.0138** 
 (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0034) (0.0031) (0.0026) (0.0047) 
Market concentration 0.6896+ 1.7343*** 2.2071** 1.1207 2.0930*** -0.5653 
(0.3977) (0.4531) (0.8320) (0.7342) (0.5787) (1.5061) 
Population in HQ state -0.0113* 0.0127* 0.0234* -0.0068 0.0046 -0.0187 
(0.0048) (0.0062) (0.0108) (0.0075) (0.0073) (0.0163) 
Poverty rate in HQ state 0.0075*** 0.0041+ 0.0089* 0.0093* 0.0082* 0.0110* 
 (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0033) (0.0052) 
Constant 0.2445+ -0.4812** -0.2272 -0.0348 -0.3415+ 0.8867 
 (0.1370) (0.1732) (0.1399) (0.2310) (0.2016) (0.6664) 
R2 0.3516 0.3332 0.3190 0.3524 0.3436 0.3017 
N 25440 25440 12439 13001 19464 5976 
Notes: Dependent variable is the dummy variable of advocacy giving of a focal firm in a given issue area in each year.  
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Table 3.6. Recipient choices within each issue area 
 M18 M19 M20 M21 
 Giving by ideological opponents 
vs. ideological allies 
Effect of ideological gap 








Giving by ideological 
opponents 
0.0258* 0.0183+   
(0.0107) (0.0109)   
Giving by ideological allies 0.0801*** 0.0801***   
(0.0058) (0.0060)   
Ideological gap   -0.0780*** -0.7538*** 
   (0.0118) (0.1148) 
Giving by industry peers   -0.0290** -0.0344*** 
  (0.0099) (0.0102) 
Giving by other firms  0.0748*** 0.0749*** -0.0614*** -0.0720*** 
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0104) (0.0107) 
Firm size 0.0629*** 0.6374*** 0.0681*** 0.6797*** 
 (0.0061) (0.0590) (0.0149) (0.1462) 
ROA -0.1891*** -1.6841*** -0.1357+ -1.1579+ 
 (0.0388) (0.3566) (0.0789) (0.7034) 
R&D-to-sales ratio -0.2699*** -2.4126*** -0.5048* -4.5949+ 
 (0.0707) (0.6557) (0.2422) (2.5008) 
Advertising-to-sales ratio -0.2200 -2.1526 -0.4932 -4.3183 
 (0.1802) (1.7938) (0.4019) (4.1265) 
Capex-to-sales ratio 0.1196** 1.1937** 0.2306* 1.9727* 
 (0.0419) (0.3941) (0.0986) (0.9347) 
Board female ratio -0.0332 -0.2581 -0.0389 -0.2870 
 (0.0260) (0.2503) (0.0632) (0.6281) 
Lobbying-to-sales ratio 0.8986*** 8.1259*** 1.0080* 9.3552* 
 (0.1553) (1.4970) (0.4050) (3.9988) 
CSR rating -0.0053*** -0.0502*** -0.0072** -0.0678** 
 (0.0010) (0.0100) (0.0024) (0.0239) 
Market concentration 1.1644*** 10.0005*** 0.6532 3.7550 
(0.2381) (2.4059) (0.4989) (5.1246) 
Headquarter population 0.0056+ 0.0250 0.0014 -0.0115 
(0.0032) (0.0318) (0.0067) (0.0706) 
Headquarter poverty rate 0.0086*** 0.0871*** 0.0094** 0.0888** 
 (0.0013) (0.0126) (0.0031) (0.0302) 
Constant -0.8631*** -7.6531*** -1.0973*** -9.4710*** 
 (0.0982) (0.9821) (0.2316) (2.3403) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y 
Recipient FE (& Issue FE) Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.0910 0.0993 0.2089 0.2112 
N 93192 93192 21993 21993 
Notes: Dependent variable is the dummy variable of advocacy giving of a focal firm in a given nonprofit in 
each year in M18 and M20, and the logged amount of advocacy giving of a focal firm in a given nonprofit 
in each year in M19 and M21. Coefficients of OLS panel regressions. Robust standard errors clustered by 




GENERAL CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
By the existing CSR accounts, corporate philanthropy is typically conceptualized 
as a form of delegated philanthropy, whereby firms give back to society in expectation of 
rewards from external stakeholders by funding of service nonprofits (e.g., soup kitchens, 
homeless shelters) that deliver social goods and services to people in need. While this 
view of corporate giving as a means of voluntary redistribution of corporate wealth to 
serve external social needs applies well to the traditional form of service giving, it does 
not hold in the case of corporate advocacy giving. The pattern of findings in the three 
chapters of my dissertation suggest that corporate advocacy giving may represent an 
overlooked yet important source of ideological influence of many firms’ internal 
organizational members, who often hold homogeneous and extreme preferences. Also, I 
found that ideological preferences of the firm’s organizational members are especially 
likely to translate into its advocacy giving activities, when such activities allow the firm 
to distance themselves from their competitors in terms of ideological issue positions and 
thus gain strategic benefits of competitive advantage.  
Academically, these findings contribute to nonmarket and corporate philanthropy 
literature by challenging and extending its scholarly conceptions of what corporate giving 
is. My findings suggest that firms give to advocacy not to meet exist external social needs 
and demands, but to cater to their internal organizational members’ private, ideological 
preferences to give to certain advocacy issues to promote their preferred issue positions. 
In doing so, I extend our view not only on why firms give but also raise concerns about 
the potential welfare implications of CSR and corporate philanthropic activities that firms 
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may use for their strategic benefits. These findings contribute not only to business 
literature examining the impact of corporate giving on both firms and society, but also to 
broader inter-disciplinary literature straddling economics, law, and political science that 
investigates the prevalence of money from private and ideological interests in socio-
political discourse. In particular, this means that we need to move beyond our focus on 
campaign finance and lobbying in the existing literature (on which fine-grained data is 
readily available), and consider less visible avenues of influence such as corporate 
donation to fully understand the role of private, ideological interests in society. 
Practically, the findings from my dissertation point to multiple potential ways in 
which tax-exempt philanthropic activities of corporations may often fail to help society 
and, in some cases, even create social costs, thus raising the need for effective social 
monitoring on corporate donation and foundations. My findings for firm employees as a 
key driver of advocacy giving suggest that it may amplify their ideological voice in a way 
that is difficult for the public to discern. Given that these organizational members’ 
ideological preferences and issue-related views may significantly diverge from those of 
the broader society, it raises concerns not only about the welfare consequences of these 
giving activities, but also a fundamental question about if such use of corporate giving is 
democratic. After all, there exist a variety of regulations in place (e.g., campaign finance 
laws) that are designed to protect equal voice among individuals and to avoid giving 
greater voice to those with more power or financial resources. Yet, my dissertation 
suggests that corporate donation may serve as a less visible channel that may amplify the 
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impact of certain individuals who are often members of prestigious and financially 
resourceful organizations to begin with, and often hold extreme preferences.  
Moreover, my findings for the dynamics of ideological competition between firms 
with opposing ideologies suggest that corporate advocacy giving may also add to further 
polarization and gridlock around key issues in US society, which is already 
acknowledged as an issue of growing importance. Thus, my research proposes the need 
for effective social monitoring on corporate donation to ensure that it is allocated in ways 
that truly help society. Monitoring can be achieved through state regulation by enforcing 
stricter public disclosure requirements, and/or through collective efforts of private actors 
in society (e.g., the media, activists, consumers) to closely observe and evaluate how 
philanthropic dollars from firms are actually spent. Without such vigilance, my research 
shows, corporate philanthropy may fail to contribute to social benefits, despite the huge 
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Appendix Figure 1.1 
 
Notes: Baseline values represents the distribution of advocacy nonprofit presence across causes, 
as measured by % of nonprofit revenues in each area divided by aggregate revenue in all areas. 
Appendix Figure 1.2 
 
Notes: % of general foundations’ advocacy giving to each area is calculated by dividing the total 
amount of general foundation giving to the area by the total amount of giving across all areas. 
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Appendix Table 1.1. List of full NTEE Code categorized as advocacy 
   NTEE MAJOR CODE AND DESCRIPTION ADVOCACY 
CODE 
ADVOCACY CODE DESCRIPTION 
A. Arts, Culture, and Humanities A01   Alliances & Advocacy  
  A05   Research Institutes & Public Policy 
Analysis  
B. Education B01   Alliances & Advocacy  
  B05   Research Institutes & Public Policy 
Analysis  
C. Environmental Quality, Protection, and 
Beautification 
C01   Alliances & Advocacy  
  C05   Research Institutes & Public Policy 
Analysis  
D. Animal-Related D01   Alliances & Advocacy  
  D05   Research Institutes & Public Policy 
Analysis  
E. Health E01   Alliances & Advocacy  
  E05   Research Institutes & Public Policy 
Analysis  
F. Mental Health, Crisis Intervention F01   Alliances & Advocacy  
  F05   Research Institutes & Public Policy 
Analysis  
G. Diseases, Disorders, Medical Disciplines G01   Alliances & Advocacy  
  G05   Research Institutes & Public Policy 
Analysis  
H. Medical Research H01   Alliances & Advocacy 
  H05   Research Institutes & Public Policy 
Analysis  
I. Crime, Legal Related I01   Alliances & Advocacy  
  I05   Research Institutes & Public Policy 
Analysis 
J. Employment, Job Related J01   Alliances & Advocacy 
  J05   Research Institutes & Public Policy 
Analysis 
K. Food, Agriculture, and Nutrition K01   Alliances & Advocacy 
  K05   Research Institutes & Public Policy 
Analysis  
L. Housing, Shelter L01   Alliances & Advocacy  
  L05   Research Institutes & Public Policy 
Analysis  
M. Public Safety M01   Alliances & Advocacy  
  M05   Research Institutes & Public Policy 
Analysis  
N. Recreation, Sports, Leisure, Athletics N01   Alliances & Advocacy  
  N05   Research Institutes & Public Policy 
Analysis 
O. Youth Development O01   Alliances & Advocacy  
  O05   Research Institutes & Public Policy 
Analysis  
P. Human Services - Multipurpose and Other P01   Alliances & Advocacy  
  P05   Research Institutes & Public Policy 
Analysis 
Q. International, Foreign Affairs, and National 
Security 
Q01   Alliances & Advocacy  
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  Q05   Research Institutes & Public Policy 
Analysis  
R. Civil Rights, Social Action, Advocacy R01   Alliances & Advocacy  
  R02   Management & Technical Assistance  
  R03   Professional Societies & Associations  
  R05   Research Institutes & Public Policy 
Analysis  
  R11   Single Organization Support  
  R12   Fund Raising & Fund Distribution  
  R19   Support N.E.C.  
  R20   Civil Rights  
  R21   Immigrants' Rights 
  R22   Minority Rights  
  R23   Disabled Persons Rights  
  R24   Womens Rights  
  R25   Seniors Rights  
  R26   Lesbian & Gay Rights  
  R27   Patients' Rights 
  R28   Children's Rights  
  R29   Employee & Workers' Rights(Draft 
Code  
  R30   Intergroup & Race Relations  
  R40   Voter Education & Registration  
  R60   Civil Liberties  
  R61   Reproductive Rights  
  R62   Right to Life  
  R63   Censorship, Freedom of Speech & Press  
  R65   Freedom of Religion Issues 
  R67   Right to Die & Euthanasia  
  R99   Civil Rights, Social Action & Advocacy 
N.E.C 
S. Community Improvement, Capacity Building S01   Alliances & Advocacy  
  S05   Research Institutes & Public Policy 
Analysis  
  S21   Community Coalitions  
  S22   Neighborhood & Block Associations  
U. Science and Technology U01  Alliances & Advocacy  
  U05  Research Institutes & Public Policy 
Analysis  
V. Social Science Research Institutes, Services V01   Alliances & Advocacy  
  V05   Research Institutes & Public Policy 
Analysis  
W. Public, Society Benefit W01   Alliances & Advocacy  
  W05   Research Institutes & Public Policy 
Analysis  
  W20  Government & Public Administration  
  W22   Public Finance, Taxation & Monetary 
Policy  
  W24   Citizen Participation  
  W70   Leadership Development  




Appendix Table 1.2. Summary statistics and correlation of variables 
 
  
Mean SD Min Max 
1 Size 8.002 2.669 0.000 15.143 
2 ROA 0.039 0.571 -16.118 46.455 
3 R&D-to-Sales Ratio 0.018 0.055 0.000 1.555 
4 Advertising-to-Sales Ratio 0.010 0.024 0.000 0.343 
5 Capex-to-Sales Ratio 0.046 0.053 0.000 0.201 
6 KLD Strength 1.116 1.769 0.000 14.000 
7 KLD Concern 1.299 1.776 0.000 12.000 
8 Market Concentration 0.033 0.042 0.000 0.427 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 1.000 
        
2 0.007 1.000 
       
3 0.084 -0.002 1.000 
      
4 0.091 0.007 0.037 1.000 
     
5 0.259 0.004 0.056 -0.008 1.000 
    
6 0.345 0.014 0.197 0.128 0.079 1.000 
   
7 0.315 0.005 0.026 -0.029 0.212 0.448 1.000 
  
8 0.091 -0.003 -0.088 0.094 0.052 -0.009 0.056 1.000 
 
9 0.264 0.008 0.057 0.070 0.060 0.351 0.240 0.002 1.000 
 
Notes: Firm- and industry-level characteristics of Fortune 1,000 firms included as controls in 
regressions. Number of firm-year observations for all variables is 7,770. Missing values of all 
variables are recorded as zero. Given the high level of correlation between KLD Strength and 





Appendix Table 2.1. Replication of Results with Service Giving 
 (AM1) (AM2a) (AM2b) (AM3a) (AM3b) 
 Main Ideological heterogeneity Ideological radicalness 
  High Low High Low 
Executive ideological 
intensity 
0.0382 0.0691 0.0106 -0.0274 0.0679 
(0.0669) (0.1274) (0.1354) (0.1115) (0.0851) 
Non-executive 
ideological intensity 
0.0014+ 0.0017+ -0.0010 0.0004 0.0019* 
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0037) (0.0013) (0.0009) 
Giving by industry peers 0.0614 0.0791 0.0587 0.1093 0.0169 
(0.0538) (0.0913) (0.0596) (0.0672) (0.0813) 
Giving by other firms -1.0637 1.3499 -0.0718 0.6765 -2.6733 
(1.2265) (2.3466) (2.1774) (1.7431) (1.7527) 
Ideological position 0.2939 0.9232+ 0.6911+ 0.3119 0.3555 
(0.1846) (0.4803) (0.3827) (0.2024) (0.3254) 
Size 0.0551 0.0382 -0.0035 0.1343 -0.0976 
 (0.0756) (0.1529) (0.1016) (0.0948) (0.1285) 
Total employees -0.0041 -0.0008 0.0044 0.0071 -0.0078 
 (0.0053) (0.0064) (0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0067) 
ROA -0.5087 -1.8339 0.0731 -0.5718 -0.7568 
 (0.8709) (1.1766) (2.2284) (1.2691) (1.1975) 
R&D-to-sales ratio -2.5007* -0.7645 -0.3711 -2.0413* -10.1899+ 
 (1.0190) (3.2316) (1.9965) (0.9458) (5.6086) 
Advertising-to-sales 
ratio 
-14.6616 -8.9800 -1.3815 -23.7316+ 12.9267 
(12.3496) (10.8028) (9.2230) (13.1103) (12.8901) 
Capex-to-sales ratio 2.1791+ 0.5261 0.4381 1.7531 3.3143 
 (1.2685) (3.8993) (1.7080) (1.2382) (3.3742) 
Board female ratio 0.4472 0.7550 1.8324 1.5115 -0.6883 
(1.3187) (2.2862) (2.2214) (1.7660) (1.9939) 
Lobbying amount -0.0415 -0.0465 -0.0874+ -0.0435 -0.0413 
(0.0261) (0.0442) (0.0467) (0.0415) (0.0317) 
CSR rating -0.0104 -0.0579 0.0574 -0.1315 0.0921 
 (0.0618) (0.0882) (0.1092) (0.1039) (0.0695) 
Market concentration 10.5610 33.8414 -7.8385 -0.8752 27.0461 
(17.1295) (21.3908) (24.8122) (22.1079) (27.9149) 
Population in HQ state 0.1311 0.1022 -0.1279 0.1241 0.1069 
(0.1368) (0.1342) (0.3518) (0.2486) (0.1562) 
Poverty rate in HQ state 0.1481+ 0.2646* 0.0317 0.0724 0.2507* 
(0.0768) (0.1200) (0.1285) (0.1065) (0.1093) 
Constant 18.9987 -23.8706 7.2150 -11.2547 47.6244 
 (21.3096) (40.9822) (37.2883) (30.2311) (30.5624) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.0473 0.0434 0.0384 0.0585 0.0477 
N 5713 2475 2507 2866 2847 
Notes: Dependent variable is the logged amount of service giving of a focal firm in a given each year. 




Appendix Table 3.1. Economic magnitude of coefficients of Giving by Ideological 








Table 3.2. Main results   
M4 Year, issue FE: Full model  12.6% 9.6% 
M5 Year, issue, firm FE: Full model  15.0% 4.4% 
M6 Year, firm-issue FE: Full model (*main model) 13.6% 5.5% 
Table 3.3. Robustness analysis   
M7 Firm-issue, issue FE: Full model 12.3% 1.6% 
M8 Firm-issue, issue FE: Using giving by firms in different 
states 
13.1% 1.6% 
M9 Dynamic panel model  20.4% -1.7% 
Table 3.4. Mechanism analysis (1): Role of employees   
M12a High executive & High non-executive ideological intensity 15.0% 0.9% 
M12b High executive & Low non-executive ideological intensity 7.6% 5.4% 
M12c Low executive & High non-executive ideological intensity 11.4% 14.0% 
M12d Low executive & Low non-executive ideological intensity 9.8% 7.7% 
M13a Ideologically heterogeneous firms 13.3% 9.4% 
M13b Ideologically homogeneous firms 15.0% 0.4% 
M14a High labor market competition 12.3% -0.3% 
M14b Low labor market competition 20.2% 12.2% 
Table 3.5. Mechanism analysis (2): Ideological competition   
M15a Donation in swing states 11.5% 1.0% 
M15b Donation in non-swing states 12.3% 13.7% 
M16a Ideologically radical firms 13.1% 0.2% 
M16b Ideologically moderate firms 13.4% 9.4% 
M17a Ideologically liberal firms 9.8% 7.8% 
M17b Ideologically conservative firms 27.4% 3.8% 
Notes: Table shows the change in a focal firm’s subsequent probability of making advocacy giving to a 
given issue area over its mean value, which is associated with the change in the variables of Giving by 
Ideological Opponents and Giving by Ideological Allies from 0 to 1, based on their estimates in the 





Appendix Table 3.2. Role of external stakeholders 
 AM1a AM1b AM2a AM2b 
 Product-market competition Consumer sensitivity 
 High Low High Low 
Giving by ideological 
opponents 
0.0168 0.0512*** 0.0153 0.0524*** 
(0.0120) (0.0132) (0.0122) (0.0121) 
Giving by ideological 
allies 
0.0456** 0.0029 0.0261* 0.0032 
(0.0154) (0.0120) (0.0128) (0.0135) 
Giving by other firms -0.0460 0.1019 -0.0401 0.0701 
(0.0683) (0.0771) (0.0799) (0.0687) 
Firm size 0.0106*** 0.0064 0.0112* 0.0073* 
 (0.0028) (0.0048) (0.0046) (0.0030) 
ROA -0.1229 -0.2203* -0.2618** -0.1905* 
 (0.0782) (0.0929) (0.0828) (0.0875) 
R&D-to-sales ratio -0.1030 -0.1853*** -0.1092 -0.1684*** 
 (0.1643) (0.0547) (0.1303) (0.0413) 
Advertising-to-sales 
ratio 
-1.1589+ -0.3454   
(0.6425) (0.4751)   
Capex-to-sales ratio -0.0897 0.3131** -0.2163* 0.2519* 
 (0.0981) (0.1079) (0.0852) (0.0993) 
Board female ratio -0.1893* 0.2075** 0.0566 0.0375 
(0.0789) (0.0756) (0.0735) (0.0808) 
Lobbying-to-sales ratio 0.1669 1.5752*** 1.3998*** 0.4686 
(0.3615) (0.4253) (0.3774) (0.4070) 
CSR rating -0.0049 -0.0101** -0.0010 -0.0137*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0033) 
Population in HQ state 0.0002 0.0039 -0.0095 0.0252* 
(0.0078) (0.0109) (0.0070) (0.0117) 
Poverty rate in HQ state 0.0162*** 0.0041 0.0065 0.0133*** 
(0.0042) (0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0037) 
Market concentration   2.5124*** 0.2231 
  (0.6864) (0.8589) 
Constant -0.1080 -0.2136 0.1184 -0.2717 
 (0.2997) (0.3036) (0.2162) (0.2694) 
R2 0.3872 0.3219 0.3470 0.3236 
N 12318 13122 12648 12792 
Notes: Dependent variable is the dummy variable of advocacy giving of a focal firm in a 
given issue area in each year. Coefficients of OLS panel regressions with firm-issue and 
year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by firm-issue level are used. Standard 




Appendix Table 3.3. Comparison of main results in service giving 
 AM3 AM4 AM5 AM6 AM7 AM8 
Giving by industry 
peers 
0.0371*** 0.0277*** 0.0165*    
(0.0058) (0.0065) (0.0071)    
Giving by other firms -0.1069* -0.1109** 0.0551 -0.1022* -0.1132** 0.0469 
 (0.0433) (0.0412) (0.0447) (0.0433) (0.0412) (0.0447) 
Giving by ideological 
opponents 
   0.0273*** 0.0205*** 0.0172** 
   (0.0052) (0.0057) (0.0063) 
Giving by ideological 
allies 
   0.0241*** 0.0245*** 0.0122+ 
   (0.0053) (0.0059) (0.0064) 
Firm size 0.2202*** 0.0295 0.0299 0.2181*** 0.0288 0.0292 
 (0.0115) (0.0188) (0.0187) (0.0114) (0.0187) (0.0187) 
ROA 0.1380 -0.0477 -0.0369 0.1443 -0.0602 -0.0478 
 (0.2018) (0.2164) (0.2156) (0.2014) (0.2160) (0.2152) 
R&D-to-sales ratio 0.2692 -0.3209 -0.3168 0.1910 -0.3193 -0.3163 
 (0.3940) (0.4860) (0.4838) (0.3938) (0.4858) (0.4837) 
Advertising-to-sales 
ratio 
-1.1732 -4.6556* -4.6719* -1.0992 -4.5420* -4.5751* 
(1.1379) (2.2180) (2.2118) (1.1361) (2.2101) (2.2052) 
Capex-to-sales ratio -0.9607*** -0.1180 -0.1025 -0.9299*** -0.1743 -0.1430 
 (0.2344) (0.2872) (0.2861) (0.2345) (0.2874) (0.2863) 
Board female ratio 2.7573*** 1.4734*** 1.4852*** 2.7781*** 1.4653*** 1.4787*** 
 (0.2490) (0.3155) (0.3145) (0.2491) (0.3152) (0.3144) 
Lobbying-to-sales ratio 9.5440*** 7.8099*** 7.8148*** 9.6692*** 7.8513*** 7.8456*** 
(1.0898) (1.3619) (1.3583) (1.0901) (1.3595) (1.3567) 
CSR rating 0.0569*** -0.1002*** -0.1001*** 0.0547*** -0.1006*** -0.1004*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0176) (0.0175) (0.0141) (0.0176) (0.0175) 
Market concentration 7.7014*** 18.7688*** 18.8187*** 8.5269*** 17.9635*** 18.1415*** 
 (1.2875) (3.1883) (3.1774) (1.3108) (3.1850) (3.1724) 
Headquarter population -0.0284*** 0.1201+ 0.1207+ -0.0284*** 0.1231* 0.1227* 
(0.0035) (0.0626) (0.0623) (0.0035) (0.0626) (0.0624) 
Headquarter poverty 
rate 
0.0582*** 0.0582*** 0.0583*** 0.0601*** 0.0577*** 0.0579*** 
(0.0112) (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0112) (0.0156) (0.0156) 
Constant 3.3775*** -0.6753 -2.0499+ 3.0885*** -0.7631 -2.0283+ 
 (0.8686) (1.7213) (1.0674) (0.8682) (1.7165) (1.0644) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Issue FE Y Y  Y Y  
Firm FE  Y   Y  
Firm-Issue FE   Y   Y 
P-value in Chi-square test comparing  
giving by ideological opponents and allies 
0.7066 0.6361 0.5917 
R2 0.1670 0.4483 0.0050 0.1676 0.4485 0.0056 
N 71368 71368 71368 71368 71368 71368 
Notes: Dependent variable is the logged amount of service giving of a focal firm in a given issue area in 
each year. Coefficients of OLS panel regressions. Robust standard errors clustered by firm-issue level are 
used. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
